was relieved by a brigade of the Third Division, Fifth Corps, and marched to Germanna Ford, where I took position, and covered the crossing of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, and the picket details of the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Corps. The division was then withdrawn, with the exception of 100 men, who remained until the bridges were taken up, and then came over in boats. About noon on the 2d of December, I left the river and bivouacked near Stevensburg. The division left Stevensburg this morning and is now encamped, one brigade at Paoli Mills and one at Kelly's Ford. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. C. ROBINSON, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.

Lieut. Col. C. KINGSBURY, Jr.,

Assistant Adjutant-General, First Army Corps.

No. 9.

Report of Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, U. S. Army, commanding Second Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY CORPS,

December 3, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Second Army Corps, in the late movement, beginning on the 26th of November and ending on the 2d of December. This I do in obedience to the circular of this date, which requires that

Corps commanders will forthwith send in their reports of the part taken by their respective commands during the same, specifying any delays or obstacles they may have encountered.

At 6.30 a. m. of the 26th of November, the corps left its.camp on Mountain Run, corps headquarters being at what is known as Berry Hill, and marched to Germanna Ford, accompanied by a battery of four 44-inch guns, and one of six 20-pounder Parrotts from the Artillery Reserve; also 100 cavalrymen, under Captain Schwartz, of the Fourth New York Cavalry, and a pontoon-bridge train, under Captain Mendell, of the Engineers. The head of our column reached the high banks at Germanna Ford at 9.30 a. m. Roads were rapidly cut out among the trees, and batteries posted, and all preliminary arrangements about complete, as far as they could be made without attracting the attention of the enemy's sentinels on the opposite bank, by 11 a. m.

About this time General Meade himself arrived, and directed a suspension of our operations till General French's command was heard from. About 1.30 p. m. we were authorized to go forward. No resistance was offered. The enemy's mounted sentinels ran away, and Captain Schwartz forded the river and advanced about 2 miles. General Caldwell's division immediately began to ford the stream and two brigades crossed the stream in this manner. The safety of the passage having been thus secured, the further crossing of infantry was delayed till the completion of the pontoon bridge on account of the deep water wetting the rations and ammunition. The artillery and ambulances continued to cross at the ford.

Captain Mendell had promptly begun laying the bridge, but was de

layed more than an hour by finding himself one boat deficient in spanning the stream. This, as soon as possible, he remedied with a trestle. All the pioneers of the corps were put at work preparing roadways up the opposite bank, much difficulty having been encountered in getting up the hill. The infantry and artillery moved out on the plank road and encamped on Flat Run as directed.

At daybreak on the 27th of November, we moved out on the plank road, and turned off to our right about 1 mile beyond Flat Run, going as direct as possible for the old macadamized turnpike. Reaching this, we moved rapidly toward Old Verdierville, which was the point we were directed to gain, to be joined on the way by theThird Corps, near Robertson's Tavern. General Hays' division led the advance, followed by General Webb's and then General Caldwell's. General Hays struck the advancing enemy at Robertson's Tavern and drove them back along the turnpike. General Webb came up rapidly and deploying to the right of the road, drove them also along the road to Raccoon Ford. In doing this, Lieutenant-Colonel Hesser, commanding Seventy-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, was killed; this was about 11.30 a. m. The enemy, concealed in the wood which masked his force, extended his skirmishers to our right, and required dispositions to meet this which deployed nearly all my force.

Prisoners informed me that Rodes' division was opposed to me, and that Johnson's division was between me and Raccoon Ford. Upon communicating this to General Meade, who was near, and also that I had been unable to ascertain the whereabouts, or to yet communicate with the columns on my right and left, but that I was prepared to move forward and attack the enemy if he thought it best to farther advance the center-so comparatively weak, with the wings of the army separated not less than 4 or 5 miles from me-he directed me to wait where I was till reports were received from the right and left. A report from the left wing very soon came, and with it the sound of cannon where General Gregg's cavalry was engaged along the plank road. About this time also the firing was heard of General Custer's cavalry at Morton's Ford.

This

While awaiting information the enemy showed so much enterprise in extending around my right flank (during which LieutenantColonel Joslin, commanding the Fifteenth Massachusetts Volunteers, was wounded and taken prisoner), that I was compelled to make a feint of a general attack by advancing my skirmish line. brought on a brisk little contest along my front, in which Colonel Carroll's brigade behaved very handsomely, driving the enemy down the turnpike to his main line of battle, and capturing numbers of Gordon's brigade of Early's division.

