many cases no other than a decifion of judgment. Every review that judgment takes of the productions of genius, difcovers some relation of the parts. This relation is a new perception which may tranfport fancy to others that are connected with it, and thus condu& it into regions which it did not formerly think of exploring, and from which it may bring home many conceptions fit for perfecting its work. A few experiments will enable a philofopher to exercise his judgment fo far as to guess at the conclufions to which they lead, or to determine the different ways in which the phenomena that they exhibit, may be accounted for. And this exertion of reason will lead him to imagine the farther experiments that are neceffary for bringing the queftion to a decifion, experiments of which he never would have thought if this judgment had not intervened. It is only a judgment that can be the occafion of suggesting what is called an experimentum crucis, in philofophical enquiries. Had not judgment been properly exercised, M. Azout could never have contrived an experiment of this kind, for determining the cause of the afcent of fluids in exhaufted tubes, nor Sir Ifaac Newton for evincing indisputably that

the

the inequality of refraction in the prifmatic image, arises from an original difference in the rays of which the light of the fun is compofed. When a poet has, by the exercise of judgment, determined the general nature and qualities of the incidents which will be proper for promoting the end of his poem, this determination will affift him in finding out fuch incidents. Homer having discovered by judgment, that the defign of an epic poem would be beft accomplished by a series of incidents rising naturally from one another, and by means of their mutual dependence conftituting one action, doubtless found many incidents fuggefted to him by this view of the economy of the whole, which might have otherwise escaped his notice. Spencer having neglected to form fuch a previous judgment of the nature of his work, needed all the force of his amazing fancy, along with the numerous fictions of romance, to furnish him with fuch a variety of unconnected adventures as might continually engage the foul and fill it with surprise by their extravagance and boldness. All the affiftances in invention, which orators have contrived, by means of topics and common places, are founded on

6

this

this principle; That judgment, by furveying the work directs imagination to many quarters where it may find conceptions adapted to its purpose: and Quintilian juftly observes, that these artificial helps are no farther useful than as they enable imagination to take the hint from the decifion of judgment, and by its own force run directly forward to those topics which fuit the present cafe (b). Judgment will likewife give a new impulfe to fancy, and prompt us in invention, by perceiving an error, either in the matter or in the difpofition. The very fame view of these which serves to detect the fault, will often fuggeft the means by which, not only it may be rectified, but new truth or beauty also may be produced. It is in this way that an examination of the imperfect or faulty productions of others, often enables a man of genius to make advances in art or science, and leads him on to new difcoveries. In fuch ways as

(6) Illud quoque ftudiofi eloquentiæ cogitent, neque omnibus in caufis ea quæ demonftravimus, cuncta poffe reperiri : heque cum propofita fuerit materia dicendi, fcrutanda fingula, et velut oftiatim pulfanda, ut fciant an ad probandum id quod intendimus, forte refpondeant, nifi cum difcunt, et adhuc ufa carent. Infinitam enim faciet ipfa res dicendi tarditatem, fi femper neceffe fit, ut tentantes unumquodque eorum quod aptum atque conveniens, experiendo nofcamus. Inft. Orat. lib. v. cap. 10.

thefe,

thefe, judgment affifts the imagination, by putting it in the track of invention, as well as by controling and regulating its opera

tions.

SECT. V.

Of the Dependence of Genius on other intel

lectual Powers.

T was formerly observed, that all our intellectual powers may be reduced to four claffes, sense, memory, imagination, and judgment. We have found that Genius is the immediate offspring of the imagination, and that it is attended by judgment in all its exertions. Its relation to sense and memory, is more diftant, and its dependence on them more indirect. What is the precise nature of this relation and dependence, will appear. from the following observations.

THE affociating principles of the mind would never exert themselves if they were not excited into action by the impulfe of fome object already perceived. It is only when thus excited, that imagination runs out in search of those ideas which are related to that object. On this account, in analysing the

operations

i

per

operations of genius, we must at last have re-
course to fome perception giving rise to them,
which was not itself suggested by imagination,
but exhibited either by sense or by memory (a).
These faculties give therefore in a manner
the first hint of every invention; a hint
haps inconfiderable in itself, but which may
in fome fense be confidered as the fource of
the whole discovery that genius makes by
means of it. The largest river takes its rife
from fome small fountain; iffuing from this,
it rolls its ftreams over a long extent of coun-
try, and is enlarged during its courfe by the
influx of many rivulets derived from springs
no more confiderable than its own, till at last
it becomes an impaffable torrent, liker to the
ocean than to the pitiful rill which purled
near its fource. In like manner, even thofe
works of genius which appear most stupen-
dous when they are compleated, spring at first
from fome fingle perception of sense or me-
mory, obvious, it may be, and trifling, and
become stupendous only by the gradual accef-
fion of ideas fuggefted by perceptions equally
trivial and common. (We admire with rea-

(e) Quicquid parro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a fenGbus. Cic. de fin. lib. i. Καὶ διαὶ τοῦτο μητέρα τῶν μουσών αμυ Φιλάγησαν· εἶναι τὸ ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗΝ. ΠΛΟΥΤΑΡΧ. περὶ πολλο

fon,