6th Obferv. Where we cannot find out the effence or effential difference of any fpecies or kinds of beings. that we would define, we mult content ourselves with a collection of fuch chief parts or properties of it, as may beft explain it fo far as it is known, and beft diftinguish it from other things: fo a marigold is a flower which hath many long yellow leaves, round a little knot of feeds in the midft, with such a peculiar ftalk, &c. So if we would define filver, we fay it is a white and hard metal, next in weight to gold: if we would define an elder-tree, we might fay it is one among the leffer trees, whofe younger branches are foft and full of pith, whofe leaves are jagged or indented, and of fuch a particular fhape, and it bears large clusters of small black berries: fo we must define water, earth, stone, a lion, an eagle, a ferpent, and the greateft part of natural beings, by a collection of thofe properties, which according to our obfervation diftinguish them from all other things. This is what Mr Locke calls nominal effences, and nominal definitions. And indeed fince the effential differences of the various natural beings or bodies round about us arife from a peculiar fhape, fize, motion, and fituation of the fmall particles of which they are composed, and fince we have no fufficient method to inform us what 'these are, we must be contented with fuch a fort of definition of the bodies. they compofe.

Here note, that this fort of definition, which is made up of a mere collection of the most remarkable parts or properties, is called an imperfect definition or a defcription; whereas the definition is called perfect, when it is compofed of the effential difference, added to the general nature or genus.

7th Obferv. The perfect definition, of any being always includes the definition of the name whereby it is called, for it informs us of the fenfe or meaning of that word, and fhews us what idea that word is affixed to: but the definition of the names does by no means include a perfect definition of the thing; for as we have said before, a mere fynonymous word a negation of the contrary, or the mention of any one or two dif tinguishing properties of the thing may be a fufficient

definition of the name. Yet in those cafes where the effential difference or effence of a thing is unknown, there a definition of the name by the chief properties, and a defcription of the thing are much the fame.

And here I think it neceffary to take notice of one general fentiment, that feems, to run through that excellent performance, Mr Loeke's effay of human understanding, and that is, "That the effences of things are utterly unknown to us, and therefore all our pretences to diftinguish the effences of things can reach no farther than mere nominal effences; or a collection of such properties as we know; to fome of which we affix particular names, and others we bundle up, feveral together, under one name: and that all our attempts to rank beings into different kinds of fpecies can reach no farther than to make mere nominal fpecies and therefore our definitions of things are but mere nominal descriptions or definitions of the name.”

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Now, that we may do juftice to this great author, we ought to confider that he confines this fort of difcourfe only to the effence of fimple ideas, and to the effence of substances, as appears evident in the fourth and fixth chapters of his third book; for he allows the names of mixed modes always to fignify the real effences of their fpecies, chap. V. and he acknowledges artificial things to have real diftinct fpecies and that in the diftinétion of their effences, there is generally lefs confufion and uncertainty than in natural, chap. VI. Sect. 40, 41. though it must be confeffed that he fcarce makes any diftinction between the definition of the name, and the definition of the thing, as chap. IV. and fometimes the current of his difcourfe decries the knowledge of effences in fuch general terms, as may justly give occafion to mistake.

It must be granted, that the eflence of most of our fimple ideas, and the greatest part of particular natural fubitances are much unknown to us; and therefore the effential difference of fenfible qualities, and of the various kinds of bodies (as I have faid before) lie beyond. the reach of our understandings: we know not what makes the primary real inward diftinctions between red, green, fweet, four, & between wood, iron, oil,

ftone, fire, water, flesh, clay, in their general natures, nor do we know what are the inward and prime diftinctions between all the particular kinds or fpecies in the vegetable, animal, mineral, metallic, or liquid world of things. See Philofoph. efiays. eff. xi. fect. 1.

But ftill there is a very large field for the knowledge of the effences of things, and for the use of perfect definitions amongst our complex ideas, the modal appearances and changes of nature, the works of art, the matters of fcience, and all the affairs of the civil, the moral and the religious life; and indeed it is of much more importance to all mankind to have a better acquaintance with the works of art for their own livelihood and daily use, with the affairs of morality for their behaviour in this world, and with the matters of religion, that they may be prepared for the world to come, than to be able to give a perfect definition of the works of

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nature.

