All which loudly proclaim, that Adam was here considered as the head of mankind.

XV. To the same purpose is that beautiful opposition of the first and second Adam, which Paul pursues at large, Rom. v. 15. & seq. For as the second Adam does in the covenant of grace sustain the person of all the elect, so far as they are accounted to have themselves done and suffered, what he did and suffered in their name and stead; so likewise the first Adam sustained the person of all that were to spring from his stock.

XVI. That God was righteous in this constitu tion, is not to be disputed. For it does not become us to question the right of God, or to inquire too curiously into it, much less to measure it by the standard of any right established amongst us despicable mortals, when the fact is evident. We are previously to judge of God, Thou art righteous in what thou speakest, and pure in thy judgment.* Truly he is unacquainted with the majesty of the Suprume Being, and with his unspotted holiness, which in every thing is most consistent with itself, who presumes to scan his actions, and call his equity to account. A freedom which no earthly father would bear in a son, no king in a subject, nor master in a servant. And do we, mean worms of the earth, take upon us to use such freedom with the Judge of the whole universe! As often as our murmuring flesh dares to bawl out, The ways of the Lord are not equal; so often let us oppose to it Are not thy ways unequal ?†

XVII. Nevertheless it is usual with us, that we more calmly acquiesce in the daterminations of God, when we understand the reason of them. Let us therefore see, whether here also we cannot demonstrate the equity of the divine right. What if we should consider the matter thus? If Adam had, in his own and our name, stood to the conditions of the covenant; if, having finished the course of his probation, he had been confirmed in happiness, and we his posterity in † Ezek. xviii. 25.

* Pfal. li. 6.

him; if, fully satisfied with the delight of animal life, we had, together with him, been translated to the joys of heaven; no body would have complained, that he was included in the head of mankind: every one would have commended both the wisdom and goodness of God: not the least suspicion of injustice would have arisen in any one, on account of God's putting the first man into a state of probation in the room of all, and not every individual for himself, How shall that which in this event would have been deemed just, be unjust on a contrary event? For the justice or injustice of actions is not to be judged of by the event.

XVIII Besides, who is there of mankind that can bring himself to believe, that he, placed in the same circumstance with Adam, would have better consulted his own interest? Adam was not without wisdom, holiness, a desire after true happiness, an aversion to the miseries denounced by God against the transgressor, nor, in fine, without any of those things, by which one might confidently expect to be on his guard against sin; and yet he suffered himself to be inveigled in the snare by the craft of a flattering seducer. And dost thou, most iniquitous censurer of the ways of the Lord, boast thou wouldst have better used thy free-will? Nay, on the contrary, all thy actions cry aloud, that thou approvest, that thou art highly pleased with, and always takest example from that deed of thy first parent, about which thou unjustly complainest. For when thou transgressest the commands of God, when thou settest less by the will of the Supreme Being than by thy lusts, when thou preferrest earthly to heavenly things, present to future; when, by thine own choice, thou seekest after happiness, but not that which is true; and instead of taking the right way, goest into by-paths; is not that the very same, as if thou didst so often eat the forbidden fruit? Why then dost thou blame God, for taking a compendious way, including all in one; well knowing, VOL. I.

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that the case of each in particular, when put to the \test, would have been the same?

CHAP. III.

Of the Law, or Condition of the Covenant of Works. HITHERTO we have treated of the contracting parties. Let us now take a view of the condition prescribed in the covenant. Where, first, we are to consider the law of the covenant, then the observance of that law. The law of the covenant is two-fold. 1. The law of nature, implanted in Adam at his creation. 2. The symbolical law, concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

II. The law of nature, is the rule of good and evil, inscribed by God on man's conscience, even at his creation, and therefore binding upon him by divine authority. That there was such a law connate with, and as it were implanted in man, appears from the relics, which, like the ruins of some noble building, still remain in all men; namely, from those common notions, by which the Heathens themselves distinguish right from wrong, and by which they are a law to themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness. From which we gather, that all these things were complete in man, when newly formed after the image of God.

