The batteries of the center and right were to open at 8 o'clock, at which time Warren was to make the main attack, and at 9 o'clock Sedgwick was to assault with his column, and, when these attacks proved successful, the three divisions of the Third and First Corps left to hold the center would assault, in conjunction with the others, after making demonstrations in their fronts at 8 o'clock. The division of cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Gregg held the plank road in rear of the infantry, and repulsed several attempts of the enemy's cavalry to break through his lines for the purpose of reaching our communications. The division of cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Custer, charged with the duty of holding the upper fords of the Rapidan, was very active, and crossed the river and followed up the enemy wherever he fell back from his works. On the 30th, the batteries opened at 8 a. m. The skirmishers of the First and Third Corps advanced across Mine Run and drove in the enemy's skirmishers, and every preparation was made by Sedgwick for his attack (he having moved his columns during the night and Imassed them out of view of the enemy), when, about ten minutes of 9, I received a dispatch from General Warren to the effect that "the position and strength of the enemy seem so formidable in my present front that I advise against making the attack here-the full light of the sun shows me that I cannot succeed." The staff officer who brought this dispatch further reported that General Warren had suspended his attack, and would not make it without further orders. As Sedgwick's attack was subsidiary to Warren's, and as, owing to Warren's confidence of the night before, I had given him so large a part of the army that I had not the means of supporting Sedgwick in case of a repulse, or re-enforcing him in the event of success, I was obliged to suspend the attack of Sedgwick on the enemy's left, which I did just in time; and immediately proceeded to General - Warren's column, some 4 miles distant, in the hope of arranging some plan by which the two attacks might yet take place in the afternoon. I reached General Warren between 10 and 11 a. m., and found his views were unchangeable, and that it was his decided opinion it was hopeless to make any attack. It was too late to move the troops back and make an attack on the center that day, and General Warren was already so far separated from the right that his movement to turn the enemy's right could not be continued without moving up the rest of the army in support, and abandoning the turnpike road, our main line of communications. Nothing further could be done this day, and at night the two divisions of the Third Corps returned to the center, and the Fifth and Sixth Corps returned to their former positions. It was then reported to me that the opening of our batteries in the morning had exposed to the enemy our threatened attack on his left, and that he could be seen strengthening the position, by earthworks, abatis, putting guns in position, &c., so that by nightfall the chances of success had been materially diminished, and, knowing he would work all night, I felt satisfied that by morning the proposed point of attack, which had been weak, would be as strong as any other part of his line. Under these circumstances I could see no other course to pursue than either to hazard an assault, which I knew to be hopeless, and which I believed would be attended with certain disaster, or, acknowledging the whole movement a failure, withdraw the army to the south bank of the Rapidan. 2 R R-VOL XXIX, PT I To have attempted any further flank movement would have required abandoning the turnpike and plank roads, and involved the necessity of bringing across the river and up to my lines the supply trains of the army, which till now had remained at Richardsville. I was precluded from attempting this by the knowledge that a day's storm would prevent this train and the artillery from returning, and that, in the event of disaster, I should have to abandon both. Besides, an inspection of the map will show that all the roads in that part of the country run nearly east and west, connecting Gordonsville and Orange Court-House with Fredericksburg, whereas, in moving around the enemy, I should have to take a southerly direc tion, and would be obliged to make roads across the country, not only the work of time, but, from the character of the soil, impracticable at this period of frosts. In full view of the consequences, after mature deliberation, I determined to withdraw the army. But for the restrictions imposed upon me by the instructions of the General-in-Chief, I should, in retiring, have taken up a position in front of Fredericksburg, and I cannot but think that substantial advantages would have resulted from such a disposition of the army. I am free to admit that the movement across the Rapidan was a failure, but I respectfully submit that the causes of this failure, a careful perusal