reason as the former, viz. That our minds are narrow and fcanty in their capacities, and as they are not able to confider all the parts of a complex idea at once, fo neither can they at once contemplate all the different attributes and circumstances of it: we must therefore confider things fucceffively and gradually in their various appearances and circumstances: as our natural eye cannot at once behold the fix fides of a dye or cube, nor take cognizance of all the points that are marked on them, and therefore we turn up the fides fucceffively, and thus furvey and number the points that are marked on each fide, that we may know the whole.

In order to a comprehenfive view of any idea we must first confider, whether the object of it has an existence as well as an effence; whether it be a simple or complex idea; whether it be a substance or a mode: if it be a fubftance, then we muft enquire what are the effential modes of it, which are neceffary to its nature, and what are those properties or accidents of it, which belong to it occafionally, or as it is placed in fome particular circumftances: we must view it in its internal and abfolute modes, and obferve it in those various external relations in which it stands to other beings: we must consider it in its powers and capacities either to do or fuffer: we must trace it up to its various caufes, whether fupreme or fubordinate. We must defcend to the variety of its effects, and take notice of its feveral ends and designs which are to be attained by it. We must conceive of it as it is either an object or a fubject; what are the things that are a-kin to it, and what are the oppofites or contraries of it; for many things are to be known both by their contrary and their kindred ideas.

If the thing we difcourfe of be a mere mode, we muft inquire whether it belongs to fpirits or bodies; whether it be a physical or moral mode: if moral, then we must confider its relation to God, to ourselves, to our neighbours; its reference to this life, or the life to If it be a virtue, we muft feek what are the principles of it, what are the rules of it, what are the tendencies of it, and what are the falfe virtues that counterfeit it, and what are the real vices that oppose

come.

it, what are the evils which attend the neglect of it, what are the rewards of the practice of it both here and hereafter.

If the fubject be historical or a matter of fact, we may then inquire whether the action was done at all; whether it was done in fuch a manner, or by such perfons as is reported; at what time it was done; in what place; by what motive, and for what defign; what is the evidence of the fact; who are the witneffes; what is their character and credibility; what figns there are of fuch a fact; what concurrent teftimonies which may either fupport the truth of it, or render it doubtful.

In order to make due inquiries into all these and many other particulars which go towards the complete and comprehenfive idea of any being, the science of ontology is exceeding neceffary. This is what was wont to be called the first part of metaphyfics in the peripatetic fchools. It treats of being in its moft general nature, and of all its affections and relations. I confess the old popish schoolmen have mingled a number of useless fubtilties with this science; they have exhaufted their own spirits, and the fpirits of their readers in many laborious and intricate trifles, and fome of their writings have been fruitful of names without ideas, which hath done much injury to the facred study of divinity. Upon this account many of the moderns have moft unjustly abandoned the whole science at once, and thrown abundance of contempt and raillery upon the very name of metaphyfics; but this contempt and cenfure is very unreafonable, for this science separated from fome Ariftotelian fooleries and fcholaftic fubtilties, is fo neceffary to a diftinct conception, solid judgment, and just reafoning on many fubjects, that fometimes it is introduced as a part of logic, and not without reafon. And thofe who utterly despise and ridicule it, either betray their own ignorance, or will be fuppofed to make their wit and banter a refuge and excufe for their own laziness. Yet thus much I would add, that the late writers of ontology are generally the beft on this account, because they have left out much of the ancient jargon. See the brief scheme of ontology in the philofophical effays by I. W.

Here let it be noted that it is neither useful, neceffary, or poffible to run through all the modes, circumftances, and relations of every subject we take in hand; but in ontology we enumerate a great variety of them, that fo a judicious mind may choose what are thofe circumstances, relations and properties of any fubject, which are most neceffary to the prefent defign of him that speaks or writes, either to explain, to illustrate, or to prove the point.

As we arrive at the complete knowledge of an idea in all its parts, by that act of the mind which is called divifion, fo we come to a comprehenfive conception of a thing in its feveral properties and relations, by that act of the mind which is called abftraction, that is, we confider each fingle relation or property of the subject alone, and thus we do as it were withdraw and separate it in our minds both from the fubject itself, as well as from other properties and relations, in order to make a fuller observation of it.