Though it was impossible to say how much force was near me, the prisoners from two divisions of Ewell's corps, and the report that the other was near, required caution on my part. General Ewell was probably as ignorant of my real strength as I of that of his corps opposed to me, else, by rapid concentration, it was in his power to have overwhelmed me and cut our army in two. About

p.m. information was received that General French had met and engaged the enemy, and that his advance was checked, his distance being still some 4 miles from me, and his exact location uncertain. About one hour before dark, when I could afford to venture, trusting to nightfall to cover me if I met superior force, I again advanced my skirmish line, strongly supported. The enemy resisted stubbornly and could be driven but a little way. The woods which

he occupied prevented the efficient use of lines of battle, concealed his force so as to require caution in advancing, and furnished him the means of rapidly constructing breastworks, which he had done. The day closed without any material change in my position as first taken up, and without a junction of my force with any other. My loss was about 50 killed and wounded.

The First Corps, which had been called from the left column in the afternoon, arrived within about a mile of my rear just about dark, and before daylight on the 28th moved up and took position in line of battle on my right, south of the turnpike. The Sixth Corps also took position on my right just before daylight.

At sunrise the First and Second and Sixth Corps advanced simultaneously in line of battle, only to find that the enemy was gone. Our rapid advance soon came upon him in a strong position on the west bank of Mine Run, about 2 miles from Robertson's Tavern. Deserters picked up as we advanced told us that Hill's corps had come down the plank road from Orange Court-House, and there joined Ewell's corps, so that we found General Lee's army in a formidable position, and partially intrenched. A heavy rain came on early in the day, and somewhat obscured our observations of the enemy.

A personal reconnaissance, during which I lost 20 men killed and wounded, along our front, made as close to the enemy as our most venturesome skirmish line could approach, failed to discover to me a promising point of attack. I stated this to the commanding general in the evening, when all our troops had been brought into position, and requested to be allowed to take my corps and make a demonstration in the enemy's right, to threaten it, and endeavor to discover a more favorable position to assault, and finally, if this could not be done, to move on around as if to get in his rear, with the intention of making him abandon his present front. This plan was acquiesced in, and General Terry's division of the Sixth Corps, about 6,000 strong, was sent with me, and 300 cavalry. As I intended making an extended and rapid movement, I left nearly all my ambulances and ammunition trains behind, half my artillery, and the rear ammunition chests of my caissons. The movement being one that might be long and fatiguing, required the men to start fresh.

No inconsiderable preparations were required to issue rations, dispose of surplus trains, relieve our line, &c., along the enemy's front, and all combined determined me not to start till daybreak. The night was dark and stormy, and our route, after going to the rear as far as Robertson's Tavern, lay through woods along bad roads. The cheerful tone of my men as I began the move on the 29th of November, the unsought expressions of opinion from officers in all grades of my command, told me plainly enough that their views-tried soldiers as they were--did not differ from mine as to the impractica bility of an attack on the enemy where we had left him. Our march on the 29th was rapid and unobstructed, until we reached (about 10.30 p. m.) the cavalry outposts of General Gregg on the plank road. Our march up to this point was 8 miles.

In company with General Gregg, I reconnoitered the enemy while my column was closing up. Just behind the enemy's vedettes, he pointed out a line of intrenchments, and so it seemed to me to be; it afterward proved to be the railroad embankment. I at once ordered up General Caldwell's division, taking care to conceal our movement, deployed the Irish Brigade to the right of the plank road,

and Colonel Miles' brigade to the left. The 300 cavalry under Captain Schwartz was placed on the plank road and a battery immediately in its rear, the rest of the division to follow closely as support, and the whole column right after this. When all was ready (and no time was lost unnecessarily in preparing), the advance was ordered. This was about 1 p. m., and notice was given to General Prince on my right.

We pushed on, and at the head of Mine Run, having driven the enemy 3 miles, we found him in his trenches. Colonel Miles' brigade especially acquitted itself in this movement. Time was necessary to bring up the three divisions in the rear to assault, and at the same instant staff officers from General Gregg reported that the enemy had cut his command in two, and called for re-enforcements. I at once sent word to General Terry to give General Gregg all the assistance he required, even to his whole division, but only one brigade, General Shaler's, was called for.

