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have been achieved, although some progress has been registered. Arbitration treaties and various pacts relating to commercial, industrial and cultu ral matters have been signed, and there has been a growing tendency to refer matters of dispute between American states to the arbitration of the Spanish government. The movement of trade between Spain and the HispanicAmerican countries will prove disappointing to those who are searching for this supposedly solid basis for intimacy. Spain's commerce with these states in 1907 was only half what it had been in 1897. This was due largely to the loss of Cuba. But no remarkable increase has been recorded since 1907. In 1913 Spain furnished only three and one-half per cent of the total commerce of Hispanic America, while she purchased from it a still smaller portion of its exports. By 1918 these percentages had risen to about four and one-half and a little more than two and one-half, respectively, while in 1919 the relative percentages decreased, although the absolute bulk increased.2

It

One's estimate of the importance of this Pan-Hispanic movement in Hispanic America will depend, however, upon his theory as to the forces determining national policies and national action. Those who are convinced that economic considerations are the controlling element will be inclined to give it small weight. On the other hand, alarmists who expect the era of national combats to be superseded by titanic inter-racial struggles and those who give great weight to cultural and idealistic influences will take a very different view of the matter. seems to me that the future of the movement will be conditioned largely by three factors: (1) the progress of liberalism and the continuance of economic prosperity in Spain; (2) the persistence of Yankeephobia among the Hispanic-American peoples; and (3) the prevalence in Hispanic America of that social philosophy which maintains that the social problems of these republics can be solved only by a revival of racial pride, a return to the culture and the ideals of the Spanish race.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

J. FRED RIPPY

1 Pan-American Union, Bulletin, January and November, 1919; May, 1921, passim. Data for 1920-1921 are not available.

PROPOSALS FOR THE NEUTRALITY OF THE
BRITISH COLONIES

T

HE question of the neutrality of the British colonies is by no means new. It is a hardy perennial which keeps cropping up from time to time at moments of international complication and danger. From the days of the American colonies to our own time it has troubled the minds of colonial and imperial statesmen. In times of peace the issue lies quiescent and apparently dead, but on the outbreak of war it quickly revives. During the World War it took on a new and more vigorous lease of life. The Treaty of Versailles and the conference at Cannes have given it an additional signifiIn brief, the question has been transformed from a theoretical issue into a matter of practical politics. The selfgoverning Dominions have undoubtedly acquired a new international status but it is by no means certain what that status is in international law or according to the provisions of the League of Nations. The question nevertheless is one which may require an early answer.

Probably the earliest attempt to secure immunity for the colonies in time of war is to be found in the closing days of the Stuart régime. The exposed position of the colonies was a continual source of trouble to the English and French governments throughout the seventeenth century. European wars were fought out again on a smaller scale in the overseas possessions. The French government at this time was anxious to arrange a political and commercial treaty with England and had sent a special commissioner to London for that purpose. The moment was opportune to effect such an arrangement, as King

1 On the outbreak of the war Germany proposed that the colonies of the respective belligerents should be neutralized, but Great Britain refused to entertain the suggestion.

2 Article IV of the abortive Anglo-French alliance provided that "the present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the Dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the Dominion concerned."

James II was engaged in a bitter controversy with Parliam and felt the need of French support to maintain his throne. secret agreement was accordingly concluded, one of the clau of which provided for the neutrality of their respective poss sions in case of war between the two nations. The Revoluti of 1688, however, put an end to this entangling alliance a nothing more was heard of the matter for many years.

