Genius, the creative faculty, as possessed by individual minds, does not extend to as wide a range of objects as Taste It is not uncommon to meet persons possessed of good Taste in several of the elegant arts, in painting, sculpture, music, and poetry; but to find one who is an excellent performer in all these is much more rare, or rather not to be expected at all. A universal genius is not likely to excel in any thing only when the creative powers of the mind are directed exclu sively to one object, is there a prospect of attaining eminence. With Taste the reverse is the case; exercising it on one class of objects is likely to improve it as regards all. $250. Genius, as remarked above, implies the existence of Taste; and the more the latter is cultivated and improved, the nobler will be the achievements of the former. Genius, however, may exist in a higher degree than Taste; that is, a person's Genius may be bold and strong, while his Taste is remarkable for neither delicacy nor correctness. This is often the case in the infancy of a literature or an art: for Genius which is the gift of nature, attains its growth at once; while Taste, being in a great degree the result of assiduous study and cultivation, requires long and careful training to attain perfection. Shakspeare is a case in point. Full of vigor and fire, and remarkable for the originality of his thoughts, he still lacks much of that delicacy, both of conception and expression, which has been attained by later writers of far inferior Genius. Indeed, those who dazzle the minds of their readers with great and brilliant thoughts are too apt to disregard the lesser graces of composition. a universal genius? What is the result of exercising Taste on any particular class of >bjects! § 250. What is implied in genius? May it exist without a high degree of Taste! When is this often the case? What author is a case in point? LESSON XXXVII. PLEASURES OF THE IMAGINATION. §251. THE pleasures of Taste, since they arise from im pressions made on the imagination, are generally known as the Pleasures of the Imagination. § 252. The Imagination is that faculty of the mind by which it conceives ideas of things communicated to it by the organs of sense, and, selecting parts of different conceptions, combines them into new wholes of its own creation. to man. Imagination, like every other faculty of mind, is of course confined Opening to him, as it does, an enlarged sphere of manifold and multiform pleasures, it affords a striking proof of Divine benevolence. The necessary purposes of life might have been answered, though our censes had served only to distinguish external objects, without conveying to us any of those delightful emotions of which they are now the source. The Creator, however, has seen fit to vouchsafe to man these pure and innocent enjoyments for the purpose of elevating his aspirations, ennobling his emotions, banishing unworthy thoughts from his breast, freeing him from the control of passion and sense, and leading him to look beyond the earth, and "Before the transient and minute To prize the vast, the stable, the sublime." The mind that has once feasted on the pleasures which imagination affords, will never be satisfied to leave them for meaner enjoyments; any more than one who from some height views a majestic river rolling its waves through spacious plains and past splendid cities, will withdraw his gaze from the inviting prospect, to contemplate the stagnant pool at his feet. § 253. The process by which the emotions alluded to affect the imagination next requires attention. Whenever an object 251. From what do the pleasures of Taste ariso? What are they generally called? 252. What is meant by the imagination? To whom is it confined? Show how its bestowal is a proof of divine beneficence. How do the pleasures of the imagination compare with other enjoyments? $253. Describe the process by which the sensations a question affect the imagination. calculated to produce them is presented to the mind, unless its attention is previously engrossed, a train of thought is inmediately awakened, analogous in character to the object exciting it. It must be observed, however, that the simple perception of the object is insufficient of itself to excite the emotion. No pleasurable impression will be produced, unless the mind operates in connection with the sensatior,; unless the imagination busies itself with the pursuit of such trains of thought as are awakened. We find that the same thing is true of the creations of art. A fine landscape, a beautiful poem, a thrilling strain of harmony, excite feeble emotions in our minds, as long as our attention is confined to the qualities they present to our senses. We fully appreciate them only when our imaginations are kindled by their power, when we lose ourselves amid the images summoned before us, and wake at last from the play of fancy as from the charm of a romantic dream. § 254. That pleasurable emotions are not produced by mere impressions on the external scnses, but remain unfelt unless these impressions are transferred to the imagination, is susceptible of conclusive proof. If, for instance, the mind is in such a state as to prevent the play of imagination, the sensation of pleasure is entirely lost, although of course the effect on the outward sense is the same. A man in pain or afflic tion will contemplate without the slightest admiration scenes and objects, which, were his imagination at liberty, would afford him the liveliest pleasure. The sublimity and beauty of external nature are almost constantly before us, and not a day passes without presenting us objects calculated to charm and elevate the mind; yet it is in general with a heedless eye that we regard them, and only at particular moments that we are sensible of their power. There are few