maxims do not exclude a surety, who may come under engagements in man's stead, to undergo the penalty, and perform the condition. But of this it is not yet time to speak. We shall now discourse of each of them in order.

III. It is indeed a most destructive heresy to maintain, that man, sinful and obnoxious to punishment, is not bound to obedience. For, by no misconduct of man, can God forfeit his right and supremacy. Now, this right and supremacy of God requires, that man, and even every creature, be subject in all respects to God, as far as possible. Moreover, the rational creature, such as sinful man is, and does continue to be, can be subject not only to the natural, but also to the moral, providence of God; nor only to his vindictive justice, but also to his legislative authority; and as he can, so he ought to be subject to him, as to the obligation of obedience; since every possible subjection is essential to the creature,

IV. If the sinner, who deserves punishment, was not subject to the law, he could no longer sin and therefore by one sin he would set himself free from the danger of further sinning. For where no law is binding, there is no transgression, no sin, which John defines to be ANOMIA, the transgression of the law.* But nothing can be imagined more absurd, than that man, by sin, has acquired an impeccability, or an incapacity of sinning.

V. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, all sinners would be equal, and an equal degree of punishment remain for every one; which is contrary both to sound reason and scripture, where the inequality of sins and punishment is so often inculcated.

VI. There is a plain passage, Gal. v. 3. which confirms, that, even by the promulgation of the new gospel-covenant, the breakers of the covenant, who are without Christ, are not set free from that obliga

* 1 John iii. 4.

tion of the law, which demands perfect obedience, but continue debtors to the whole law.

VII. Nay, even in a human court, the penal compact is deemed an additional compact, adding to the principal convention, and consequently not abrogating, but accumulating the former obligation. Much less, at the bar of God, can the obligation to punishment, arising from the violation of the covenant, abrogate the primary and principal obligation of the law, whereby the covenant was ratified.

VIII. Arminius therefore* very basely refuses, that God, when man once fell from the state of innocence, and became obnoxious to punishment, even of right required obedience of man: as if God had forfeited his right by man's disobedience. He makes use of these arguments. 1. Becanse when man is in a state of sin, he is not in covenant with God: therefore there is no contract between God and man, by which he can require obedience: for by what reward, what punishment, can he give sanction to the law, since man, for the disobedience already committed, has forfeited the reward, and is become obnoxious to punishment? 2. As God has, because of sin, deprived man, of ability and power to fulfil the law, so, by this very thing, he has signified that he will no longer require man to fulfil it, unless he restore his ability; nay, he cannot in justice do it. If any shall say, could therefore the creature be exempted from the right or authority of the Creator, so as no longer to be bound to obey him? He answers, Yes indeed, if the creature be accursed, and the Creator reckon it unworthy to require obedience from it: for it is the highest punishment, so to conclude the sinful creature under sin, as not to require any more obedience from him; that being an evidence of irreconcilable anger; namely in that state. 3. The law itself, which is to be performed, is such as it would be unbecoming it should be performed by a sinner who is out of the favor of God. * In epist. pæstantium virorum, p. 173.

He is commanded to have God for his God, to love,
honor, and adore him, to put his trust in him, to use
his name with reverence, &c. Is it
Is it probable, that
such an obedience is required of him, who is under
the curse of God? Thus far Arminius, whose argu-
ments deserve to be carefully examined.

