a severe engagement, the enemy bringing up infantry, he fell back to the Fifth Corps, which held the enemy in check.

'The night has been spent in bringing up the Sixth and First Corps, now going into position, and I shall immediately advance to the attack. Prisoners have been taken from both Hill's and Ewell's corps, which are in position in my front, covering Orange Court-House. GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK.

DECEMBER 1, 1863.

GENERAL: After writing my last dispatch (a. m., 28th instant), it was ascertained the enemy had retired on the old turnpike. He was followed to the crossing of Mine Run, where he was found in a formidable position, not only so by nature, but greatly strengthened by intrenchments.

The army was in position by the morning of the 29th, and on that afternoon General Warren, with the Second Corps, was sent to the plank road, where the enemy was also found strongly intrenched. Every effort has been made, as yet without avail, to find a point where an assault would be practicable, and both flanks have been threatened by our extending from our lines of communication as far as prudence will permit. I shall endeavor to maneuver the enemy out of his works.

Major-General HALLECK.

GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General, Commanding.

DECEMBER 2, 1863, 12 m.
(Received 7 p. m.)

GENERAL: It being my deliberate judgment that there was no probability of success in attacking the enemy in his strongly intrenched position, and it being impossible to make any further movement toward his right, I deemed it my duty to withdraw the army, and have accordingly recrossed the Rapidan, and shall re-occupy the position I left when I advanced to turn his right flank.

It is due to myself to say that but for your disapproval of a change of base, I should, instead of recrossing the Rapidan, have taken up a position in front of Fredericksburg. I have further to add that I do not see any other movement now practicable, at this advanced season, and that nothing but remarkably fortunate weather has enabled me to execute the operation just completed.

GEO. G. MEADE, Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

December 7, 1863.

GENERAL: My last report of the operations of this army included the 20th ultimo. I have now to submit, in continuance of that com

munication, the following report of subsequent operations to the present date:

The railroad and the depot at Brandy Station being completed, and all the necessary wants of the army supplied, arrangements were at once made for an advance. The position of the enemy was known to be behind his strong intrenchments on the Rapidan. These were known to extend from the junction of the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers to a point as high up as Liberty Mills, west of Orange Court-House.

An attack in front had long been impracticable, and the instructions of the General-in-Chief confined my operations to such tactical maneuvers as my judgment dictated. A movement, therefore, to immediately turn either flank of the enemy was the question to be decided. I ascertained from reliable sources that the enemy had abandoned the design of guarding the lower fords, but relied for the protection of his right flank on an intrenched line he had constructed perpendicular to the Rapidan, leaving it at Morton's Ford and extending as far as Bartlett's Mill on the road from Robertson's Tavern to Raccoon Ford. (See accompanying sketch.)

I could hear of no works or defenses on the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike or plank road. Ewell's corps, estimated between 25,000 and 30,000 men, held the line from Bartlett's Mill to near Rapidan Station, and Hill's corps, over 25,000 strong, held the left from Rapidan Station to Liberty Mills.

The plan I decided on was to cross the Rapidan at the lower fords, in three columns, and by a prompt movement seize the plank road and turnpike, advancing rapidly toward Orange Court-House, thus turning the enemy's works, and compelling him to give battle on ground not previously selected or prepared, and I indulged the hope that in the execution of this plan I should be enabled to fall on part of the enemy's forces before he could effect a concentration, and thus so cripple him as to render more certain the success of the final struggle.

In accordance with this plan, orders were issued on the 23d for the movement. A storm occurring during the night of the 23d, the orders were postponed till the morning of the 26th, at 6 a. m. of which day the several columns were directed to move.

Major-General French, commanding the Third Corps, was directed to proceed with his corps to Jacobs' Mill, cross the Rapidan at that point, and continue his march by a road known to exist from Jacobs' Mill to Robertson's Tavern, where he would effect a junction with the Second Corps. Major-General Warren was ordered to cross at Germanna Ford and take the turnpike to Robertson's Tavern.

The Fifth Corps, Major-General Sykes, was directed to cross at Culpeper Ford, and entering the plank road, to continue his march as far as Parker's Store, and, if practicable, to the crossing of the road from Robertson's Tavern.

A division of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Gregg, was ordered to cross at Ely's Ford and proceed on the Catharpin road as far as Corbin's Bridge, to cover the left flank of the army. A division of cavalry, under General Custer, held the upper fords of the Rapidan, and the Third Division, under General Merritt, was ordered to guard the trains assembled at Richardsville.

