4. There is a logical whole, which is alfo called an univerfal; and the parts of it are all the particular ideas to which this universal nature extends. So a genus is a whole in refpect of the feveral fpecies which are its parts. So the fpecies is a whole, and all the individuals are the parts of it. This thall be treated of in the fourth rule to guide our conceptions.

At prefent we confider an idea as an integral whole, and our fecond rule directs us to contemplate it in all its parts; but this can only refer to complex ideas, for fimple ideas have no parts.

SECT. VIII.

Of Definition, and the Rules of it.

INCE our minds are narrow in their capacities,

SINC

and cannot survey the feveral parts of any complex being with one fingle view, as God fees all things at once; therefore we must as it were take it to pieces, and confider of the parts separately, that we may have a more complete conception of the whole. So if I would learn the nature of a watch, the workman takes it to pieces and fhews me the fpring, the wheels, the axles, the pinions, the balance, the dial-plate, the pointer, the cafe, &c. and defcribes each of these things to me apart, together with their figures and their uses. If I would know what an animal is, the anatomist confiders the head, the trunk, the limbs, the bowels, apart from each other, and gives me diftinct lectures upon each of them. So a kingdom is divided into its feveral provinces; a book into its feveral chapters; and any fcience is divided according to the feveral fubjects of which it treats.

This is what we properly call the divifion of an idea, which is an explication of the whole by its several parts, or an enumeration of its feveral parts, that go to compofe any whole idea, and to render it complete.

And I think when man is divided into body and foul, it properly comes under this part of the doctrine of integral divifion, as well as when the mere body is divided into head, trunk, and limbs: this divifion is fometimes called partition.

When any of the parts of any idea are yet farther divided in order to a clear explication of the whole, this is called a fubdivifion; as when a year is divided into months, each month into days, and each day into hours, which may also be farther fubdivided into minutes and feconds.

It is neceffary in order to the full explication of any being, to confider each part, and the properties of it, diftinct by itself, as well as in its relation to the whole: for there are many properties that belong to the feveral parts of a being, which cannot properly be afcribed to the whole, though thefe properties may fit each part for its proper ftation, and as it ftands in that relation to the whole complex being: as in a house, the doors are moveable, the rooms iquare, the cielings white, the windows tranfparent, yet the houfe is neither moveable, nor fquare, nor white, nor transparent.

The Special rules of a good divifion are thefe.

I. Rule. Each part fingly taken muft contain less than the whole, but all the parts taken collectively (or together) must contain neither more nor less than the whole. Therefore in difcourfing of a tree you divide it into the trunk and leaves, it is an imperfect divifion, because the root and the branches are needful to make up the whole. So logic.would be ill divided into apprehenfion, judgment, and reasoning; for method is a confiderable part of the art which teaches us to use our reafon right, and should by no means be omitted.

Upon this account, in every divifion wherein we defign a perfect exactnefs, it is neceflary to examine the whole idea with diligence, left we omit any part of it through want of care; though in fome cafes it is not poffible, and in others it is not neceffary, that we should defcend to the minutest parts.

II. Rule. In all divifions we should first confider the larger and more immediate parts of the fubject, and not di

vide it at once into the more minute and remote parts. It would by no means be proper to divide a kingdom first into streets, and lanes, and fields, but it must be first divided into provinces or counties, then thofe counties may be divided into towns, villages, fields, &c. and towns into streets and lanes.

III. Rule. The feveral parts of a divifion ought to be oppofite, that is, one part ought not to contain another. It would be a ridiculous divifion of an animal into head, limbs, body, and brain, for the brains are contained in the head.

Yet here it must be noted, that fometimes the fubjects of any treatife, or the objects of any particular fcience may be properly and neceffarily fo divided, that the fecond may include the first, and the third may include the firft and fecond, without offending against this rule, becaufe in the fecond or following parts of the science or discourse, these objects are not confidered in the fame manner as in the firft; as for instance, geometry divides its objects into lines, furfaces and folids now though a line be contained in a surface, or a folid, yet it is not confidered in a furface, feparate and alone, or as a mere line, as it is in the first part of geometry, which treats of lines. So logic is rightly divided into conception, judgment, reafoning, and method. For though ideas or conceptions are contained in the following parts of logic, yet they are not there treated of as feparate ideas, which are the proper fubject of the first part.

