Rafh judgments are called prejudices, and fo are the fprings of them. This word in common life fignifies an ill opinion which we have conceived of fome other perfon, or fome injury done to him. But when we ufe the word in matters of fcience, it fignifies a judgment that is formed concerning any perfon or thing before fufficient examination; and generally we suppofe it to mean a falfe judgment or mistake: at least, it is an opinion taken up without solid reason for it, or an affent given to a propofition before we have juft e, vidence of the truth of it, though the thing itself may happen to be true.

Sometimes thefe rafh judgments are called prepoffeffions, whereby is meant, that fome particular opinion has poffeffed the mind, and engaged the affent without fufficient fearch or evidence of the truth of it.

There is a vast variety of these prejudices and prepoffeffions which attend mankind in every age and condition of life; they lay the foundations of many an error, and many an unhappy practice, both in the affairs of religion, and in our civil concernments; as well as in matters of learning. It is neceffary for a man who purfues truth to inquire into thefe fprings of error, that as far as poffible he may rid himself of old prejudices, and watch hourly against new ones.

The number of them is fo great, and they are so in terwoven with each other, as well as with the powers of human nature, that it is fometimes hard to diftin guifh them apart; yet, for method's fake, we fhall reduce them to thefe four general heads, (viz.) prejudices arising from things, or from words, from ourselves, or from other perfons; and after the defcription of each prejudice, we fhall propofe one or more ways of curing it.

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SECT. I.

Prejudices arifing from Things.

HE firft fort of prejudices are those which arife from the things themselves about which we judge.

But here let it be obferved that there is nothing in the nature of things that will neceffarily lead us into error, if we do but use our reafon aright, and with-hold our judgment till there appear fufficient evidence of them. But fince we are fo unhappily prone to take advantage of every doubtful appearance and circumftance of things, to form a wrong judgment and plunge ourselves into miftake, therefore it is proper to confider what there is in the things themselves that cafion our errors.:

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I. The obfcurity of fome truths, and the difficulty of fearching them out, is one occafion of rash and mistaken judgment.

Some truths are difficult, becaufe they lie remote from the first principles of knowledge, and want a long chain of argument to come at them: fuch are many of the deep things of algebra and geometry, and some of the theorems and problems of moft parts of the mathematics. Many things alfo in natural philofophy are dark and intricate upon this account, because we cannot come at any certain knowledge of them with out the labour of many and difficult, as well as chargeable experiments.

There are other truths which have great darkness upon them, because we have no proper means or mediums to come at the knowledge of them. Though in our age we have found out many of the deep things ef nature by the affiftance of glaffes and other instruments; yet we are not hitherto arrived at any fufficient matters to difcover the shape of thofe little particles of matter which diftinguish the various fapours, odours, and colours of bodies; nor to find what fort of atoms compofe liquids or folids, and diftinguish wood, minerals, metals, glass, fione, &c. There is a darknefs alfo lies upon the actions of the intellectual or angelical world; their manners of fubfiftence and agency, the power of fpirits to move bodies, and the union of our fouls with this animal body of ours, are much unknown to us on this account.

Now in many of thefe cafes, a great part of man kind is not content to be entirely ignorant, but they

rather chufe to form rafh and hafty judgment, to guess at things without juft evidence, to believe fomething concerning them before they can know them, and thereby they fall into error.

This fort of prejudice, as well as moft others, is cured by patience and diligence in inquiry and reasoning, and a fufpenfion of judgment, till we have attained fome proper mediums of knowledge, and till we fee fufficient evidence of the truth.

II. The appearance of things in a disguife, is another fpring of prejudice or rafh judgment. The outfide of things which firft ftrikes us, is oftentimes different from their inward nature, and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according to outward appearances. If a picture is daubed with many bright and glaring colours, the vulgar eye admires it as an excellent piece; whereas the fame perfon judges very contemptuoufly of some admirable defign sketched out only with a black pencil on a coarse paper, though by the hand of Raphael. So the scholar spies the name of a new book in public news-papers, he is charmed with the title, he purchases, he reads with huge expectations, and finds it all trafh and impertinence: this is a prejudice derived from the appearance: we are too ready to judge that volume valuable which had fo good a frontifpiece. The large head of encomiums and fwelling words of affurance that are bestowed on quack-medicines in public advertisements tempt many a reader to judge them infallible, and to use the pills or the plaifter with vaft hope, and frequent difappointment.