IX. We begin with the first. Arminius supposes a great many things in this argument, which we cannot admit, such as; that all the obligation of man arises from the covenant; that the law does not oblige, but in so far as it is enforced by rewards and punishments, that God cannot threaten a greater punishment, after man is once become obnoxious to the penalty; all which if we deny, as we do deny them, nay if we porve them to be false, as we hope to do, there will not remain the least appearance of force in this argument. The obligation of man to obedience is not founded first and principally on a covenant, but in the supereminent sovereignty, majesty, and holiness of God; and every rational creature, because he is such, is wholly bound to be subject to his sovereignty, adore his majesty, and form himself according to the example of his holiness. God would not be the absolute sovereign, if any rational creature existed, which was not bound to take the rule of its actions from him, and therefore, in regulating its actions, was not subject to God. God would not be the supreme majesty, if there was any rational creature, who was not bound to acknowledge, worship, adore, and be subject to him in every respect. God would not be perfect holiness, if any rational creature existed, which was not bound to acknowledge that holiness, as most worthy of its imitation. As God is such a being, he cannot but require to be esteemed to be so. The creature cannot acknowledge him in this manner, without owning its obligation, at the same time to obey him, who is the first, the most high, and most holy God. Which we have already explained and proved more fully, chap. iii. sect. 8. Moreover, it is not true,

that the law is not binding, but because of the sanction of rewards and punishments. The principal obligation of the law arises from the authority of the lawgiver, to which is joined the perfect equity of all his commands. Though God had enforced his law neither by rewards nor purtishments, we had been no less bound to obedience; lest self-love, whereby we are led to obtain the reward, and avoid the penalty, should be the only motive to stir us up to obey God: the reverence of the Supreme Being, and the love of holiness, are to hold the chief place here. In fine, it is also false, that no further punishment will be inflicted, after that man, having once broken the covenant, is become obnoxious to the penalty: for there are degrees in condemnation. And if that was true, it would not take off the obligation to obedience. It would not be lawful for a robber condemned to be burnt alive, or broken on the wheel, or to the most cruel death that man can devise, to commit in the mean time, a new capital crime. For, as we have said, the obligation arises neither primarily nor chiefly from the penal sanction, but from the authority of the law giver.

X. To the second, I answer, 1. Man himself is not only the meritorious, but also the physical cause of his own impotence, which he brought upon himself by his misconduct; as if an insolent and naughty servent should put out the candle, by which he ought to carry on his master's business; or by drinking to excess, willingly render himself unfit for the service of his master. In this case, that master, does by no means, fall from his right of requiring every piece of service properly due to him, and of punishing that naughty servant for non-performance. 2. Though God, as a just judge, had taken away from man abil ity to fulfil the law, yet, on that account, he both will, and in point of right can, require the performance of it by man. He can do this very justly; because no wickedness of man, justly punished by God,

can diminish God's authority over him; otherwise it would be in man's power, at his own pleasure, either to extend or limit the authority of God; which is contrary to the immutable perfection and blessedness of God. He also does require this for wise reasons; of which this is one, that sinful man may, by that means, be convinced of his irreparable misery, upon finding such things justly required of him, which he has rendered himself incapable to perform. And since he is as unwilling as unable to obey God, he is the more inexcusable, the more clearly the duty of the law is inculcated upon him. 3. 'Tis absurd to say, that it is the greatest punishment that God inflicts on man, not to require obedience from the rebellious creature. It is indeed true, that the creature ought to reckon it a part of its happiness, that the glory of obeying is left to it. And it is the punishment of the creature, if, by the just judgment of God, it is condemned, never to perform what is incumbent upon it, and may be acceptable to God. But it is another thing to say, that God will not require obedience from it. If God requires not obedience, the creature owes none. If it owes none, it does not amiss by disobeying; and if it does not amiss by disobeying, that cannot be in the place of the highest punishment for it. And thus Arminius himself cuts down his own vines (destroys his own argument.) He would have spoke rightly, had he said, that it is instead of the highest -punishment to the creature, to be condemned by the just judgment of God, not to perform that obedience, which God, consistently with his justice and holiness, requires of it. 4. Should we deal more closely with a bold disputant, we might say, that there is a contradiction in the adjunct, when he supposes God addressing the creature thus, I will not have thee to perform any obedience to me. For he that talks of obedience, presupposes not only some authority, by which he can require it, but also a command, which requires obedi ence, and which must be obeyed. Whoever, by his VOL. I.

A a