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4. There is a logical whole, which is also called an universal; and the parts of it are all the particular ideas to which this universal nature extends. So a genus is a whole in respect of the several species which are its parts. So the species is a whole, and all the individuals are the parts of it. This Thall be treated of in the fourth rule to guide our conceptions.

At present we consider an idea as an integral whole, and our second rule directs us to contemplate it in all its part3 ; but this can only refer to complex ideas, for simple ideas have no parts.


Of Definition, and the Rules of it.

VINCE our minds are narrow in their capacities, D and cannot survey the several parts of any complex being with one single view, as God sees all things at once ; therefore we must as it were take it to pieces, and consider of the parts separately, that we may have a more complete conception of the whole. So if I would learn the nature of a watch, the workman takes it to pieces, and shews me the spring, the wheels, the axles, the pinions, the balance, the dial-plate, the pointer, the cafe, &c. and describes each of these things to me apart, together with their figures and their uses. If I would know what an animal is, the anatomist confiders the head, the trunk, the limbs, the bowels, apart from each other, and gives me distinct lectures upon each of them. So a kingdom is divided into its several provinces; a book into its several chapters; and any science is divided according to the several subjects of which it treats.

This is what we properly call the division of an idea, which is an explication of the whole by its several parts, or an enumeration of its several parts, that go to compose any whole idea, and to render it complete. And I think when man is divided into body and soul, it properly comes under this part of the doctrine of integral division, as well as when the mere body is divided into head, trunk, and limbs: this division is sometimes called partition

When any of the parts of any idea are yet farther divided in order to a clear explication of the whole, this is called a subdivision; as when a year is divided into months, each month into days, and each day into hours, which may also be farther subdivided into minutes and seconds.

It is necessary in order to the full explication of any being, to consider each part, and the properties of it, distinct by itself, as well as in its relation to the whole: for there are many properties that belong to the several parts of a being, which cannot properly be ascribed to the whole, though these properties may fit each part for its proper station, and as it stands in that relation to the whole complex being : as in a house, the doors are moveable, the rooms iquare, the cielings white, the windows transparent, yet the house is neither moveable, nor square, nor white, nor transparent.

The special rules of a good division are these. I. Rule. Each part fingly taken must contain less than the whole, but all the parts taken collectively (or together) must contain neither more nor less than the whole. Therefore in discoursing of a tree you divide it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect division, because the root and the branches are needful to make up the whole. So logic.would be ill divided into apprehenfion, judgment, and reasoning; for method is a considerable part of the art which teaches us to use our reason right, and should by no means be omitted.

Upon this account, in every division wherein we de. lign a perfect exactness, it is necessary to examine the whole idea with diligence, lest we omit any part of it through want of care ; though in some cases it is not possible, and in others it is not necessary, that we should descend to the ininutest parts.

II. Rule. In all divisions we bould first consider the larger and more immediate parts of the subject, and not di

vide it at once into the more minute and remote parts. It would by no means be proper to divide a kingdom firit into streets, and lanes, and fields, but it must be firft divided into provinces or counties, then those counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, fc. and towns into streets and lanes.

III. Rule. The several parts of a divifon ought to be opposite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. It would be a ridiculous division of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the brains are contained in the head.

Yet here it must be noted, that sometimes the fubjects of any treatise, or the objects of any particular science may be properly and neceffarily fo divided, that the second may include the first, and the third may include the first and second, without offending against this rule, because in the second or following parts of the science or discourse, these objects are not confidered in the same manner as in the first; as for instance, geometry divides its objects into lines, surfaces and folids : now though a line be contained in a surface, or a folid, yet it is not considered in a surface, separate and alone, or az a mere line, as it is in the first part of geometry, which treats of lines. So logic is rightly divided into conception, judgment, reasoning, and method. · For though ideas or conceptions are contained in the following parts of logic, yet they are not there treated of as separate ideas, which are the proper subject of the first part.

IV. Rule. Let not subdivisions be too numerous without neceffity; for it is better many times to distinguish more parts at once if the subject will bear it, than to mince the discourse by excessive dividing and subdividing. It is preferable therefore in a treatise of geography to say, that in a city we will consider its walls; its gates, its buildings, its streets, and lanes, than to divide it formal. ly first into the encompailing and encompaffed parts ; the encompassing parts are the walls and gates; the encompassed part includes the ways and the buildings; the ways are the streets and lanes ; buildings congit of the foundations and the superstructure, &c.

Too great a number of subdivifions has been affecta. ed by some persons in fermons, treatises, instructions, &c. under pretence of greater accuracy: but this sort of subtilties hath often given great confusion to the understanding, and sometimes more difficulty to the memory. In these cases it is only a good judgment can determine what subdivisions are needful.

V. Rule. Divide every subject according to the special design you have in view. One and the same idea or subject may be divided in very different manners, according to the different purposes we have in discourfing of it. So if a printer were to consider the several parts of a book, he must divide it into sheets, the sheets into pages, the pages into lines, and the lines into letters. But a grammarian divides a book into periods, fentences and words, or parts of speech, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A logician considers a book as divided into chapters, fections, arguments, propositions, ideas; and with the help of ontology, he divides the propofitions into subject, object, property, relation, action, passion, cause, effect, &c. But it would be very ridiculous for a logician to divide a book into sheets, pages, and lines ; or for a printer to divide it into nouns and pronouns, or into propositions, ideas, properties or causes.

VI. Rule. In all your divisions observe with greatest exactness the nature of things. And here I am constrained to make a subdivision of this rule into two very neceffary particulars.

(1.) Let the parts of your division be such as are properly distinguished in nature. Do not divide asunder those parts of the idea which are intimately united in nature, nor unite those things into one part which nature has evidently disjoined: this would be very improper in treating of an animal body, to divide it into the superior and inferior halves : for it would be hard to say how much belongs by nature to the inferior half, and how much to the superior. Much more improper would it be still to divide the animal into the righthand parts and left-hand parts, which would bring greater confusion. This would be as unnatural as a man who should cleave a halel-nut in halves through the husk, the shell, and the kernel, at once, and say ? nut is divided into these two parts; whereas nature

leads plainly to the threefold-distinction of husk, fhell, and kernel. .. . (2.) Do not affect duplicities nor triplicities, nor any certain number of parts in your division of things ; for we know of no such certain number of parts which God the creator has observed in forming all the varie. tiez of his creatures, nor is there any uniform deter. mined number of parts in the various subjects of human art or science ; yet some persons have disturbed the ore der of nature, and abused their readers by an affecta. tion of dichotomies, trichotomies, fevens, twelves, &c. Let the nature of the subject, considered together with the design which you have in view, always determine the number of parts into which you divide it.

After all it must be confessed that an intimate knowledge of things, and a judicious observation will affift in the business of division, as well as of definition, better than too nice and curious an attention to the mere formalities of logical writers, without a real acquainta ance with things.

SECT. IX. . Of a comprehensive Conception of Things, and of Alba


THE third rule to direct our conception requires

1 us to conceive of things comprehenfively. And we must survey an object in all its parts to obtain a complete idea of it, so we must consider it in all its modes, attributes, properties, and relations, in order to obtain a comprehensive conception of it.

The comprehension of an idea, as it was explained under the doctrine of universals, includes only the es. sential modes or attributes of that idea; but in this place the word is taken in a larger sense, and implies also the various occasional properties, accidental modes and relations.

The neceflity cf this rule is founded upon the same

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