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is when one truth is inferred or drawn from others by natural and just methods of argument: as, if there be much light at midnight, I infer, it proceeds from the moon because the fun is under the earth*. If I fee a cottage in a forest, I conclude fome man has been there and built it. Or when I furvey the heavens and earth this gives evidence to my reason, that there is a God' who made them.

The propofitions which I believe upon this kind of evidence, are called conclufions, or rational truths, and the knowledge that we gain this way is properly called fcience.

Yet let it be noted, that the word fcience is ufually applied to a whole body of regular or methodical ebfervations or propofitions which learned men have formed concerning any subject of speculation, deriving one truth from another by a train of arguments. If this knowledge chiefly directs our practice, it is ufually called an art. And this is the most remarkable dif tinction between an art and a science, (viz.) the one refers chiefly to practice, the other to fpeculation. Natural philofophy, or phyfic, and ontology, are fciences; logic and rhetoric are called arts;, but mathematics include both art and science; for they have much of spe. culation, and much of practice in them.

Obferve here, that when the evidence of a propofi tion derived from fenfe, confcioufnefs, intelligence, or reafon is firm and indubitable, it produces fuch affent as we call a natural certainty.

V. When we derive the evidence of any proposition from the testimony of others, it is called the evidence of faith; and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten thousand things there are which we believe merely upon the authority or credit of those who have spok en or written of them. It is by this evidence that we know there is fuch a country as China, and there was fuch a man as Cicero who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that most of the tranfactions in human life are managed: we know our parents and our kindred by this,

*Note, Since this book was written, we have fo many appearances of the aurora borealis as reduces this inference only to a probability.

means, we know the perfons and laws of our préfent: governors, as well as things that are at a vast distance from us in foreign nations, or in ancient ages..

According as the perfons that inform us of any thing. ́are many or few, or more or lefs wife, and faithful, and credible, fo our faith is more or lefs firm or wavering, and the proposition believed is either certain or doubtful; but in matters of faith, an exceeding great probability is called a moral certainty.

Faith is generally distinguished into divine and hu-man, not with regard to the propositions that are believed, but with regard to the teftimony upon which we believe them. When God reveals any thing to us, this gives us the evidence of divine faith; but what man only acquaints us with, produces a human faith in us; the one, being built upon the word of man, arifes but to moral certainty; but the other being founded on : the word of God, arises to an absolute and infallible: affurance, fo far as we understand the meaning of this. word This is called fupernatural certainty.

Propofitions which we believe upon the evidence of human teftimony, are called. narratives, relations, reports, hiftorical obfervations, &c. but fuch as are built. on divine teftimony, are termed, matters of revelation;, and if they are of great importance in religion, they are called articles of faith..

There are fome propofitions or parts of knowledge,, which are faid to be derived from observation and ex--perience, that is experience in ourfelves, and the ob fervations we have made on other perfons or things; but these are made up of fome of the former fprings of knowledge joined together, (viz.) fenfe, confcioufness, reason, faith, &c. and therefore are not reckoned a diftinct kind of evidence.

VI. Infpiration is a fort of evidence diftinct from all the former, and that is when fuch an overpowering impreffion of any propofitions is made upon the mind by God himself, that gives a convincing and indubitable evidence of the truth and divinity of it; fo were the prophets and the apoftles infpired.*

*Note here, I fpeak chiefly of the highest kind of infpiration.

Sometimes God may have been pleased to make use: of the outward fenfes, or the inward workings of the imagination, of dreams, apparitions, vifions and voices, or reasoning, or perhaps human narration, to convey divine truths to the mind of the prophet; but none of thefe would be fufficient to deserve the name of inspi ration, without a fuperior or divine light and power attending them.

This fort of evidence is also very diftinct from what we ufually call divine faith; for every common chriftian exercifes divine faith when he believes any proposition which God has revealed in the bible upon this account, because God has faid it, though it was by a train of reasonings that he was led to believe that this is the word of God: whereas in the case of inspira. tion, the prophet not only exercifes divine faith, in believing what God reveals, but he is under a fuperior heavenly impreffion, light and evidence, whereby he is affured that God reveals it. This is the most eminent kind of fupernatural certainty.

