When we arrived near the river I directed Captain McDonald to turn his trains down the river to the crossing near the ford, send his teams to camp, bivouac his men, and build his bridge at daylight. We reached our old camp, about 1 mile from the river (where I had left Captain Folwell and his company), at midnight, put out the teams and bivouacked for the night. The weather was intensely cold, and the men suffered from insufficient protection.

At 7.30 on the morning of the 4th instant Captain McDonald's bridge was completed. Early in the morning a large force was at work on the trains, putting them in order for instant use.

At 10.15 a. m. I received an order from Major Duane to send a train to Welford's Ford, on Hazel Run, and build a bridge there, and requesting me to state at what hour the bridge would be finished. The distance was about 8 miles. I replied that the train would start in one hour, and the bridge probably be completed at from 2.30 to 3 p. m. I sent Captain Hine with his train, giving him Captain Folwell's animals that had been resting while we were gone to the Rapidan.

Captain Hine writes me that the roads were bad, but that his bridge was completed at 2.55 p. m.

At noon to-day (the 5th instant) I received orders to have a train ready to move to Kelly's Ford at short notice. I directed Company F to be ready, had the harness put on the animals, and sent a telegram to headquarters that the train was all ready except hitching up. Up to this hour (10.30 p. m.) it has not been ordered to move.

I was directed to put the roads in order from this place to Bealeton and to call upon General Sykes for such assistance as I might require, which I did. The Eighty-third Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Lamont commanding, reported this morning with about 350 men. Twenty wagons were also sent.

I placed Captain McDonald in charge of the work, and it is progressing fairly. Captain McDonald is thoroughly efficient in this department, as in every other in which I have had occasion to place him. Though partially crippled by the wound in his arm he does full duty, and does it more fully and faithfully than any other line officer in my command except, perhaps, Captain Folwell; and not only this, but he has drilled and disciplined his men until they have now the finest appearance and most soldierly bearing of the men of any company in this detachment.

The behavior of our men has been excellent. In fact, since our active operations commenced, nearly two months since, there has been no occasion for serious punishment and rarely for reprimand. The labor performed by our small detachment while on the Rapidan, besides building and maintaining the bridges, was more than I have seen done by any 1,000 men in the same length of time since I have been in the service.

We are now hard at work upon our trains, making them as perfect as possible, and holding them always ready for immediate use. The surgeon reports 5 men only off duty. The health of the remainder is good. Our animals are also in good condition.

Very respectfully,

I. SPAULDING,

Lieut. Col., Comdg. Detachment 50th New York Vol. Engrs.

Brig. Gen. H. W. BENHAM,

Commanding Engineer Brigade.

64 R R-VOL XXIX, PT I

Review by Judge-Advocate-General Joseph Holt, U. S. Army, of the proceedings of a court of inquiry, convened by Brig. Gen. Benja min F. Kelley, commanding the Department of West Virginia, at the request of Col. Benjamin L. Simpson, Ninth Maryland Infantry, to investigate the circumstances attending the surprise and capture of Charlestown, W. Va., October 18, 1863.

The undersigned have obtained all the evidence in this case which has been attainable. They have carefully considered and compared it, and in obedience to the order convening them respectfully express their opinion to be:

That the surprise and capture of the greater part of the forces under the command of Col. Benjamin L. Simpson, Ninth Maryland Infantry, at Charlestown, Va., on the morning of the 18th day of October ultimo, were inevitable, because of the peculiar location of the place, which, surrounded by an open country for several miles on all sides, and approachable by a large number of roads from all directions, was easy to be flanked and surrounded, and because of the superior force by which it was attacked and of the inferior force for its defense. The rebel attacking force was 2,000 men, with six pieces of artillery. The defending force, under the command of Colonel Simpson, consisted of 375 infantry and 75 or 80 cavalry. Although the pickets of Colonel Simpson were posted not so far out as at first view might seem to have been desirable, yet when the smallness of his force and the circuit of his picket lines, extending as they were established 3 miles, are taken into account, it is not perceived how he can be justly held blamable for not extending them farther. The proof shows that General Lockwood when in command directed one of the posts to be drawn in from what he considered its too great exposure. That they were driven in simultaneously and rapidly was due to the location of Charlestown, and the fact that the enemy had availed of it to post his forces around it on all sides during the darkness of the night of the 17th, and so to be ready for attack on each picket post at the same moment, which it may well be inferred had been previously fixed on. Colonel Simpson's infantry force consisted of part of the Ninth Maryland Volunteers, which had been in the service but two months and had not been under fire before. The exposure to an artillery fire as described in the testimony, whilst the enemy approached their position by cross and by streets, keeping concealed from view and refusing fair combat, was well calculated to demoralize new troops. Still a very painful feature of the affair was the disorganized condition of the men from the time they left the yard of the court-house to the time of their capture. In such a case the undersigned are of opinion that the field and line officers should have enforced the orders given to form column and line respectively, and should have maintained military order and decorum and consequent efficiency, by such use of their side-arms upon their own men as might have been necessary to accomplish these results. In such case the worst enemies to the whole theory and spirit of the Army Regulations are those men who refuse from any cause compliance with the first paragraph of the first article of those regulations, and such enemies should be met and subdued by all the means at command of their officers. The undersigned are not aware

