plain and strong, we cannot with-hold our affent; we thould then be neceffarily expofed to believe falfhood, if complete evidence fhould be found in any propofitions that are not true. But furely the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness would never oblige his creatures to be thus deceived; and therefore he would never have conftituted us of fuch a frame as would render it naturally impoffible to guard against error.

Another confequence is naturally derived from the former; and that is, that the only reafon why we fall into a mistake is because we are impatient to form a judgment of things before we have a clear and evident perception of their agreement or difagreement; and if we will make hafte to judge while our ideas are obscure and confused, or before we fee whether they agree or difagree, we fhall plunge ourselves into perpetual errors. See more on this fubject in an effay on the freedom of will in God and man; published 1732. Sect. 1. p. 13.

Note, What is here afferted concerning the neceflity of clear and diftinct ideas refer chiefly to propofitions, which we form ourselves by our own powers: as for propofitions which we derive from the teftimony of others, they will be accounted for in chap. IV.

SECT. VIII.

Of certain and dubious Propofitions, of Knowledge and

SINCE

Opinion.

INCE we have found that evidence is the great criterion and the fure mark of truth; this leads us directly to confider propofitions according to their evidence; and here we mnft take notice both of the different degrees of evidence, and the different kinds of it.

Propofitions according to their different degrees of evidence are diftinguished into certain and dubious.*

*It may be objected, that this certainty and uncertainty being only in the mind, the divifion belongs to propofitions rather according.

Where the evidence of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas is fo ftrong and plain, that we cannot forbid or delay our affent, the propofition is called certain; as, every circle hath a centre; the world did not create itself. An affent to fuch propofitions is honoured with the name of knowledge.

But when there is any obfcurity upon the agreement or disagreement of the ideas, fo that the mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not compelled to affent or diffent, then the propofition, in a proper and philofophical fenfe, is called doubtful or uncertain; as, the planets are inhabited; the fouls of brutes are mere matter; the world will not ftand a thousand years longer; Dido built the city of Carthage, &c. Such uncertain propofitions are called opinions.

When we confider ourfelves as philofophers or fearchers of truth, it would be well if we always fufpended a full judgment or determination about any thing, and made further inquiries, where this plain and perfect evidence is wanting; but we are fo prone of ourselves to judge without full evidence, and in fome cafes the neceffity of action in the affairs of life, constrains us to judge and determine upon a tolerable degree of evidence, that we vulgarly call thofe propositions certain, where we have but very little room or reafon to doubt of them, though the evidence be not complete or resiftless.

Certainty, according to the schools, is distinguished into objective and fubjective. Objective certainty is when the proposition is certainly true in itfelf; and fubjective, when we are certain of the truth of it. The one is in things, the other is in our minds.

But let it be obferved here, that every proposition in itself is certainly true, or certainly falfe. For tho' doubtfulness or uncertainty feems to be a medium be

to the degrees of our affent, than the degrees of evidence. But it may well be anfwered, that the evidence here intended is that which appears fo to the mind and not the mere evidence in the nature of things; befides, (as we fhall fhew immediately) the degree of affent ought to be exactly proportionable to the degree of evidence: and therefore the difference is not great, whether propofitions be called certain or uncertain, according to the meafure of evidence, or of affent.

tween certain truth and certain falfhood in our minds, yet there is no fuch medium in things themselves, no, not even in future events: for now at this time it is certain in itself, that Midfummer-day feven years hence will be ferene, or it is certain it will be cloudy, though we are uncertain and utterly ignorant what fort of day it will be this certainty of diftant futurities is known to God only.

Uncertain or dubious propofitions, that is, opinions, are diftinguished into probable, or improbable.