Though perfons might be affured of their own infpiration by fome peculiar and inexpreffible confcioufnefs of this divine infpiration and evidence in their own fpirits, yet it is hard to make out this infpiration to others, and to convince them of it, except by fome an tecedent or confequent prophecies or miracles, or some public appearances more than human.

The propofitions which are attained by this fort of evidence are called infpired truths. This is divine revelation at first hand, and the dictates of God in an immediate manner, of which theological writers difcourse at large, but fince it belongs only to a few favourites of heaven to be inspired, and not the bulk of mankind, it is not neceffary to fpeak more of it in a treatise of logic, which is defigned for the general improvement of human reafon.

The various kinds of evidence upon which we behieve any propofition, afford us thefe three remarks:

I. Remark. The fame propofition may be known to us by different kinds of evidence that the whole is bigger than a part is known by our fenfes, and it is

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known by the felf-evidence of the thing to our mind.. That God created the heavens and the earth is known to us by reason, and is known alfo by divine testimony or faith.

II. Remark. Among those various kinds of evidence,. fome are generally stronger than others in their own nature, and give a better ground for certainty. Inward confcioufnefs and intelligence, as well as divine faith and infpiration, usually carry much more force with them than sense or human faith, which are often fallible; though there are inftances wherein human faith, fenfe and reafoning lay a foundation alfo for complete affurance, and leave no room for doubt.

Reason in its own nature would always lead us into the truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, or it would require us to fufpend our judgment where there is want of evidence. But it is our floth, precipitancy, fenfe, paffion, and many other things that lead our reafon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect eftate hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty of fo many errors in reafoning, especially about divine things, because our reafon either is bufy to enquire, and refolved to determine about matters that are above our prefent reach; or because we mingle many prejudices and fecret influences of fenfe, fancy, paffion, inclination, &c. with our exercises of reafon, and judge and determine according to thefe irregular influences.

Divine faith would never admit of any controversies ́or doubtings, if we were but affured that God had spoken, and that we rightly understood his meaning.

IH. Remark. The greateft evidence and certainty of any propofition does not depend upon the variety of the ways or kinds of evidence, whereby it is known, but rather upon the ftrength and degree of evidence, and the clearness of that light in or by which it appears to the mind. For a propofition that is known only one way may be much more certain, and have ftronger evidence than another that is fuppofed to be known many ways. Therefore thefe propofitions, nothing has no properties, nothing cannot make itself, which are known only by intelligence, are much furer and truer than this propofition, the rainbow has real and inherent co

lours in it, or than this, the fun rolls round the earth; though we feem to know both these last by our senses, and by the common teftimony of our neighbours. So any propofition that is clearly evident to our consciouf, nefs of divine faith, is much more certain to us than a thousand others that have only the evidence of feeble and obfcure fenfations, of more probable reafonings and doubtful arguments, or the witnefs of fallible men, or even though all these should join together..

CHAP. III. .

THE SPRINGS OF FALSE JUDGMENT, OR THE DOCE TRINE OF PREJUDICES.

INTRODUCTION.

N the end of the foregoing chapter we have furvey

IN

ed the feveral forts of evidence, on which we build our affent to propofitions. Thefe are indeed the general grounds upon which we form our judgments concerning things. What remains in this fecond part of logic is to point out the feveral springs and caufes of our mistakes in judging, and to lay down some rules by which we fhould conduct ourselves in paffing a judgment of every thing that is propofed to us.

I confefs many things which will be mentioned in thefe following chapters might be as well referred to the third part of logic, where we shall treat of reasoning and argument; for most of our falfe judgments, feem to include a fecret bad reasoning, in them; and while we fhew the fprings of error, and the rules of true judgment, we do at the fame time discover which arguments are fallacious, which reafonings are weak,, and which are just and strong. Yet fince this is ufually called a judging ill, or judging well, I think we may, without any impropriety, treat of it here; and this will lay a surer foundation for all forts of ratiocination and argument.

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