would not only ruin the Central Powers but would also bring economic distress to the other countries, including the United States, that are bound to the Teutonic Powers by economic bonds. Therefore, to aid in the annulment of the Treaty of Versailles would be to perform a valuable service not only to Germany and Austria but also to the United States and the other Great Powers.

The author is of the opinion that the "German Government's share of guilt in the matter is extremely small", and that the Allied Powers are mainly to blame for bringing on the world conflict. In support of this opinion he endeavors to show that England was inspired by jealousy of Germany due to economic rivalry and was doing all in her power to isolate her rival during the decade preceding August, 1914; that the French and British military authorities had been "in active collaboration for war with Germany ever since January, 1906"; and that Russia, supported by France, had been preparing for war since 1909. Practically nothing is said of the negotiations that took place during the eventful twelve days that preceded the outbreak. The fact that Austria, certainly with the permission if not the encouragement of Germany, started the war by an unjustifiable attack on Serbia, is entirely ignored. Apparently he fails to appreciate the importance of the immediate causes in apportioning the blame for the great war.

The desire to create a sentiment in favor of a conquered people is to be commended, and any worthy effort to tone down the prejudice of our people against their former enemies should be encouraged. But when anyone essays this difficult rôle he should be peculiarly fitted by training and temperament for the work. To defy successfully a well-entrenched prejudice, a writer should be well armed with evidence and should be able to present it in a cool, dispassionate manner. The author of this work does not meet either of these tests. The unrestrained partisanship exhibited by him antagonizes the reader and the evidence offered is not sufficient to overcome this

antagonism. His range of sources is narrow. He gets nearly all of his material from three books written by E. D. Morel and Francis Neilson. From these works he has gathered some documentary evidence in support of his contention, though not enough to convince the reader that he has sustained the charges made against the Allies. He quotes from the reports made by Belgian diplomatic representatives at Paris, London and Berlin to the Belgian foreign office covering the period from February, 1905, to July, 1914. He also refers to and quotes from the Russian documents made public by the Soviet

authorities. However, he does not make as good a use of the Russian documents as he might have done. For example, he says that they show that France and Russia, and England and France, had entered into secret treaties of alliance in 1912, but he does not give the texts of any of these treaties. While much that he says is true, yet the evidence presented is often not convincing even in the case of admitted facts.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

Immortal Italy.

O. P. CHITWOOD

By EDGAR ANSEL MOWRER. D. Appleton and Company, 1922.-ix, 418 pp.

New York,

Generally speaking, ancient Italy is better known to us than is modern Italy, much less remote in time, but farther removed from genuine understanding and appreciation. Mr. Mowrer's volume is an attempt to bridge this wide gap. As correspondent of the Chicago Daily News for many years, he has had extended opportunities for studying Italian characteristics and institutions, and has taken full advantage of his unusual contacts with men and affairs. This is not the systematic work of an historian or an economist, but the study of a highly intelligent journalist, who writes largely on the basis of his intimate observation of conditions that came before him. Much of his history comes from Bolton King, but this is not the best part of Immortal Italy. Mr. Mowrer's own comments are more effective, for he does better when he is "on his own", observing and appraising as he goes, and almost always going.

The writer's introductory characterization of the Italian is artistically executed, Italian in its frankness and in its idealistic conclusions. "Everything in Italian life is better than it seems", is his paradoxical conclusion. His discussion of Italy's entrance into the War is illuminating and valuable as the comment of a trained observer. Mr. Mowrer's consideration of Baron Sonnino, the JewishEnglish, Egyptian-born champion and leader of Italian nationalism, is of great interest. The author acutely says that, "What the pious statesmen of other nations have never pardoned him was that he refused to pay verbal homage to principles that he did not intend to serve." The conclusion is that, "The real cause of Italy's diplomatic defeat at Paris and her undeserved humiliation was the stubborn temperament of the silent Minister of Foreign Affairs." His rugged inflexibility was at once the source of his strength and his weakness, Mr. Mowrer believes.

Very readable is the chapter on "Fiume o Morte ", dealing with D'Annunzio's vivid régime in the little city that became a storm center of international politics for two hectic years. The Revolution that Never Was" discusses with great insight the relations between the Italian Socialists and the Russian Communists, ending in the breach between the redoubtable Serrati and the pontifical Lenine, and in the independence of the Italian Left. Mr. Mowrer's description of the origin and tactics of the Fascisti is helpful in obtaining a clear view of this significant movement, so widely discussed and so little comprehended.

The concluding chapter on Present Problems" is brief, too brief, but full of interest and suggestions. A fuller discussion of Turati's plans for the future development of Italy would not have been amiss. Despite the economic deficiencies and the political shortcomings which he depicts, the writer has faith in the future of the Italian nation—a prophet of the Italian idealists. "Sooner or later this country", says he, "with its wholly admirable sense of civilization, its brilliant flowering of individual genius, its wide tolerance and humanity, will inevitably take a great part in the evolution of world culture and politics."