IV. Rule. Let not fubdivifions be too numerous without neceffity for it is better many times to diftinguish more parts at once if the fubject will bear it, than to mince the difcourfe by exceffive dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable therefore in a treatife of geography to say, that in a city we will confider its walls, its gates, its buildings, its ftreets, and lanes, than to divide it formally first into the encompailing and encompaffed parts; the encompaffing parts are the walls and gates; the encompaffed part includes the ways and the buildings; the ways are the streets and lanes; buildings confitt of the foundations and the superstructure, &c.

Too great a number of fubdivifions has been affect

ed by fome perfons in fermons, treatifes, inftructions, &c. under pretence of greater accuracy: but this fort of fubtilties hath often given great confufion to the understanding, and fometimes more difficulty to the memory. In these cafes it is only a good judgment can determine what fubdivifions are needful.

V. Rule. Divide every fubject according to the fpecial defign you have in view. have in view. One and the fame idea or fubject may be divided in very different manners, according to the different purposes we have in difcourfing of

it.

So if a printer were to confider the several parts of a book, he muft divide it into sheets, the fheets into pages, the pages into lines, and the lines into letters. But a grammarian divides a book into periods, fentences and words, or parts of fpeech, as noun, pronoun, verb, &c. A logician confiders a book as divided into chapters, fections, arguments, propofitions, ideas; and with the help of ontology, he divides the propofitions into fubject, object, property, relation, action, paffion, cause, effect, &c. But it would be very ridiculous for a logician to divide a book into fheets, pages, and lines; or for a printer to divide it into nouns and pronouns, or into propofitions, ideas, properties or caufes.

VI. Rule. In all your divifions obferve with greatest exactness the nature of things. And here I am conftrained to make a fubdivifion of this rule into two very neceffary particulars.

(1.) Let the parts of your divifion be fuch as are properly distinguished in nature. Do not divide afunder thofe parts of the idea which are intimately united in nature, nor unite those things into one part which nature has evidently disjoined: this would be very im proper in treating of an animal body, to divide it into the fuperior and inferior halves: for it would be hard to say how much belongs by nature to the inferior half, and how much to the fuperior. Much more improper would it be still to divide the animal into the righthand parts and left-hand parts, which would bring greater confufion. This would be as unnatural as a man who fhould cleave a hafel-nut in halves through the husk, the shell, and the kernel, at once, and fay a nut is divided into thefe two parts; whereas nature

leads plainly to the threefold-diftinction of husk, fhell, and kernel.

(2.) Do not affect duplicities nor triplicities, nor any certain number of parts in your divifion of things; for we know of no fuch certain number of parts which God the creator has observed in forming all the varieties of his creatures, nor is there any uniform determined number of parts in the various fubjects of human art or fcience; yet fome perfons have disturbed the order of nature, and abused their readers by an affectation of dichotomies, trichotomies, fevens, twelves, &c. Let the nature of the subject, confidered together with the defign which you have in view, always determine the number of parts into which you divide it.

After all it must be confeffed that an intimate knowledge of things, and a judicious obfervation will affift in the business of divifion, as well as of definition, better than too nice and curious an attention to the mere formalities of logical writers, without a real acquaintance with things.

SECT. IX.

Of a comprehensive Conception of Things, and of Ab

THE

fraction.

HE third rule to direct our conception requires us to conceive of things comprehenfively. And we must survey an object in all its parts to obtain a complete idea of it, fo we must confider it in all its modes, attributes, properties, and relations, in order to ob tain a comprehenfive conception of it.

The comprehenfion of an idea, as it was explained under the doctrine of univerfals, includes only the effential modes or attributes of that idea; but in this place the word is taken in a larger fenfe, and implies alfo the various occafional properties, accidental modes and relations.

The neceffity of this rule is founded upon the fame