that have not con templated with delight the beauties of a glowing sunset; yet every one knows that, at times, all the gorgeous magnificence What, beside the sensation, is essential to the production of a d'easurable emotion in the mind? What is said of the emotions produced by the creations of art? § 254. Prove that pleasurable emotions are not produced by mere impressions on the xternal senses. To what is the difference in the impressions prod iced by the same with which Nature paints the heavens at the close of day falls powerless on the eye. This difference of effect is clearly not attributable to the objects themselves, nor to the external senses on which the impression is primarily produced: it arises from a difference in the state of our imagina. tions; from our disposition at one time to follow out the train of thought awakened, and our incapacity to do this, at another, in consequence of the pre-occupation of our minds by some engrossing idea. The pleasures of Taste are enjoyed in their perfection only when the imagination is free, and the attention is so little occupied as to leave us open to all the impressions created by the objects before us. It is, therefore, always in leisure hours that we turn to music and poetry for amusement. The seasons of care, of grief, of business, have other occupations; and destroy, for the time at least, our sensibility to the beautiful or the sublime, in proportion as the state of mind produced by them is unfavorable to the exercise of the imagination. Another proof that imagination is the source of the pleasures of Taste may be derived from what is observed in the process of criticising. When, in considering a poem or painting, we attend minutely to the language and structure of the one, or the coloring and design of the other, we cease to feel the delight which they otherwise produce. The reason of this is that by so doing we restrain our imagination, and, instead of yielding to its suggestions, resist them by fixing our attention on minute and unconnected parts. On the contrary, if the imagination is ardent and is left to its free exercise, the mind receives pleasure from the performance as a whole, and takes no note of the minor details of criticism. It is this chiefly that makes it difficult for young persons with lively imaginations to form correct judgments of the productions of literature and art, and which so often induces them to approve of mediocre performances. It is not that they are incapable of learning in what merit of composition consists; for the principles which direct us in the forma object at different times attributable? When are the pleasures of taste enjoyed in their perfection? When do we turn to music or poetry for amusement? What do facts observable in the process of criticising prove with regard to tho pleasures of Taste? State the arguments thus derived. What kind of critics are persons with ardent imaginations likely to become? What renders it difficult for the young to form correct judgments of literary performances? What effect has to labor tion of critical opinions are neither numerous nor abstruse. It is not that sensibility increases with age; for this all experience contradicts. But it is because at this period of life the imagination is fresh, and is excited by the slightest causes; because the young decide on the merits of a composition according to the impression it makes on this faculty; because their estimate of its value is formed, not by comparing it with other works or with any abstract or ideal standard, but from the facility with which it leads them into those enchanting regions of fancy where youth loves to wander. It is their own imagination that in reality possesses the charms which they attribute to the work that excites it; and the simplest tale is as capable of exciting this faculty in the young, and is therefore advanced to as high a rank in their estimation, as the most meritorious performances would be at a later period. All this flow of imagination, however, in which youth and men of sensibility are apt to indulge, and which so often yields them pleasure while it involves them in incorrect judgments, the labor of criticism destroys. Thus employed, the mind, instead of being free to follow the trains of imagery successively awakened, is either fettered to the consideration of minute and isolated parts, or pauses to weigh the various ideas received. Thus distracted, it loses the emotion, whether of beauty or sublimity; and, since the impression on the outward sense is evidently the same as before, it must be the restraint of imagination alone that makes the difference, and consequently this faculty is the sole source whence the pleasures of Taste flow. Accordingly, the mathematician who investigates the demonstrations of the Newtonian philosophy, the painter who studies the designs of Raphael, the poet who reasons on the measure of Milton,—all in such occupations lose the delight which these several productions give; and, when they wish to recover the emotion of pleasure, must withdraw their attention from minute considerations, and leave their fancy to revel amid the great and pleasing conceptions with which it is inspired. 255. The pleasures received from objects of Taste depending, as we have seen, on the action of the imagination, it follows that whatever facilitates the lively exercise of this faculty heightens the pleasurable emotions experienced. This is obviously the effect of those interesting associations with of criticism on the flow of imagination? What is said of the mathematician, the § 255. On what do the pleasures received from objects of Taste depend? What, therefore, heightens the pleasurable emotions experienced? Of what is this obviously the effect? In how many classes are associations comprised? What is the first clase |