Anticipating an attempt on the part of the enemy to check the heads of columns until he could get into position, and looking for this attack first on my right flank, the nearest to his known position,

I ordered the Sixth Corps, Major-General Sedgwick, to follow the Third Corps, thus placing considerably more than half my infantry on the right flank, and directed Major-General Newton, commanding two divisions of the First Corps (the Third Division being left on the railroad), to follow the Fifth Corps, thus re-enforcing the left flank, and leaving the center to be supported from either of the other two columns, as circumstances might render the most convenient.

In accordance with the above order, the troops were put in motion at 6 a. m. of the 26th, the heads of columns of the Fifth and Second Corps reaching the river between 9 and 10 a. m., but the Third Corps, from causes not yet explained, not getting to Jacobs' Mill till after 12 m., and thus delaying the other two corps, the advance being directed to be simultaneous.

This delay of the Third Corps, together with physical obstacles arising from the steep banks of the Rapidan at all the crossings, proved fatal to the design of having the heads of columns reach Robertson's Tavern and its vicinity by the night of the 26th, as was expected, the corps all crossing, but the heads of columns only proceeding a mile or two before bivouacking. Orders were issued for the columns to move at early daylight on the 27th, and renew the march as previously indicated.

The Second Corps arrived at Robertson's Tavern about 10 a. m., driving the enemy's skirmishers for some distance before reaching it, and at the tavern coming into the presence of a considerable force of the enemy, said by prisoners to be parts of two divisions of Ewell's corps. At this point I directed General Warren to halt and maintain his ground until connection was made with the Third Corps, momentarily expected.

About 11 a. m. a communication was received from General French to the effect that the head of his column was near the plank road, and that he was waiting for General Warren. A reply was immediately sent to him to push on promptly, and he would find General Warren at Robertson's Tavern, then engaged with the enemy and requiring his support. Several officers were sent to communicate with General French and to urge him forward.

About 1 p. m. a dispatch was received from General French saying the enemy were throwing a force to his right flank on the Raccoon Ford road. On the receipt of this a peremptory order was sent to General French to move forward at once, and, if the enemy interposed, to attack with his whole force at all hazards, throwing forward his left toward General Warren. This order, as I am informed by Captain Cadwalader, aide-de-camp-who accompanied the officer carrying it was received at 2.30 p. m. by General French, who protested against it as hazardous to his command, and desired Captain Cadwalader to assume the responsibility of suspending it.

General French, in his report herewith submitted, states that after sending, at 9.20 a. m., to General Prince (commanding his leading division), to ascertain his position, he (General French) became satisfied that the head of his column had struck the Raccoon Ford road near the enemy's intrenched position on Mine Run, and that he then determined to throw his line forward, deploying to his left to connect with Warren; and that he communicated this fact to the commanding general. No such information was received by me, and it would appear, by the reports of the division commanders of the Third Corps, that no such movement was made by that corps till about 2.30 p. m., or the time my order was delivered, as stated, by Captain Cadwalader, aide-de-camp.

Brigadier-General Prince, commanding the leading division, reports that, after advancing a short distance (about a mile), he came to a fork in the road, where he halted to obtain information; that he ascertained that the right-hand fork was the most direct route to Robertson's Tavern, but that it led into the Raccoon Ford road occupied by the enemy; that the left-hand road led to Robertson's Tavern, and also in the direction of Warren's firing, which he plainly heard. For these reasons General Prince was satisfied he should take the left-hand road, and so reported to General French, and awaited orders. After a delay of two hours, he was finally ordered to take the other road, which he did, his skirmishers soon encountering the enemy. He then reports he was ordered to cease operations as he was on the wrong road, and, after another delay, he was again ordered forward, with the information that he was on the right road.

Soon after advancing the second time, Carr's division being deployed on his left, the enemy opened a warm fire, and General Prince reports his line fell back a short distance, till they uncovered a battery he had posted in the only open ground that was in the rear. The line rallied, and reformed behind the battery, the fire from which checked the advancing enemy, when the line advanced to its former position and halted, the action ceasing, as it was then dark.

General Carr, on the left of General Prince, had one of his brigades driven back, and his other brigades relieved by Birney's division after exhausting their ammunition. Birney's division, formed in rear of Carr's, soon relieved the latter, repulsing all the attacks of the enemy, and finally, toward dark, advancing its line of skirmishers over the battle-field.