that the course of action indicated has been recognized as a general rule governing officers under like circumstances, and they cannot therefore feel justified in censuring Colonel Simpson or his officers for having failed to pursue a course consonant with their opinions but not demanded by a generally recognized rule, whilst they think it unfortunate that it did not occur to them to resort to it. They entertain no doubt, however, that whatever might have been the action of Colonel Simpson and his officers in this respect, the result would have been the same. The capture was inevitable, from the superior force of the enemy and its success in having selected its positions without hinderance, because of the facilities before alluded to. All the facts and circumstances considered together, the undersigned think that no blame can justly be attached to Colonel Simpson on account of the surprise and capture of Charlestown, Va., on the 18th October last.

There is a feature of this transaction which the undersigned think ought not to be passed without notice. It is a clearly established fact that the rebel forces, commanded by General Imboden, did, on the occasion referred to, shell Charlestown whilst it was occupied by women and children without allowing time for their possible removal from the localities shelled. And it is notorious that the population of Charlestown is composed, almost wholly, of active, or warmly sympathizing, co-laborers and friends of General Imboden in the work of rebellion. And this was done by a general with a force of 2,000 men and six pieces of artillery attacking a force of 450 men with not one piece of artillery. It is irresistibly inferable that the object of the rebel commander was the capture of the force, so greatly inferior to his own, before that force could receive re-enforcements to put it on an equality with his, and so have opportunity for a fair, equal, and manly fight; and that, to the accomplishment of this object, he did not hesitate to sacrifice the safety of the women and children of the-by him and them-claimed Southern Confederacy. In fact, within a short period after the accomplishment of this feat, the entire force of General Imboden retreated rapidly before the charge of Major Cole's battalion of about 300 men, which had come up to Colonel Simpson's relief; and before that battalion and one regiment of infantry (the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts) and one battery of artillery (Miner's), which shortly after came up, all under command of Col. George D. Wells, commanding First Brigade, and numbering less than 700 men all told, he continued industriously his retreat, with his 2,000 men and six pieces of artillery, for more than 9 miles, and until the pursuing force was recalled.

The loss of Colonel Simpson's regiment at Charlestown was 2 men killed, 2 officers and 7 men wounded, 16 officers and 340 men captured; 4 wagons, 2 ambulances, and 20 horses, together with some arms, and the ammunition on the persons of the men, about 60 rounds each.

There was but a small quantity of quartermaster's or other stores on hand.

WM P. MAULSBY, Col. 1st Maryland P. H. B. Vols., President Court of Inquiry. FRANK A. ROLFE,

Major First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery.

W. B. CURTIS.

Major Twelfth Regiment West Virginia Volunteer Infantry.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF WEST VIRGINIA,

Cumberland, Md., December 22, 1863.

The within proceedings of a court of inquiry convened at Harper's Ferry, Va., to inquire into the facts and circumstances connected with the surprise and capture, on the 18th day of October last at Charlestown, Va., of the forces under the command of Col. Benjamin L. Simpson, Ninth Maryland Volunteers, are respectfully forwarded for the consideration of the honorable Secretary of War. After a careful perusal of the testimony adduced, I cannot concur in the opinion expressed by the Court that no blame can justly be attached to Colonel Simpson on account of the surprise and capture of Charlestown, or that the capture was inevitable. I am of the opinion that Colonel Simpson was derelict in suffering his command to be surprised, and that he could and should have maintained himself in his position until he could have been relieved by the forces at Harper's Ferry, which were started to his assistance as soon as the cannonading of the enemy was heard at that place. I therefore respectfully recommend that Col. Benjamin L. Simpson, Ninth Maryland Volunteer Infantry, be dismissed from the service of the United States.