We are attempted to form our judgment of perfons as well as things by thefe outward appearances. Where there is wealth, equipage and fplendor we are ready to call that man happy, but we fee not the vexing dif quietudes of his foul and when we fpy a perion in ragged garments, we form a defpicable opinion of him too fuddenly: we can hardly think him either happy or wife, our judgment is fo ftrangely biaffed by outward and fenfible things. It was through the power of this prejudice that the Jews rejected our bleffed Saviour: they could not fuffer themselves to believe that the man

who appeared as the fon of a carpenter, was alfo the fon of God. And because St. Paul was of a little ftature, a mean prefence, and his voice contemptible, fome of the Corinthians were tempted to doubt whether he was infpired or no.

This prejudice is cured by a longer acquaintance with the world, and a just obfervation that things are fometimes better and fometimes worfe than they appear to be. We ought therefore to reftrain our exceffive forwardnefs to form our opinion of perfons or things before we have opportunity to fearch into them more perfectly. Remember that a grey beard does not make a philofopher; all is not gold that glifters; and a rough diamond may be worth an immense fum.

III. A mixture of different qualities in the fame thing, is another temptation to judge amifs. We are ready to be carried away by that quality which ftrikes the firft or the ftrongeft impreffions upon us, and we judge of the whole object according to that quality, regardlefs of all the rest: or fometimes we colour over all the other qualities with that one tincture, whether it be bad or good.

When we have just reason to admire a man for his virtues, we are fometimes inclined not only to neglect his weakneffes, but even to put a good colour upon them, and to think them amiable. When we read a book that has many excellent truths in it, and divine fentiments, we are tempted to approve not only that whole book, but even all the writings of that author. When a poet, an orator, or a painter, has performed admirably in feveral illuftrious pieces, we fometimes also admire his very errors, we mistake his blunders for beauties, and fo ignorantly fond as to copy after them.

It is this prejudice that has rendered fo many great fcholars perfect bigots, and inclined them to defend Homer or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in all their mistakes, and vindicate all the follies of their favourite author. It is this that tempts fome great writers to fupport the fayings of almoft all the ancient fathers of the church, and admire them in their very reveries.

On the other hand, if an author has profeffed heretical fentiments in religion, we throw our fcorn upon every thing he writes, we defpife even his critical or mathematical learning, and will hardly allow him common sense. If a poem has fome blemishes in it, there is a fet of falfe critics who decry it univerfally, and will allow no beauties there.

This fort of prejudice is relieved by learning to diftinguish things well, and not to judge in the lump. There is fcarce any thing in the world of nature or art, in the world of morality or religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a mixture of wifdom and folly, vice and virtue, good and evil, both in men and things. We should remember that fome perfons have great wit, and little judgment; others are judicious, but not witty. Some are good humoured without compliment; others have all the formalities of complaifance, but no good humour. We ought to know that one man may be vicious and learned, while another has virtue without learning. That many a man thinks admirably well who has a poor utterance; while others have a charming manner of speech, but their thoughts are trifling and impertinent. Some are good neighbours, and courteous and charitable toward men, who have no piety toward God; others are truly religious, but of morofe natural tempers. Some excellent fayings are found in very filly books, and fome filly thoughts appear in books of value. We should neither praife nor difpraise by wholefale, but feparate the good from the evil, and judge of them apart; the accuracy of a good judgment confifts much in making fuch distinctions.

Yet let it be noted too, that in common difcourfe we ufually denominate persons and things according to the major part of their character. He is to be called a wife man who has but few follies: he is a good philofopher who knows much of nature, and for the most part reasons well in matters of human science : and that book fhould be efteemed well written, which has much more of good fense in it than it has of impertinence.

IV. Though a thing be uniform in its own nature, yet the different lights in which it may be placed, and the different views in which it appears to us, will be P