When the evidence of any propofition is greater than the evidence of the contrary, then it is a probable opinion: where the evidence and arguments are stronger on the contrary fide, we call it improbable. But while the arguments on either fide feem to be equally ftrong, and the evidence for and against any propofition appears equal to the mind, then in common language we call it a doubtful matter. We alfo call it a dubious or doubtful propofition, when there is no argument on either fide, as next Christmas-day will be a very sharp froft. And in general all these propofitions are doubtful, wherein we can perceive no fufficient marks or evidences of truth or falfhood. In such a cafe, the mind which is fearching for truth ought to remain in a ftate of doubt or fufpence, until fuperior evidence on one fide or the other incline the balance of the judgment, and determine the probability or certainty to the one fide,

A great many propofitions which we generally believe or difbelieve in human affairs, or in the sciences, have very various degrees of evidence, which yet arife not to complete certainty, either of truth or falfhood. Thus it comes to pafs that there are fuch various and almost infinite degrees of probability and improbability. To a weak probability we thould give a weak affent; and a stronger affent is due where the evidence is greater, and the matter more probable. If we proportion our affent in all things to the degrees of evidence, we do the utmost that human nature is capable of in a rational way to fecure itself from error.

SECT. IX.

Of Senfe, Consciousness, Intelligence, Reafon, Faith, and Infpiration.

A

FTER we have confidered the evidence of propofitions in the various degrees of it, we come to furvey the feveral kinds of evidence, or the different ways whereby truth is let into the mind, and which produce accordingly several kinds of knowledge. We thall diftribute them into these fix, (viz.) sense, conscioufnefs, intelligence, reason, faith, and inspiration, and then diftinguish the propofitions which are derived from them.

1. The evidence of fenfe is when we frame a propofition according to the dictate of any of our senses; fo we judge that grafs is green; that a trumpet gives a pleafant found; the fire burns wood; water is foft, and iron is hard for we have seen, heard or felt all these. It is upon this evidence of fenfe that we know and believe the daily occurrences in human life; and almoft all the hiftories of mankind that are written, by eye or ear witneffes are built upon this principle.

Under the evidence of fense we do not only include that knowledge which is derived to us by our outward fenfes of hearing, feeing, feeling, tafting, and smelling, but that alfo which is derived from the inward fenfations and appetites of hunger, thirst, eafe, pleasure, pain, wearinefs, reft, &c. and all thofe things which belong to the body; as, hunger is a painful appetite; light is pleasant; reft is fweet to the weary limbs.

Propofitions which are built on this evidence, may be named fenfible propofitions, or the dictates of fense..

II. As we learn what belongs to the body by the evidence of fenfe, fo we learn what belongs to the foul by an inward confciousness, which may be called a fort of internal feeling, or fpiritual fenfation of what paffes in the mind; as, I think before I speak; I defire large

knowledge; I fufpect my own practice; I ftudied hard to day; my confcience bears witnefs of my fincerity: my foul hates vain thoughts; fear is an uneafy passion; long meditation on one thing is tiresome.

Thus it appears that we obtain the knowledge of a multitude of propofitions, as well as of fingle ideas, by those two principles which Mr Locke calls fenfation and reflection: one of them is a fort of consciousness. of what affects the body, and the other is a confcioufnefs of what paffes in the mind.

Propofitions which are built on this internal confcioufness, have yet no particular or diftinguishing name affigned to them:

III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abftracted. propofitions which carry their own evidence with them, and admit no doubt about them. Our perception of this felf-evidence in any proposition is called intelligence. It is our knowledge of thofe first principles of truth which are (as it were) wrought into the very nature and make of our mind: they are fo evident in themselves to every man who attends to them, that they need no proof. It is the prerogative and peculiar excellence of thefe propofitions, that they can fcarce. ever be proved or denied: they cannot eafily be proved, because there is nothing fuppofed to be more clear or certain, from which an argument may be drawn to prove them. They cannot well be denied, because their own evidence is fo bright and convincing, that affoon as the terms are understood the mind neceffarily affents; fuch are thefe, whatsoever acteth hath a being; nothing has no properties; a part is lefs than the whole; nothing can be the cause of itself.

Thele propofitions are called axioms, or maxims, or first principles, thefe are the very foundations of all im.. proved knowledge and reafonings, and on this account. thefe have been thought to be innate propofitions, or truths born with us.

Some fuppofe that a great part of the knowledge of angels and human fouls in the feparate ftate is obtained in this manner, (viz.) by fuch an immediate view of things in their own nature, which is called intuition.. IV. Reafoning is the next fort of evidence, and that