The subject naturally attracted much greater interest in t colonies than in England. From the very beginning, the que tion of the international status of the colonies has been close bound up with, and dependent upon, their constitutional rel tions to the mother country. The colonies were looked up at first as appanages of the Crown rather than as parliamentar possessions. They derived their powers from the king an carried on their governments subject to his general supervi ion. It was not until the last half of the seventeenth centur that Parliament began to interfere actively in colonial affair Some of the colonial governments did not take kindly to thi exercise of superior authority over them. Massachusetts too the lead in challenging this attempted usurpation of powers In 1679, the local assembly distinctly repudiated the new doc trine of imperial parliamentary supremacy and asserted a con stitutional equality with the Parliament of Westminster. Ac cording to this conception, the relation between the English and colonial governments was in the nature of a personal union under a common sovereign. But, unfortunately for the colonies Massachusetts was unable to maintain her constitutional contention. She was more than two centuries ahead of the times. Had she succeeded in her claims the whole course of imperial history might have been changed. The Empire would have been speedily transformed from a great imperial state with dependencies into a league or association of equal and independent nations in war as in peace. In other words, the several governments would have been free to direct their own foreign as well as domestic policies according to their particular desires and interests.

1 Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question, p. 274. 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, vol. I, p. 173.

For the most part the supremacy of the British government in matters of war and peace was seldom questioned in the colonies. A royal declaration of war was legally binding on the whole Empire irrespective of the wishes or interests of the particular colonies. But the colonies were still left free to determine what part, if any, they would play in the war. Upon this matter there was the widest divergence of policy and practice among the colonies. The northern colonies, by reason of their exposed situation, generally found themselves either voluntarily or involuntarily engaged in a bitter struggle with their French neighbors, whereas the Quakers of Pennsylvania and the inhabitants of the southern colonies usually declined to participate in these wars unless their territories were threatened by invasion. In 1745, for example, upon learning of the outbreak of war in Europe, Massachusetts proceeded to raise an armed force to attack Louisburg, without even waiting for the approval or military assistance of the home government. Great indeed was her anger and disappointment, therefore, when the British government saw fit to hand back her conquest to the French on the conclusion of peace without even taking the trouble to consult her in regard to its disposition. She felt, and justly felt, that she had been swindled out of her victory. In the end, therefore, Massachusetts found herself worse off than her sister colonies which had declined to render aid and had maintained an attitude of virtual neutrality throughout the struggle.

The colonies, moreover, possessed a limited war-making power for purposes of local defense. In some cases this power was expressly conferred by charter, but in the absence of any such grant, the colonies did not fail to exercise the right whenever the circumstances seemed to require it. The independent exercise of this right sometimes led to serious difficulties, inasmuch as the colonial governments could not always agree upon a common course of action in dealing with the enemy. Each government felt free to pursue its own interests irrespective of the wants or necessities of the sister colonies. The colonies had an excellent object-lesson, as regards the danger of dis

'Parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict, vol. III, p. 86.

union, in 1754, when a majority of the colonial assemblies declined to come to the aid of Virginia in repelling a dangerous French invasion.

A few of the far-seeing leaders in the colonies had long foreseen the need for uniform action in matters of general concern, particularly foreign affairs. An intercolonial conference was accordingly called at Albany, at which a plan of union was drawn up by Benjamin Franklin for submission to the British government and the colonial legislatures. By one of the provisions of this plan, "the president-general" or governor-inchief of the proposed federation was authorized, with the advice of the Grand Council, "to hold and direct all Indian treaties in which the general interest of the colonies may be concerned; to make peace or declare war with the Indian nations." The reason for this proposal is clearly set forth in the accompanying explanation,

but if, in consequence of this power [namely, the independent power of making peace and war] one colony might make peace with a nation that another was justly engaged in war with; or make war on slight occasions without the concurrence or approbation of neighboring colonies greatly endangered by it; or make particular treaties of neutrality in case of a general war to take their own private advantage in trade by supplying the common enemy; of all which there have been instances; it was thought better to have all treaties of a general nature under a general direction that so the good of the whole may be consulted and provided for.

In the minds of the framers of this instrument, the questions of federation, neutrality and treaty-making were all closely interrelated. But the Albany plan of Union signally failed. The scheme was rejected, both by the English Board of Trade and by the colonial assemblies to which it was presented. "The assemblies", according to Franklin, “ all thought there was too much prerogative in it and in England it was thought to have too much of the democratic ".2

About the same time the question of the neutrality of the 1Albany Convention, 1754. Old South Leaflets, vol. I, no. 9.

2 Ibid.

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