I have been thus minute in the details of the movements of the Third Corps, because, in my opinion, the unnecessary delay in the progress of this corps, and the failure to attack the enemy as soon as he was encountered, deploying to the left, and allowing the Sixth Corps to pass and continue the line to Warren, was the cause that a junction of the center and right columns was not made early on the morning of the 27th, and was one of the primary causes of the failure of the whole movement.

In consequence of this delay, Warren remained on the defensive all day, and toward evening, being pressed by the enemy, and I being anxious to hold Robertson's Tavern, the center and key-point of my position, sent orders for the First Corps to move over from the plank road to the support of Warren, the corps arriving at Robertson's Tavern about dark on the 27th. The Fifth Corps moved early in the morning, after a slight delay, to permit Gregg's division of cavalry to precede it on the plank road.

Gregg advanced as far as [New] Hope Church, where he had a severe engagement with the enemy's cavalry, in which he was successful in driving them until they were strongly re-enforced by infantry, when Gregg fell back and was relieved by Major-General Sykes, commanding the Fifth Corps, who by this time had been advised of the failure of the Third Corps to connect with the Second, and who was accordingly instructed not to advance beyond the crossing of the road from Robertson's Tavern, near which is [New] Hope Church.

From reports of the force in front of Major-Generals French and Warren, there was reason to believe the enemy were concentrating on the turnpike and Raccoon Ford roads, and orders were sent to the Sixth and Fifth Corps to move over toward Robertson's Tavern, which order was executed by daylight the next morning, the 28th ultimo.

On this day, the 28th, disposition was made to attack the enemy, but, on driving in his pickets, it was found he had retired during the night. Pursuit was immediately made, the Second Corps in advance, when, after a march of about 2 miles, the enemy was found in position on the west bank of Mine Run.

A severe storm of rain had set in, delaying the march of the troops, particularly the artillery, and preventing a position being taken up till after dark, at which time the Second, Sixth, First, and part of the Third Corps were in line fronting the enemy.

A reconnaissance of the enemy's position showed it to be extremely formidable. The western bank of Mine Run, with an elevation of over 100 feet, had a gentle and smooth slope to the creek, averaging over 1,000 yards of cleared ground. The summit, on which was the enemy's line of battle, was already crowned with infantry parapets, abatis, and epaulements for batteries. The creek itself was a considerable obstacle, in many places swampy and impassable.

A careful examination, made personally and by engineer officers, convinced me there was no probability of success in an attack in our immediate front, in the vicinity of the turnpike. It was therefore determined, on the evening of the 28th, to send Major-General Warren, with the Second Corps and a division of the Sixth Corps, to move to our left, to feel for the enemy's right flank, and turn him, if practicable. At the same time orders were given to each corps commander to critically examine his front and ascertain the practicability of an assault. The 29th was spent in these reconnaissances and the movement of General Warren.

About 6 p. m. Brigadier-General Wright, commanding a division in the Sixth Corps, reported to me he had discovered a point on our extreme right, where the obstacles to be overcome were much less than in our immediate front, and where an assault, he thought, was practicable with inconsiderable loss. At the same time Captain Michler, Engineers, reported that an assault in front of the Third Corps, though hazardous, was not impracticable. I also learned from Major Ludlow, aide-de-camp, just returned from General Warren's column, that General Warren had moved up the plank road, driving in the enemy's skirmishers till he developed their line of battle, and had taken a position which outflanked the enemy, and from which there was no difficulty of assaulting and turning the enemy's flank. These favorable reports caused me to decide on making three assaults, one on the enemy's left flank, with the Sixth and Fifth Corps ; one on the center, with the Third and First Corps, and one on the enemy's right, by the force under General Warren, consisting of the Second Corps and one division of the Sixth.

At 8 p. m. General Warren reported in person, confirming all Major Ludlow had reported, and expressing such confidence, in his ability to carry everything before him as to induce him to give the opinion that he did not believe the enemy would remain over night, so completely did he command him. The earnest confidence that General Warren expressed of his ability to carry everything before him, and the reliance I placed on that officer's judgment, together with the fact that Major-General French had given an adverse opinion to assaulting in his front, induced me to modify my plan so far as to abandon the center attack, and re-enforce Warren's column with two divisions of the Third Corps, which would give him six divisions, nearly half the infantry force under my command. Orders were accordingly issued to that effect.