of the foregoing report will show, were beyond my control. I maintain my plan was a feasible one. Had the columns made the progress I anticipated, and effected a junction on the night of the 26th, at and near Robertson's Tavern, the advance the next day would either have passed the formidable position of Mine Run without opposition, or, had Ewell attempted to check the movement, he would have been overwhelmed before re-enforced by Hill. Prisoners reported that Hill did not come up till the afternoon of the 27th, so that if the movements of the Third Corps had been prompt and vigorous on the 27th, assisted by the Sixth and Second, there was every reason to believe Ewell could have been overcome before the arrival of Hill. And after the enemy, through these culpable delays, had been permitted to concentrate on Mine Run, I have reason to believe, but for the unfortunate error of judgment of Major-General Warren, my original plan of attack in three columns would have been successful, or, at least, under the view I took of it, would certainly have been tried. It may be said I should not depend on the judgment of others, but it is impossible a commanding general can reconnoiter in person a line of over 7 miles in extent, and act on his own judgment as to the expediency of attacking or not. Again, it may be said that the effort should have been made to test the value of my judgment, or, in other words, that I should encounter what I believed to be certain defeat, so as to prove conclusively that victory was impossible. Considering how sacred is the trust of the lives of the brave men under my command, but willing as I am to shed their blood and my own where duty requires, and my judgment dictates that the sacrifice will not be in vain, I cannot be a party to a wanton slaughter of my troops for any mere personal end. The reports of the corps commanders, with those of such of the division commanders as accompany them, together with lists of the casualties, are all herewith submitted, except those from the cavalry, not yet received. I also send a sketch,* prepared by the engineers, showing the routes * See p. 19. taken by each column. The point marked "Widow Morris" is where the roads fork, the left-hand fork being the one the Third Corps should have taken. The point marked Tom Morris" is the scene of the action of the 27th ultimo. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS, GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General, Commanding. Adjutant-General, U. S. Army. Maj. S. F. BARSTOW, DECEMBER 8, 1863-8 p. m. Care of Maj. S. Breck, Asst. Adjt. Gen.: MAJOR: General Meade desires that you will make the following changes in his report: Where he mentions Birney's division as relieving Carr's, strike out the words, "and evidently, from the reports, bore the brunt of the engagement," and change the word "his," after "advancing," a little further on in the narrative, into "itз.' The report will then read: "Birney's division formed in rear of Carr's, soon relieved the latter, repulsing all the attacks," &c., and "advancing its line of skirmishers," &c. These changes come about midway of the report. Please acknowledge this. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General. List of Casualties during the recent operations of the Army of the Potomac, November 26-December 4, 1863. AUGUST 4, 1863.-Skirmish at Brandy Station, Va. REPORTS. No. 1.-Maj. Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding First Army Corps. No. 1. Reports of Maj. Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding First Army Corps. HEADQUARTERS FIRST CORPS, GENERAL: General Buford was attacked this p. m. by a brigade of cavalry and six guns (Whitworth and 12-pounder). Enemy were driven from the first, being pressed so hard as to prevent their forming. Buford has established his pickets 800 yards in advance of where they were this morning. Did not push his advantage, although he could have done so but thought nothing was to be gained by it, Some picket firing yet (dark), but no apprehensions of an attack. All quiet now, 8.20. Major-General HUMPHREYS, JOHN NEWTON, Major-General, Commanding. Chief Staff, Army of the Potomac. RAPPAHANNOCK, August 4, 1863-5.30 p. m. (Received 6.10.) GENERAL: The following dispatch has just been received from General Buford: Do not think the attack amounts to much; we are driving the enemy back. BUFORD. The cannonading has steadily receded for a half an hour since the above was received. General HUMPHREYS. No. 2. JOHN NEWTON, Reports of Brig. Gen. John Buford, U. S. Army, commanding First Cavalry Division. HEADQUARTERS FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION, August 4, 1863. Everything is quiet in my front. Nothing new has been learned of the enemy's movement. His line is so strong that I cannot penetrate it without a fight. Very respectfully, JNO. BUFORD, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding. Colonel ALEXANDER, Chief of Staff, Hdqrs. Cav. Corps, Army of the Potomac. |