Hannibal Carracci to unite in himself the perfections of all former artifts, and to imitate 'them at his pleasure.

In a word, every work of genius must, in its characteristical excellences and defects, bear plain marks of the degree in which its author poffeffed any of the perfections of taste. Every man's peculiar tafte, exerting itself along with his imagination, puts him on fearching for fuch conceptions as it moft relishes, on moulding them into that form which fuits it beft, on adopting fuch as it approves, on avoiding and rejecting whatever it disapproves.

I SHALL take occafion here to remark a difference between genius for fcience, and genius for the arts, refulting from the diversity of all the powers employed in these two departments, and of the manner in which they are employed, a difference that, for this reafon, falls not properly under any of the particular heads hitherto confidered. The exertions of scientific genius have in their nature a certain fedatenefs, gravity, and aufterity: genius for the arts operates with a kind of fprightliness, gaiety, vivacity, or impetuofity. This difference may be accounted for from the obfervations which we have already made.

IT

IT arifes in fome measure from the different degrees and manners in which judgment is exercised in these two kinds of genius. All the exertions of judgment about truth, are in their nature cool and compofed; and in the operation of scientific genius, these exertions are almost uninterrupted. An idea is no fooner suggested than it is examined, fcrutinized, and reasoned upon, and deliberately pursued through all its confequences: this exercise calms, and as it were depreffes the foul, and gives a caft of seriousness to the operation of genius in investigating truth. Invention in the arts, requires not fo continual an exercise of judgment, and therefore wants that cast. The exertion of judgment has a greater degree of sedateness, and more depresses the soul, when reasoning is neceffary, than when the decifion is intuitive; and the more intricate and laborious the reasoning is, the greater is the fedateness and seriousness with which it is pursued. In scientific invention, judgment is exercised chiefly in reafoning. But in the arts, an idea fuggefted, generally appears fit or unfit at first sight, and is adopted or rejected in an inftant; even when it needs to be canvaffed, this is done without a laborious

fcrutiny,

fcrutiny, and therefore without introducing folemnity of difpofition.

THE perception of truth is an indifferent feeling; the fentiments of tafle are not indifferent: the conclufions which the philofopher forms in the courfe of his investigation, are apprehended without any sensation of pleafure; the work of the artift, in the feveral fteps of his progrefs, is continually gratifying his taste, giving him fenfations of delight, and by means of these elevating his mind and enlivening his temper. The inventer in fcience has often indeed high pleasure from the consciousness of fuccefs; but the artist enjoys this in common with him, and has all the pleafures of taste superadded to it. If the philo-· fopher's pleasure in the gratification of his curiofity is to be confidered as diftinct from the agreeable consciousness of fuccefs, yet it is a Latisfaction of a more fedate nature than most of the gratifications of tafte, and therefore lefs fit for enlivening the foul.

THE exertions of the imagination have in themselves fomething brifk and fprightly; But thofe exertions of it, which enter into fciœentific genius, have less of this character,than the flights of Laney roaming through all the

:3

remoteft

remoteft relations, and often likewise animated by the influence of the paffions, which take place in the arts: and confequently, scientificgenius would be more fedate and composed than the other kind, though the continued and laborious interpofition of judgment did not check the natural gaiety and impetuofity of imagination. The mind is perhaps occupied with equal intensenefs in both kinds of invention; and hence enthusiasm is common to both kinds of genius: but the mind is occupied in different ways; different faculties of it are principally engaged. In science, judgment is employed as much as imagination; and in scientific genius; that complexion is predominant which marks the exertions of the former: its operations are fedate and composed, and it is generally attended with folidity of temper, and with a character whose very peculiarities have à certain gravity and ftayednefs. In the arts, judgment is less frequently interpofed, and it is interpofed with lefs labour, imagination is left at liberty to purfue its courfe without a continual check, and therefore purfues it with a fort of alacrity and chearfulness, heightened by the ever returning approbations of taste: genius for

the

the arts, partakes generally in this temperament of imagination; it is sprightly in all its motions, and is often accompanied with a turn of character gay, unftaid, or defultory. Sometimes indeed a melancholy caft is found along with great genius in the arts; when it is, it proceeds either from a fimilar cast of imagination, or from quick sensibility, the common attendant of a lively fancy and a delicate taste, 'too strongly affected by the gloomier views of human life.

SECT. VII.

The Power of Execution necessary to Genius for the Arts.

SCIEN

CIENTIFIC genius compleats its operations by invention; at least, very ordinary talents are fufficient for expreffing its discoveries, and it is not confidered as fuffering a very great diminution of its proper merit, from the want of ability for elegant expreffion: but genius for the arts implies, in every cafe, not only the power of invention, but also the power of execution. In different arts, the manners of expreffion, or