the first cause. And if in one action it can work independently of God, why not in a second? If in the beginning of the action, why not also in the progress ? Since the transition from non-acting to acting, is greater than the continuing an action once begun.

XXII. As these things are universally true, they obtain also in those free actions of rational creatures, in which there is a moral evil inherent: namely, that creatures may be determined to those actions by the efficacious influence of God, so far as they are actions according to their physical entity. Elegantly to this purpose speaks Thomas Aquinas, in the place just quoted. Since the act of sin is a kind of being, not only as negations and privations are said to be beings; but also as things, which in general exist, are beings, because even these actions in general are ranked in that order, it would follow, that if the actions of sin, as actions, are not from God, there would be some being which had not its essence from God: and thus God would not be the universal cause of all beings. Which is contrary to the perfection of the first being.

XXIII. Neither does God only excite and predetermine the will of men to vicious actions, so far as they are actions; but he likewise so excites it, that it is not possible, but, thus acted upon, it shall act. For if, upon supposition of that divine influx, it was possible for the created will not to act, these two absurdities would follow. 1. That the human will could baffle the providence of God, and either give to, or take from the divine influx all its effica

2. That there could be some act in the crea tore, of such weight as to resist the divine influence, and be independent of God. For I do not imagine, they will say, that God concurs to the production of that action, whereby his influx is resisted. But we have already refuted any concurrence as in itself indiffierent, to be determined by the free will of the

creatures.

XXIV. Further, the free will of man excited to actions, cannot, according to its physical essence, give them a moral and spiritual goodness, without the divine providence influencing and concurring to that goodness. This is evident from what has been before said. For as moral goodness is a superior and more perfect degree of entity than a physical entity alone, and man in the physical entity of his actions depends on God: it is necessary, he should much more depend on God, in producing the moral goodness of his actions; so that the glory thereof ought to be rendered to God, as the first cause.

XXV. If all these truths, thus demonstrated, be joined and linked to together, they produce that conclusion, which we laid down § 13. For if all creatures depend on God in acting; if he not only concurs with them when they act, but also excites them to act; if that excitation be so powerful, as that, upon supposing it, the effect cannot but follow; if God with that same efficacy influences vicious actions, so far as they are physical; if the creature cannot give its actions their due moral goodness without God: it infalliably follows, that Adam, God moving him to understand, will, and eat, could not but understand, will and eat; and God not giving goodness to those actions, man could not understand and will in a right manner. Which was to be proved.

XXVI. Yet it does not hence follow, that man was obliged to what was simply impossible. For it is only a consequential and eventual infalliability and necessity, which we have established. God bestowed those powers on man, by which he could have overcome the temptation. Yet that faculty was such as became a creature; which since it was sufficient in its kind, yet could not proceed to action, without presupposing the divine concurrence. Who shall deny, that man has a locomotive faculty, so sufficient in its kind, that he requires no more? But will any affirm, that it can happen, that man, by that locomotive

faculty, can actually move independently of God, as the first cause, without discovering his ignorance both of the supremacy of God, and the subordination of man? In like manner, we affirm, that God granted man such sufficient abilities to fulfil all righteousness, that he had no need of any further habitual grace, as it is called; yet so that all this ability was given him in such a manner, that he should act only dependently of the Creator and his influence, as we hinted, chap. ii. § 13.

XXVII. Much less should it be said, that man, by the abovementioned acts of divine providence, was forced to sin. For he sinned with judgment and will; to which faculties, liberty, as it is opposed to compulsion, is so peculiar, nay essential, that there can be neither judgment nor will, unless they be free. And when we affirm, that God foreordained and infalliably foreknew, that man would sin freely; the sinner could not but sin freely; unless we would have the event not answer to the preordination and prescience of God. And so far is the decree of God from diminishing the liberty of man in his acting, that, on the contrary, this liberty has not a more solid foundation than that. infalliable decree of God.

XXVIII. To make God the author of sin, is such dreadful blasphemy, that the thought cannot, without horror, be entertained by any Christian. It is true indeed, that God created man mutably good, infalliably foresaw his sin, foreordained the permission of that sin, really gave man sufficient powers to avoid it, but which could not act without his influx; and meanwhile influenced his faculties to natural actions, without influencing the moral goodness of those actions. We learn all those things from the event. But it is no less true, that God neither is, nor in any respect can be, the author of sin. And though it be difficult, nay impossible for us, to reconcile these truths with each other; yet we ought not to deny what is manifest, on account of that which is hard to be understood. We

will religiously profess both truths, because they are truths, and worthy of God; nor can the one overturn the other; though, in this our state of blindness and ignorance of God, we cannot thoroughly see the amicable harmony between them. This is not the alone, nor single difficulty, whose solution the sober divine will ever reserve for the world to

come.

XXIX. This is certain, that, by this permission of sin, God had an opportunity of displaying his manifold perfections. There is a fine passage to this purpose in Clemens,* which with pleasure we here insert. 'Tis the greatest work of divine providence, not to suffer the evil arising from a voluntary apostasy, to remain unuseful, or in every respect to be come noxious. For it is peculiar to divine wisdom and power, not only to do good (that being to speak so, as much the nature of God, as it is the nature of fire to warm, or of light to shine) but much more, to make the evil, devised by others, to answer a good and valuable end, and manage those things which appear to be evil, to the greatest advántage.

XXX. It remains now lastly, to consider, how, as Adam, in this covenant, stood as the head of mankind; upon his fall, all his posterity may be deemed to have fallen with him, and broken the covenant of God. The Apostle expressly asserts this. By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that in whom all have sinned, EPH HO PANTES HEMARTON.

XXXI. To make the apostle's meaning more plain, we must observe these things. 1. It is very clear, to any not bewitched with prejudice, that when the apostle affirms, that all have sinned, he speaks of an act of sinning, or of an actual sin; the very term to sin, denoting an action. 'Tis one thing to sin, another to be sinful, if I may so speak. 2. When he affirms all † Rom. v. 12.

*Strom. lib. i.

to have sinned; he, under that universality, likewise includes those who have no actual, proper, and per sonal sin, and who, as he himself says, have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.* Consequently these are also guilty of some actual sin, as appears from their death; which not being their own proper and personal sin, must be the sin of Adam, imputed to them by the just judgment of God.

3.

By these words, EPH HO PANTES HEMARTON, for that all have sinned, he gives the reason of that assertion which, he had before laid down, that, by the sin of one man, death passed upon all. This, says he, ought not to astonish us, for all have sinned. If this should be understood of some personal sin of each, either actual or habitual, the reasoning would not have been just, and worthy of the apostle, but mere trifling. For his argument would be thus, that, by the one sin of one, all were become guilty of death, because each in particular had, besides that one and first sin, his own personal sin: which is inconsequential. 4. The scope of the apostle is to illustrate the doctrine of justification, which he had before treated of. The substance of which consists in this, that Christ, in virtue of the covenant of grace, accomplished all righteousness for his chosen covenant-people, so that the obedience of Christ is placed to their charge, and they, on account thereof, are no less absolved from the guilt and dominion of sin, than if they themselves had done and suffered, in their own person, all that Christ did and suffered for them. He declares, that, in this respect, Adam was the type of Christ, namely, as answering to him. It is therefore necessary, that the sin of Adam, in virtue of the covenant of works, be so laid to the charge of his posterity, who were comprized with him in the same covenant, that on account of the demerit of his sin, they are born destitute of original righteousness, and obnoxjous to every kind of death, as much as if they them.

* Ver. 14