On the whole, Mr. Mowrer's volume is a very readable and useful contribution to the understanding of the Italy that is in the making. This is not a work of broad historical knowledge, detailed analysis of economic and social facts, discriminating discussion of technical points in law and government, although by no means without a factual basis and plenty of keen anaylsis. It is a sympathetic and competent interpretation of the social and political life of a great state which is perhaps less understood than any of the modern members of the family of nations, and which merits much more ample recognition than it has yet been accorded.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHARLES E. MERRIAM

The Great Adventure at Washington: The Story of the Conference. By MARK SULLIVAN. New York, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922.-xi, 290 pp.

In this book, Mr. Mark Sullivan, the national political correspondent of the New York Evening Post, has written a very interesting, easily understood, impressionistic account of some of the plenary sessions of the Washington Conference. His "Story" is marked with excellent word-pictures of many of the delegates and

many of the conference scenes. The picturesque descriptions of Lord Beatty's eyes, Hughes's whiskers, Lord Lee's pencil, Wells's jingoism, Balfour's frock-coat, Briand's oratory, Lord Riddell's propaganda, Mrs. Koo's Parisian clothes, Senator Lodge's resemblance to a tom-cat (p. 207), Kato's inscrutability, and the French fuss over the table-seating will interest many readers who care little about the serious work of such a diplomatic body.

As to the actual results of the Conference, Mr. Sullivan draws at least three conclusions. First, in agreeing to the American proposal for the limitation of armament, Great Britain made a "gesture" (a word of which he is very fond) which was "unique in history". Second, France was the villain who prevented the consideration of land disarmament and the limitation of submarines and auxiliary craft. Third, "The questions of the Far East were not an essential part of that great adventure" (p. 267).

Some of these conclusions may well be challenged. As a matter of fact, England's voluntary "surrender" of the supremacy of the seas, over which Mr. Sullivan rhapsodizes for several chapters, was a foregone conclusion when the Conference was first convened. With the destruction of the German fleet as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and at Scapa Flow, the practical reason for maintaining the traditional British two-power navy disappeared. Because of this reason and of the penurious financial condition in which England found herself, the British Admiralty made the revolutionary announcement in March, 1920, that henceforth Great Britain would be satisfied with a fleet only as strong as that of any other single power. The chief naval significance of the Washington Conference lay not in the ratification of this decision, but in the surrender, on the part of the United States, of the supremacy of the seas which she would have gained in three years if she had carried out her 1916 building program.

Mr. Sullivan says, "I have tried to be as complete as possible about the negotiations to limit armament" (p. 267). Yet instead of describing the respective naval programs of the powers, such as the British two-power standard, the American 1916 program, and the Japanese eight-eight program, he says that at the end of the war "We began a programme of greatly stimulated building", and, when the conference opened, "we were in a position where our navy approximated Great Britain's" (p. 280). In discussing the negotiations over disarmament, he goes into the case of the Mutsu, but he does not mention the great significance of the non-fortifica

This agreement

tion agreement in regard to the Pacific Islands. means much more to Japan than does the retention of the Mutsu. It means that the United States can build no naval bases in the Pacific (outside of Hawaii), and without them her fleet cannot effectively operate. Mr. Sullivan does not mention Singapore or the Bonin islands, which were by no means unimportant factors in these negotiations. Neither is he " complete" in the submarine controversy. He doesn't mention the Castex affair. He does say that Mr. Root introduced four resolutions in regard to submarines (p. 184). But he does not say what these resolutions were or what they really purported to do, except to reduce the "effectiveness" of the submarine. He doesn't mention the question of aircraft or of poison gas. Any account which claims to be as "complete as possible" in regard to the armament negotiations ought to explain these matters. Perhaps the most vulnerable point in Mr. Sullivan's interpretation of the Conference is his assertion that Far Eastern affairs were not an essential part "of the great adventure". This is apparently a case where the wish is father to the thought. Mr. Sullivan says (p. 250), "I am not well grounded on Far Eastern matters". In the perfunctory observations he does deign to make in regard to the Orient, he often goes astray. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was first negotiated in 1902 - not in 1901 (p. 228). It is difficult to justify Japan's position in regard to Shantung on the ground that she took it through "honest warfare" (p. 253). ment is questionable in view of the violation of China's neutrality in the Tsingtau campaign and of Japan's refusal to agree to China's suggestion that all European holdings in the Orient be neutralized during the war. It is also inaccurate to say that "Japan has little or no Chinese territory that she took direct from China" (p. 252), when Japan forced China, in the treaties of May, 1915, to extend the Manchurian leases until 1997. The statement that "The AngloJapanese Alliance was not a contract which automatically came to an end on a fixed date" (p. 236) is also misleading because, despite Lord Birkenhead's interpretation, the alliance was negotiated for a term of ten years.

Even this state

Mr. Sullivan says that the Chinese delegation frankly admitted that "they had not seriously hoped" that all of the Ten Demands would be granted. In proof of which he offers Dr. Wang's statement that China did not propose the "immediate and complete solution of extraterritoriality ". Here Mr. Sullivan misses the point entirely, because China did not ask for the immediate solution of