This act of abftraction is faid to be two-fold, either precifive or negative.

Precisive abstraction is when we confider those things apart which cannot really exift apart as when we confider a mode, without confidering its fubftance and fubject, or one effential mode without another. Negative abftraction is when we confider one thing feparate from another, which may also exift without it; as when we conceive of a fubject without conceiving of its accidental modes or relations; or when we conceive of one accident without thinking of another. If I think of reading or writing, without the exprefs idea of fome man, this is precifive abftraction; or if I think of the attraction of iron, without the exprefs idea of forne particular magnetic body. But when I think of a needle, without an idea of its fharpnefs, this is negative abstraction; and it is the fame when I think of its fharpnefs without confidering its length.

SECT. X.

Of the extenfive Conception of Things, and of Distribution.

A$

S the completeness of an idea, refers to the feveral parts that compofe it, and the comprehenfion of an idea includes various properties, fo the extenfion of an idea denotes the various forts or kinds of beings to which the fame idea belongs; and if we would be fully acquainted with a fubject we muft obferve.

This fourth rule to direct our conceptions, viz. Conceive of things in all their extenfion, that is, we must fearch out the various fpecies or special natures which are contained under it as a genus or general nature. If we would know the nature of an animal perfectly, we must take cognizance of beafts, birds, fishes and infects, as well as men, all which are contained under the general nature and name of animal.

As an integral whole is diftinguifhed into its feveral parts by divifion, fo the word diftribution is moft properly used when we diftinguifh an univerfal whole into its feveral kinds of fpecies; and perhaps it had been better if this word had been always confined to this fignification, though it must be confeffed, that we frequently fpeak of the divifion of an idea into its feveral kinds, as well as into feveral parts.

The rules of a good diftribution are much the fame with those which we have before applied to divifion, which may be just repeated again in the briefeft manner, in order to give examples to them.

I. Rule. Each part fingly taken must contain less than the whole, but all the parts taken collectively or together, muft contain neither more nor less than the whole; or as logicians fometimes exprefs it, the parts of the divifion ought to exhauft the whole thing which is divided. So medicine is justly diftributed into prophylactic, or the art of perferving health; and therapeutic, or the art of reftoring health: for there is no other fort of medicine

befides these two. But men are not well diftributed into tall or fhort, for there are some of a middle ftature. II. Rule. In all distributions we should first confider the larger and more immediate kinds of species, or ranks of being, and not divide a thing at once into the more minute and remote. A genus fhould not at once be divided into individuals, or even into the loweft fpecies, if there be a species fuperior. Thus it would be very improper to divide animal into trout, lobfter, eel, dog, bear, eagle, dove, worm and butterfly, for these are inferior kinds; whereas animal ought first to be diftributed into man, beaft, bird, fish, infect; and then beast, fhould be diftributed into dog, bear, &c. bird into eagle, dove, &c. fish into trout, eel, lobfter, &c.

It is irregular alfo to join any inferior fpecies in the farne rank or order with the fuperior; as if we would distinguish animals into birds, bears and oyfters, &, It would be a ridiculous diftribution.

III. Rule. The feveral parts of a diftribution ought to be oppofite; that is, one fpecies or class of beings in the fame rank of divifion ought not to contain or include another; fo men ought not to be divided into the rich, the poor, the learned, and the tall, for poor men may be both learned and tall, and fo may the rich.

But it will be objected, are not animated bodies rightly distributed into vegetative and animal, or (as they are usually called) fenfitive? now the fenfitive contains the vegetative nature in it, for animals grow as well as plants. I anfwer, that in this and all fuch diftributions, the word vegetative fignifies merely vegeta-" tive and in this fenfe vegetative will be fufficiently oppofite to animal, for it cannot be faid of an animal that it contains mere vegetation in the idea of it.

IV. Rule. Let not fubdivifions be too numerous without neceffity; therefore I think quantity is better diftinguished at once into a line, a furface, and a folid, than to fay as Ramus does, that quantity is either a line, or a thing lined; and a thing lined is either a furface or a folid.

V. Rule. Diftribute every fubject according to the Special defign you have in view, fo far as is neceffary or useful to your prefent inquiry. Thus a politician diftributes man