If the particular effences of natural bodies are unknown to us, we may yet be good philofophers, good artifts, good neighbours, good fubjects, and good chriftians without that knowledge, and we have just reason to be content.

Now that the effences of some of the modal appearances and changes in nature, as well as things of art, fcience and morality are fufficiently known to us to make perfect definitions of them, will appear by the fpecimen of a few definitions of these things.

Motion is a change of place. Swiftness is the passing over a long space in a fhort time. A natural day is the time of one alternate revolution of light and darkness, or it is the duration of twenty-four hours. An eclipfe of the fun is a defect in the fun's tranfmiflion of light to us by the moon interpofing. * Snow is congealed vapour. *Hail is congealed rain. An* island is a piece of land rifing above the furrounding water. An hill is an elevated part of the earth, and a * grove

*Note, Iland, hill, grove, are not defigned here in their more remote and fubftantial natures (if I may fo exprefs it) or as the matter of them is earth; for in this fente we know not their effence, but only as confidered in their modal appearances, whereby one part of

is a piece of ground thick fet with trees. An houfe is a building made to dwell in. A cottage is a mean houfe in the country. A fupper is that meal which we make in the evening. A triangle is a figure compofed of three fides. A gallon is a measure containing eight pints. A porter is a man who carries burdens for hire. A king is the chief ruler in a kingdom. Veracity is the conformity of our words to our thoughts. Covetousness is an exceffive love of money, or other poffeffions. Killing is the taking away the life of an animal. Murder is the unlawful killing of a man. Rhetoric is the art of speaking in a manner fit to perfuade. Natural philosophy is the knowledge of the properties of bodies and the various effects of them, or it is the knowledge of the various appearances in nature, and their caufes; and logic is the art of using our reason well, &c.

Thus you fee the effential differences of various be ings may be known, and are borrowed from their qualities and properties, their causes, effects, objects, adjunct, ends, &c. and indeed as infinitely various as the effences of things are, their definitions must needs have very various forms.

After all it must be confeffed, that many logicians and philofophers in the former ages, have made too great a buffle about the exactness of their definitions of things, and entered into long fruitless controverfies and very ridiculous debates in the several sciences about adjufting the logical formalities of every definition : whereas that fort of wrangling is now grown very justly contemptible, fince it is agreed that true learning and the knowledge of things depends much more upon a large acquaintance with their various properties, caufes, effects, subject, object, ends and defigns, than it does upon the formal and fcholaftic niceties of genus and difference.

earth is diftinguished from another. The fame may be faid of fnow, hail, &c.

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SECT. VII.

Of a complete Conception of Things.

AVING dwelt fo long upon the first rule to direct our conceptions, and given an account of the definition both of names and things in order to gain clear and diftinct ideas, we make hafte now to the fecond rule to guide your conceptions, and that is, conceive of things completely in all their parts.

All parts have a reference to fome whole: now there is an old diftinction which logical writers make of a whole and its parts into four feveral kinds, and it may be proper just to mention them here.

1. There is a metaphyfical whole, when the effence of a thing is faid to consist of two parts, the genus and the difference, that is, the general and the fpecial nature, which being joined together make up a defini. This has been the fubject of the foregoing fec

tion. tions.

2. There is a mathematical whole which is better called integral, when the feveral parts, which go to make up the whole, are really diftinct from one another, and each of them may fubfift apart. So the head, the limbs and the trunk are the integral parts of an animal body; fo units are the integral parts of any large number; fo thefe difcourfes which I have writ ten concerning perception, judgment, reasoning and difpofition are the four integral parts of logic. This fort of parts goes to make up the completeness of any fubject, and this is the chief and most direct matter of our difcourfe in this fection

3. There is a phyfical or effential whole, which is afually made to fignify and include only the two effential parts of man, body and foul: but I think the fenfe of it may be better altered, or at least enlarged, and fo include all the effential modes, attributes or properties which are contained in the comprehenfion of any idea. This fhall be the subject of discourse under the third rule to direct our conceptions.

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