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ed any error or deception by her, who was given him as an help by God.

X. It cannot be doubted, but that providence was concerned about this fall of our first parents. It is certain, that it was foreknown from eternity; which none can deny, but he who by a sacrilegious audacity goes about to rob God of his omniscience. Nay, as God, by his eternal decree, laid the plan of the whole œconomy of our salvation, and the preconceived succession of the most important things presupposes the sin of man, it could not therefore happen unforeseen by God. And this is the more evident, because, according to Peter, Christ was foreordained before the foundation of the world, and that as the lamb, whose blood was to be shed.* Which invincible argument Socinus knew not how to elude, otherwise than by this ridiculous assertion, "That after men had sinned, Christ indeed came to abolish their sins; but that he would have come notwithstanding, though they had never sinned." But this idle assertion, besides being unscriptural, nay antiscriptural, is not apposite to this place. For the order of Peter's words does not admit any other interpretation than that of Christ's being foreknown, as a lamb to be slain, and to shed his blood, to be the price of our redemption. And he likewise speaks † of this determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, according to which Christ was delivered into the hands of wicked men. Since therefore Christ was foreknown from eternity, as one to be slain for the sins of men, man's sin was also necessarily forknown.

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XI. And if it was foreknown, it was also predetermined as Peter, in the place just quoted, joins together the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. Nor can pescience of future things be conceived in God, but in connection with his decree concerning their futurity.

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XII. From all this may be inferred, by a plain consequence, that it could not otherwise happen, but that man should fall on account of the infallibility of the divine prescience, and of that necessity which they call a necessity of consequence. For it is inconsistent with the divine perfection, that any decree of God should be rendered void, or that the event should not be answerable to it. 'Tis the prerogative of JEHOVAH to say, My counsel shall stand.* His counsels of old are faithfulness and truth.† God himself has ratified the stability of his purposes by an oath, the more certainly to declare the immutability of his counsel. The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand.§

XIII. The infallibility of the event, as to man's sin, may be proved by another argument; if we only attend to that subordination, by which all creatures depend on God in their operations. For it is not possible, that God should, by his almighty concurrence, influence any creature to act, and yet that creature suspend its acting. In like manner it is impossible, that while God does not influence to the moral goodness of that natural action, the creature should, without that influx, perform that action morally good. This follows from the nature of God and the creature; as he cannot ineffectually influence his creatures to act, so they cannot but act, when under his influence. These things being supposed, as they are evident to any person of attention, it is impossible, that man can abstain from reasoning, willing, and eating, where act God influences to these acts by his almighty concur rence. Nor is it any more possible, that man can reason, will, and eat in a holy manner, if God, by e his almighty concurrence, does not influence the holiness of the action. Supposing therefore, that God had afforded his influence to the natural act of reasoning, willing, eating as he actually did, but not to he * Is. xlvi. 10. † Is. xxv. I. ‡ Heb. vi. 17. § Is. xiv. 24.

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moral goodness of those acts, as he did not; it could not otherwise be, but that man should act at that time and perform his action wrong. All this holds true, not only with respect to this first sin of man, but with respect to all other sins. As these things are matters of evident truth, I see not why we may not boldly maintain them, especially as they tend to the glory of God, and to demonstrate his super-eminence, and the absolute dependence of the creatures upon him, as much in their operations, as in their existence. Should those of the contrary Pelagian sentiments pervert these truths, they will do so at their peril. Nor ought we so much to regard that, as on their account to conceal the truth.

XIV. However, it will not be amiss to insist a little longer on this subject; that all the apparent harshness of this doctrine may be entirely removed by an evident demonstration of the truth; which we think we shall be able to effect, by beginning with more evident truths, in one continued chain of arguments, flowing from each other, in such a manner, as to gain the assent even of the most obstinate.

XV. And, first, I think it will be readily granted, that there is but one first cause; that all other causes so depend upon that first one, both in existing and acting, as without it to be able neither to exist nor to act. Paul inculcated this upon the Athenians ;* Inhim we live, and move, and have our being. Nor, indeed, can the most powerful monarch in the world, such as the Assyrian was in the time of Isaiah, any more move without God, than the axe without him that heweth therewith, or the saw without him that shaketh it.†

XVI. Reason, in this, concurs with scripture. For if there was any cause besides God, which could act independently of him, it would follow, that there were more first principles than one ; as Thomas Aquinas reasons well. Whose reasoning, as it is both *Acts xvii. 28. † Is. x. 15. In second. sentenent, distinct 37. quæst 2. art. 2.

solid, and very much to the purpose, we shall not scruple to give in his own words. "It is," says he, "essential to the first principle, that it can act without the assistance and influence of a prior agent; so that if the human will could produce any action, of which God was not the author, the human will would have the nature of a first principle."

XVII. Though they endeavour to solve this, by saying, that, notwithstanding the will be of itself capable of producing an action, without the influence. of a prior agent, yet it has not its being from itself, but from another; whereas the nature of a first principle is to be self-existent. But it seems inconsistent to say, that what has not its being of itself, can yet act of itself; for what is not of itself, cannot continue of itself. For all the power of acting arises from the essence, and operation from the power. Consequently, what has its essence from another, must also have its power and operation from that other. And besides, though this reply denies that it is simply the first; yet we cannot but see, that it is the first agent, if its acting cannot be referred to some prior agent, as the cause. Thus far Thomas Aquinas.

XVIII. Nor does God only concur with the actions of second causes, when they act, but also influences the causes themselves to act. Because the beginning of actions depends, if not more, at least not less on God, than their progress. This opinion is not unhappily expressed in the Roman catechism, published by the decree of the council of Trent, at the command of Pope Pius V.* to this purpose: "But God not only, by his providence, preserves and governs all things that exist; but he likewise, by a secret energy, so influences those that move and act, to motion and action, that though he hinders not the efficiency of second causes, yet he prevents or goes before it ; seeing his most secret power extends to each in particular; and, as the wise man testifies, reaches powerfully * Part 1. de primo fymboli articule, num. 22. VOL. I. Y

from one end to the other, and disposes all things sweetly. Wherefore it was said by the apostle, when declaring to the Athenians the God whom they ignorantly worshipped: He is not far from every one of us; for in him we live, and move, and have our being."

XIX. Moreover, as a second cause cannot act unless acted upon, and previously moved to act, by the preventing and predetermining influence of the first cause; so in like manner, that influence of the first cause is so efficacious, as that, supposing it, the second cause cannot but act. For it is unworthy of God to imagine any concurrence of his to be so indifferent, as at last only to be determined by the co-operation of second causes: as if the rod should shake him who lifts it up; or as if the staff should lift up what is not wood ;* for so the words properly run. And the meaning is, that it is highly absurd to ascribe to an instrument of wood, the raising and managing of what is not of such vile matter as wood, but of a more excellent nature, namely spirit. By this allegory is intimated the absurdity of that opinion, which makes God to be determined in his actions by the creature.

XX. Didacus Álvarez† makes use of the following argument against this; namely, The manner of concurring by a will of itself indifferent to produce this or the other effect, or its opposite, is very imperfect; because, in its efficacy, it depends on the concurrence of a second cause; and every dependence imports, in the thing which depends, some imperfection and inferiority, in respect of him on whom it depends; and therefore such a manner of concurrence cannot be ascribed to God, or agree with his will, which is an infinite and most perfect cause.

XXI. And then this insolvable difficulty likewise remains: If the second cause determines the concurrence of God in itself indifferent, in that act of determination it will be independent of God, and so become

Is. x. 15. † De auxiliis divinæ gratiæ, lib. iii. disp. 21. p. 136.

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