knew not well how to reconcile the Epiftle of St. James to the doctrine of juftification by faith alone, and fo he could not allow it to be divine. The Papifts bring all the Apocrypha into their bible, and stamp divinity upon it; for they can fancy purgatory is there, and there find prayers for the dead, But they leave out the fecond commandment because it forbids the worfhip of images. Others fuppofe the Mofaic hiftory of the creation and the fall of man to be oriental ornaments, or a mere allegory, because the literal fenfe of those three chapters of Genefis do not agree with their theories. Even an honeft plain-hearted and unlearned chriftian is ready to find fomething in every chapter of the bible to countenance his own private fentiments; but he loves thofe chapters beft which speak his own opinions plaineft; this is a prejudice that fticks very close to our natures; the fcholar is infested with it daily, and the mechanic is not free.

Self has yet a farther and a pernicious influence upon our understandings, and is an unhappy guide in the fearch after truth. When our own inclination or our ease, our honour or our profit tempt us to the practice of any thing of fufpected lawfulneis, how do we ftrain our thoughts to find arguments for it, and perfuade ourfelves it is lawful? We colour over iniquity and finful compliance with the names of virtue and innocence, or at leaft of constraint and neceffity. All the different and oppofite fentiments and practises of mankind are too much influenced by this mean bribery, and give too juft occafion for fatyrical writers to fay that felf-intereft governs all mankind.

When the judge had awarded the damages to a perfon into whose field a neighbour's oxen had broke it is reported that he reverfed his own fentence, when he heard that the oxen which had done this mifchief were his own. Whether this be a hiftory or a parable, it is ftill a juft reprefentation of the wretched influence of felf to corrupt the judgment.

One way to amend this prejudice is to thrust felf fo far out of the question, that it may have no manner of influence whenfoever we are called to judge and confider of the naked nature, truth and justice of things. In

matters of equity between man and man, our Saviour has taught us an effectual means of guarding against this prejudice, and that is to put my neighbour in the place of myfelf, and myfelf in the place of my neighbour, rather than be bribed by this corrupt principle of felf.love to do injury to our neighbours. Thence arifes that golden rule of dealing with others as we would have others deal with us.

In the judgment of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and evil, we ought to confider that every man has a felf as well as we; and that the tastes, paifions, inclinations and interests of different men are very different, and often contrary, and they dictate contrary things: unless therefore all manner of different and contrary propofitions could be true at once, felfcan never be a juft teft or standard of truth and falfehood, good and evil.

VI. The tempers, humours, and peculiar terms of the mind, whether they be natural or acquired, have a great influence upon our judgment, and become the occafion of many miflakes.. Let us furvey a few of

them.

(1.) Some perfons are of an eafy and credulous temper, while others are perpetually discovering a fpirit of contradiction.

The credulous man is ready to receive every thing for truth, that has but a fhadow of evidence; every new book that he reads, and every ingenious man with whom he converfes, has power enough to draw him. into the sentiments of the fpeaker or writer. He has fo much complaifance in him, or weakness of foul, that he is ready to refign his own opinion to the first objection which he hears, and to receive any fentiments of another that are afferted with a pofitive air and much affurance. Thus he is under a kind of neceflity through the indulgence of this credulous humour, either to be often changing his opinions or to believe inconfiftencies.

The man of contradiction is of a contrary humour, for he ftands ready to oppofe every thing that is faid: he gives a flight attention to the reafons of other men, for an inward fcornful prefumption that they have no ftrength

e

in them. When he reads or hears a difcourfe different from his own fentiments, he does not give himself leave to confider whether that difcourfe may be true; but employs all his powers. immediately to confute it. Your great difputers and your men of controverfy are in continual danger of this fort of prejudice: they contend often for victory, and will maintain whatfoever they have afferted, while truth is loft in the noise and tumult of reciprocal contradictions; and it frequently happens, that a debate about opinions is turned into a mutual reproach of perfons.

The prejudice of credulity may in fome measure be cured, by learning to fet a high value on truth, and by taking more pains to attain it; remembering that truth oftentimes lies dark and deep, and requires us to dig for it as hid treasure; and that falsehood often puts on a fair difguife, and therefore we should not yield up our judgment to every plausible appearance. It is no part of civility or good breeding to part with truth, but to maintain it with decency and candour.