At this time Colonel Miles' brigade held the extreme left, and from the railroad around the right of the enemy. He was, however, nearly 2 miles distant from the main force. General Caldwell was holding from the railroad to the plank road, and had called for re-enforcements from General Webb, since the enemy were pushing skirmishers between himself and Prince. General Webb's division had furnished one brigade to General Caldwell, and this brigade had taken up position on the right of the corps and had placed itself in the front. To take position in rear of Colonel Miles, I was then forced to take troops from the rear of the column to support him.

The dispositions thus forced upon me by the movements of the enemy in front and rear lost me some three-fourths of an hour or more, and prevented my taking advantage of daylight to assault the right or push forward my left, as I should have desired.

My troops came up rapidly and deployed, taking up positions which required time to reconnoiter, as the country was entirely unknown to us, and roads for the artillery between the Catharpin and plank roads had to be found, the woods, railroad, and streams all being obstacles to the movement. The enemy opened upon us with artillery, and moved his troops rapidly from his left to his right to protect the place we menaced.

We had passed Mine Run; it was no longer an obstacle, and there was no stream nor commanding ground between us and their base of supplies, but there was not time to advance farther. We lost during the movement 50 killed and wounded. As soon as it was dark, reported in person to general headquarters. When I arrived there I found that a general assault had been planned for daybreak on the morrow, November 30.

General French had deemed an assault in his front impracticable. General Wright had deemed he could force the line and make a lodgment in our right, and when I saw him he reported the troops already in position. My personal report, as already indicated, made out the weakness of the enemy on our left. The general commanding, with the generous concurrence of my seniors, increased my command by two divisions of the Third Corps. I was to begin the assault at 8 a. m., and to be followed, an hour after, by an assault from our right. I spent all night in disposing my force to assault the enemy as he appeared before dark, and by daybreak I had finished.

The array was as follows: The front line was about 1 mile, and the troops were arranged in two and three lines, with strong supports

in proper places. General Terry's division, 6,000 strong, in support and reserve, held our left flank along the Catharpin road. General Hays' division, in two lines, extended to the right, as far as the unfinished railroad. General Webb, with his division in two lines, was placed next, then General Prince's division, of the Third Corps, in two lines. Then came General Carr, in two lines, with heavy reserves reaching to the plank road; and then General Caldwell's division of the Second Corps, to support and cover my right flank.

I was thus prepared for strong and repeated assaults, with my flanks well guarded. Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan, chief of staff, and myself, superintended this arrangement, and no part escaped our observation.

At daylight all was prepared, and as the sun shone upon the enemy's line, I examined the whole front. I found that the line had been re-enforced with all the troops and artillery that could be put in position; the breastworks, epaulements, and abatis perfected, and that a run for eight minutes was the least time our line could have to close the space between us, during which we would be exposed to every species of fire. I at once decided not to attack, and so informed General Meade. The operations of the day were thus suspended.

General Meade visited me about 10 a. m., and, after full consideration, I advised against any further operations on the enemy's immediate front. Any further attempt to outflank the enemy in his immediate presence, with the force I then had, separated, as I was, 4 miles from the right wing, exposed my command to the chances of an overwhelming attack from him, and was not justifiable on any principle, nor was it proposed to me. But either this or an attack where I was, or rejoining the right wing, was all that could be done that day.

The plan of bringing our whole army to the enemy's right, where I was, and thus turn his position, required a complete abandonment of our base. This, I think, was much less hazardous than an assault in front. The commanding general, however, did not approve of it, and after remaining quiet during the rest of the day, and the 1st of December, during which time the enemy still further strengthened and extended his intrenchments, we, on the night of the 1st, retired from our position, and recrossed the Rapidan, on the morning of the 2d instant, in obedience to orders.

The corps was engaged on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of November, and its loss in killed, wounded, and missing is 289.* General Terry's division, of the Sixth Corps, lost about 20 men.

During these operations all under my command behaved in the most praiseworthy manner, and their strength and spirit are unimpaired.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. K. WARREN, Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, A. A. G., Army of the Potomac.

P. S.-The detailed reports have not yet been received, and it is my desire to make honorable mention of worthy officers and soldiers during this campaign when my full information will enable me to do justice to all.

* See revised statement, p. 679,