B. F. KELLEY,
Brigadier-General.

REVIEW.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

January 23, 1864.

The within is a record* of the proceedings of a court of inquiry convened at Harper's Ferry on the 13th of November at the request of Colonel Simpson, of the Ninth Maryland Volunteers, to investigate the facts and circumstances connected with the surprise and capture of Charlestown and the forces occupying it on the 18th of October, and to give an opinion in the case.

From the evidence adduced the following facts appear:

The village of Charlestown is built upon uneven ground, surrounded by wooded hills and valleys. There are eight roads leading to it from different directions, all connected by another, which at some distance from the town completely encircles it. On the 20th of August Colonel Simpson was ordered by his brigade commander to proceed with the forces under him from Loudoun Heights and encamp in the woods on the east side of the village. After his arrival he received orders and instructions, some written, some verbal, all of which do not appear in evidence from the fact that some of the originals and the books in which they were copied have been lost or captured. The general tenor or substance of all these material to the case in question were presented for the consideration of the Court. Up to the date of the capture they appear to have been carried out promptly as far as practicable, and the result communicated by Colonel Simpson to his brigade and division commanders.

Colonel Simpson's command consisted of portions of seven companies of the Ninth Maryland Volunteers, amounting to about 350 men and a cavalry force of about 80 men.

*Filed in the office of the Judge-Advocate-General U. S. Army.

His instructions from his brigade commander were that the holding of Charlestown itself was of no more importance than as though it was an open plain, but to be vigilant in scouting the country, watching the movements of the enemy in his front, to engage and whip any force that came within his reach that was not too strong for him, and if attacked by superior numbers to retire. From about the middle of September there appears to have been a force of rebels in that vicinity, which for some time were believed to be small, under the command of Major White. About the 1st of October it was rumored that an advance of a part of Lee's army in that direction might be expected, and that unusual vigilance was necessary. On the 7th of October he was informed by Colonel Wells, commanding brigade, that Imboden was said to be preparing to make a raid on the railroad between Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry.

On the 13th of October he was directed to send a scouting party to Berryville, and one, consisting of 10 men, to follow the summit of Blue Ridge toward Front Royal. On the same day he informed Colonel Wells that he sent a force to Berryville, which drove in the enemy's pickets (supposed to be of White's battalion), but being too small to make an attack, returned; and that they could hear of no force approaching up the valley; and that the scout ordered to Blue Ridge had returned, being unable to proceed on that road; and he asked if they should endeavor to go forward by any other route. On the 14th it also appears that he had his wagons packed, and all preparations made to fall back to Harper's Ferry, but received an order from General Sullivan to wait till he was attacked. During the day he sent word to Colonel Wells that he had scouted every road leading from Charlestown, had found a force at Berryville, supposed to be White's, and a small force at Smithfield, but had gained no information of any heavy force in the valley. That he was informed that it was the intention to annoy his pickets that night; therefore he had increased their numbers, and would advance his posts on some of the roads, and have a company of men under arms to re-enforce any point that might be attacked. On the 15th he was informed by Colonel Wells that it was reported in Harper's Ferry that Imboden was at Berryville with "something of a force," and that a part of it was being sent around between Charlestown and the river, and that the matter should be looked into. Colonel Wells closed his communication by saying that the alarm about an approach up the valley seemed to have been without foundation, and that Colonel Simpson could resume the even tenor of his way at Charlestown the same as before. On the same day Colonel Wells further informed him that he had sent a detachment of cavalry on the road from Martinsburg to Winchester and Berryville, with orders to convey any information they might obtain to Charlestown. On the 17th Colonel Simpson informed Colonel Wells that a detachment of cavalry came into Charlestown the night before, being unable to reach Berryville on account of White's occupation of it. That an officer of Cole's battalion had arrived, having been wounc'ed in a skirmish, and that he represented that no other force was in the valley but Imboden's; and further that he had captured one of White's men, who informed him that White's battalion, consisting of 150 cavalry and 80 dismounted as infantry, had been at Berryville, had reconnoitered the position at Charlestown, and had found it too strong for them; and that White had moved away, and Imboden