A fpirit of contradiction is fo pedantic and hateful, that a man fhould take much pains with himself to watch against every inftance of it: He fhould learn fo much good humour, at leaft, as never to oppose any thing without juft and folid reafon for it: He fhould abate fome degrees of pride and morofeness, which are never-failing ingredients of this fort of temper, and fhould feek after fo much honefty and confcience as never to contend for conqueft or triumph; but to review his own reafons, and to read the arguments of his opponents (if poffible) with an equal indifferency, and be glad to ipy truth and to fubmit to it, though it appear on the oppofite fide.

(2.) There is another pair of prejudices derived from two tempers of mind, near a-kin to those I have just mentioned; and these a e the dogmatical and the fceptical humours, that is, always pofitive, or always doubting.

· By what means foever the dogmatist came by his opinions, whether by his fenfes, or by his fancy, his education, or his own reading, yet he believes them all with the fame affurance that he does a mathematical

truth; he has scarce any mere probabilites that belong to him; every thing with him is certain and infallible; every punctilio in religion is an article of his faith, and he answers all manner of objections by a fovereign con tempt.

Perfons of this temper are feldom to be convinced of any mistake: A full affurance of their own notions makes all the difficulties of their own fide vanish fo entirely that they think every point of their belief is written as with fun-beams, and wonder any one thould find a difficulty in it. They are amazed that learned men should make a controversy of what is to them so perfpicuous and indubitable. The loweft rank of people, both in learned and in vulgar life, is very fubject to this obftinacy.

Scepticifm is a contrary prejudice. The dogmatit is fure of every thing, and the fceptic believes nothing. Perhaps he has found himself often mistaken in matters of which he thought himself well affured in his younger days, and therefore he is afraid to give affent to any thing again. He fees fo much thew of reafon for every opinion, and fo many objections alfo arifing against every doctrine, that he is ready to throw off the belief. of every thing: He renounces at once the pursuit of truth, and contents himself to fay, There is nothing certain. It is well, if through the influence of fuch a temper, he does not caft away his religion as well as his philofophy, and abandon himself to a prophane courfe of life, regardless of hell and heaven.

Both these prejudices lalt mentioned, though they are fo oppofite to each other, yet they arife from the fame fpring, and that is, impatience of itudy, and want of diligent attention in the search of truth. The dogmatift is in hafte to believe fomething; he cannot keep himfelf long enough in fufpenfe, till fome bright and convincing evidence appear on one fide, but throws himfelf cafually into the fentiments of one party or another, and then he will hear no argument to the contrary. The fceptic will not take pains to fearch things to the bottom, but when he fees difficulties on both fides, refolves to believe neither of them. Humility of foul, patience in ftudy, diligence in inquiry, with an.

honeft zeal for truth, would go a great way towards the cure of both thefe follies.

(3) Another fort of temper that is very injurious to a right judgment of things, is an inconfiftent fickle, changeable fpirit, and a very uneven temper of mind. When fuch perfons are in one humour, they pass a judgment of things agreeable to it: when their humour changes, they reverse their first judgment, and embrace a new opinion. They have no fteadinefs of foul : they want firmness of mind, fufficient to establish themselves in any truth, and are ready to change it for the next alturing falfehood that is agreeable to their change of humour. This ficklenefs is fometimes fo mingled with their very conftitution by nature, or by distemper of body, that a cloudy day, and a lowring fky fhall ftrongly incline them to form an opinion both of themselves, and of perfons and things round about them, quite different from what they believe when the fun fhines, and the heavens are ferene.

This fort of people ought to judge of things and perfons in their moft fedate, peaceful, and compofed hours of life, and reserve thefe judgments for their conduct at more unhappy feafons.

(4.) Some perfons have a violent and turgid manner both of talking and thinking; whatsoever they judge of, it is always with a tincture of this vanity. They are always in extremes, and pronounce concerning every thing in the furperlative. If they think a man to be learned, he is the chief fcholar of the age: If another has low parts, he is the greatest blockhead in nature: If they approve any book on divine fubjects, it is the best book in the world next to the bible: If they speak of a storm of rain or hail, it is the moft terrible ftorm that fell fince the creation: And a cold winter day is the coldeft that ever was known.

But the men of this fwelling language ought to remember, that nature has ten thousand moderate things in it, and does not always deal in extremes as they do.

(5.) I think it may be called another fort of prejudices derived from humour, when fome men believe a doctrine merely because it is ancient, and has been