III. Whatever the conscience of man dictates to be virtuous or otherwise, it does so in the name of God, whose vicegerent it is in man, and the depositary of his commands. This, if I mistake not, is David's meaning,† To thee, that is, for thee, in thy stead, my heart says, or my conscience. This conscience therefore was called a God by the Heathens: as in this Iambic. BROTOIS HAPASIN HE SUNEI DESIS THEOS. In all men conscience is a God. Plato, in

* Rom. ii. 15. † Psal. xxvii. 8.

And

Philebus, calls reason a God dwelling in us. hence it is, that we are not to think that the supreme rule in the law of nature is its agreement or disagreement with the rational nature; but that is the divine wisdom manifested to, or the notion of good and evil engraved by God on the conscience. The author of the book de mundo* finely says, "God is to us a law, tending on all sides to a just equilibrium, admitting no correction, nor any variation." With this Cicero agrees,†"The true and leading law, which is proper both to command and to forbid, is the right reason of the Supreme Being."

IV. That author does not express himself very accurately, who said, "We here call the law of the knowledge of right and wrong, binding to do what is right, and to avoid what is wrong." For the law is not properly knowledge, but the object of knowledge. We say this law was naturally known to man; but it would be absurd to say, that knowledge is naturally known. Knowledge is our act, and is indeed to be squared by the rule of the law. The law is a rule prescribed by God, the director of all our actions.

V. Another is farther from accuracy, who thus determines: "Before the fall there was properly no law. For then the love of God prevailed, which requires no law. There" (as the same author elsewhere explains himself) "was a state of friendship and love, such as is the natural state of a son with repect to a parent, which nature loves. But when that love is violated, then a precept is superadded; and that love, which before was voluntary, (which best agrees with its nature, for that can scarce be called love, unless voluntary,) fall under a precept, and passes into a law, to be enforced then with commination and coercion; which rigour of coercion properly constitutes a law."

VI. But this way of reasoning does not seem to be the effect of thought and attention. For, 1. it is not the rigour of coercion that properly constitutes a law,

Chap. xi. † De ligibus, l. ii.

but the obligatory virtue of what is enjoined, proceeding both from the power of the lawgiver, and from the equity of the thing commanded; which is here founded on the holiness of the divine nature, so far as imitable by man. The apostle James* commends the perfect law of liberty. 2. Nor is it absurd to say, that the natural state of a son with respect to a parent is regulated by laws. Surely Platof says, that "the first mortals followed the customs and laws of their fathers," quoting with praise that sentence of Homer, THEMISTEUEI DE HEKASTOS FAIDON, Every one makes laws for his children. 3. Nor is it repugnant to do a thing by nature, and at the same time by a law. Philo the Jew, explaining that hackneyed saying of the philosophers, says, that "to live agreeably to nature," is done," when the mind follows God, remembering his precepts." Chrysippus in like manner, commended by Laertius,§ says, "That person lives agreeably to nature, who does nothing prohibited by the common law, which is right reason." In the sublimer style almost than one could well expect from a Heathen, is what Hierocles T says, "To obey right reason and God is the same. thing. For the rational nature being illuminated, readily embraces what the divine law prescribes. A soul which is conformed to God, never dissents from the will of God; but being attentive to the divinity and brightness, with which it is enlightened, does what it does." 4. Nor can it be affirmed, that after the breach of love, or, which is the same thing, after the entrance of sin, the law was then superadded, seeing sin itself is ANOMIA, the transgression of the law. 5. Nor is love rendered less voluntary by the precept. For the law enjoins love every way perfect, and therefore as voluntary as possible, not extorted by the servile fear of the threatening ** Nor does he salve the matter, when he says, that what is called love scarce deserves that name, unless it be volunta*Chap. i. 25. † De legibus, 1. iii. De migrat. Lib. vii. in Zenone. Ad aurea carmina Pythagcia. ** 1 John iv. 18.

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