AN ITALIAN AMBASSADOR'S DIARY OF THE PEACE

CONFERENCE

'N the rapidly expanding bibliography on "What Happened at Paris" the diary of Count Macchi di Cellere, one of

IN

the foreign diplomats who accompanied President Wilson to Paris, has a distinct place. Though not a great statesman, the Italian ambassador accredited to Washington throughout the period of the World War, was a man of tact and good judgment, well informed as to our ways of thinking and of doing things, and esteemed by many of our political leaders, including President Wilson and the members of his cabinet.

Whether the diary, now given to the Italian public with the consent of the widow of the late ambassador, was intended by him for posthumous publication, is a question. The intimate character of some of its criticisms and strictures might lead one to doubt such an intention; on the other hand, when Di Cellere wrote it he was fully aware of the political intriguing going on at Paris and Rome against him, and the diary may have been meant as a defense for future use. Certain it is that the knowledge of the humiliating machinations going on behind his back colors his record of events, but it colors it not so much with personal resentment as with indignation over the difficulties created for his country by what to this staunch Sonninian appeared (and probably were) the vacillations and incapacities of his political superiors.

The diary appears as an "Exhibit" to a book' published in Italy with a dedication by Countess Macchi di Cellere to her children. It covers only one month (May 12 to June 19, 1919), but a month of very strained relations at Paris, when it seemed as if a break among the Allied Commissioners would be unavoidable. The President had issued his Fiume proclamation and Italian opinion was seething with indignation; Premier

'Justus, V. Macchi di Cellere all' Ambasciata di Washington. R. Bemporad e Figlio, Florence, Italy.

Orlando had threatened to withdraw and the possibility of Japan's secession was more than hinted at. The American delegates and experts appeared divided or uncertain, thus allowing a fruitful field for diplomatic intrigues and "pressure" from every quarter. It is the sequence of all these uncertainties, vacillations, threats and compromises which went on at this time over the Adriatic question, that Di Cellere-a trained and sensitive observer-records as he witnessed them or as he heard them reported. That in his views he is strongly pro-Italian can hardly be held against him; that he thought of some of the Americans in Paris as Italy's friends, and of others as her enemies, is quite human; but that these qualities or defects did not warp his judgment on big issues is shown by his unsparing criticisms of some of his own countrymen no matter what their rank or position. Nor must we, in reading this diary, lose sight of one fact too often overlooked by us in comparing the "spirit of impartiality" of our delegates with those from European countries: that in the settlements which were made, or attempted, at Paris, especially in the carving out of new states or the reducing or enlarging of old ones, we dealt with territories not our own or near our borders. Obviously it is easier to be impartial and high-minded in fixing frontiers for other peoples than for ourselves; the difference in attitude is somewhat like that between the helpless patient and the expert surgeon who benignantly operates upon him-a difference we have too easily, and, in some quarters, too smugly overlooked.

The first entry in the diary gives an idea of the ambassador's activities as a go-between, and of the stage which the Adriatic question had reached at the time (Monday, May 12, 1919). After lunching with the Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino, Di Cellere was asked by Mr. Miller, one of our experts, for an exchange of views preliminary to a meeting which Orlando, the Italian premier, was to have with Colonel House the day following. The plan outlined by Mr. Miller, according to Di Cellere, was that all Italian boundary questions, except those affecting Jugoslavia, should be settled at once, while the Adriatic question should be referred to the League of Nations, which, in the meantime, would take over for a period of five years both

Fiume and Dalmatia except such Dalmatian islands as might be forthwith assigned to Italy. Di Cellere believed that this plan emanated from Colonel House and had the approval of the President. It was nearly midnight when Di Cellere informed Miller that Orlando's “informal reply" was that he would take the proposal under consideration only if it represented a starting point for discussion; otherwise the plan was unacceptable. The next day Miller, at Orlando's request, made a more detailed proposal as follows. Italy's northern frontiers were to be definitely settled at once. All Adriatic questions-Fiume, Istria, Dalmatia, the islands and Valona-were to be grouped as one and to be disposed of thus: Istria to be assigned to Italy except for that strip through which ran the railroad connecting Fiume with Vienna; Fiume and Dalmatia (except a few islands) to be under the control of the League of Nations (similar to the control exercised over the Sarre) for five years, at the end of which period a definitive settlement would be made based on plebiscites, with due consideration of the commercial needs of the hinterland and of the interests and security of Italy in the Adriatic; Zara and Sebenico to be under an Italian mandate. This plan, Miller told Di Celere confidentially a few days later, had the approval of President Wilson. Orlando advanced several objections, some of which were met in a modified proposal which Miller read from a written memorandum at a meeting held the day following (May 14). It was at this interview that, according to the diarist, Orlando made the faux pas of suggesting the possibility of a settlement directly with the Jugoslavs. This had been previously suggested by Colonel House and, on the Italian side, there must have been already an exchange of "feelers" (between April 14 and 24), as Orlando explained that "in the form of strictly private conversations" a tentative plan had been outlined as follows: Italy to have the entire line of the Alps, Fiume to go to Italy with special port privileges to Jugoslavia, the Adriatic islands mostly to Italy, and—as to Dalmatia-Italy to have Zara with its hinterland as far as Sebenico, or else to make Zara, Sebenico and Spalato free cities. What Orlando wanted to know was whether the President would approve of a settlement reached by direct negotiations even if it

should vary from Wilson's proclamation on Fiume. Miller could not say but did not appear to like the new proposal and, in fact, in order to bring Orlando back to the President's plan, stated that the Americans would not insist on taking from Istria the strip of land over which the Fiume-Vienna railroad passed. Orlando, however, was so pleased with the direct negotiations idea that Miller had to take it under advisement, and that evening he informed the Italian premier that the President would not oppose it and would agree both to mediate in the matter and to accept any settlement which might be reached.

On May 15 Di Cellere seems to have maneuvered skilfully so as to have a private chat with Miller, to whom he explained his own opposition to Orlando's plan of direct negotiations. Miller, according to the ambassador, agreed that the plan had its dangers and added that Colonel House, realizing this, had avoided telling Trumbich that the proposal had come from the Italians. But by this time even Orlando had sensed his mistake and on the nineteenth he asked Miller to drop the plan of direct negotiations and take up again the earlier proposal. In fact, all of the morning was spent by Orlando and Sonnino (the latter had never agreed to direct negotiations) in drafting a reply to the Miller proposal. The reply was intrusted to Di Cellere for delivery and elucidation.

In the meantime, however, Trumbich had filed with the Americans the Jugoslav demands, which were of such a nature that Colonel House, according to Miller, had characterized them as "not serious". Miller, in fact, "appeared preoccupied" and the tenseness of the situation is vividly brought out by Di Cellere's entries in his diary for May 16:

At 5 p. m. he [Miller] phones me that House wishes to meet Orlando a little before five-thirty. Orlando was then in my room, and we decide to go immediately to the Crillon. House (in the presence of Miller, Frazier and Beer) says that in order to hasten, if possible, the agreement we desired with the Jugoslavs, he had asked Trumbich to see him at five-thirty; that after seeing him he would report or cause to be reported to Orlando the points under discussion. Then House left and we remain with Miller and Beer (two perfect and sincere friends of ours). . . . It is a long wait. Finally Miller,

who had been summoned away, returns and tells us that the following points have been agreed to [with whom?]: Fiume a free city under the protection and guarantee of the League, the Allies to help it with a loan for its harbor needs; Dalmatia to Jugoslavia under the League; Italy to have Valona and the islands of Lussin, Lissa and Pentacola.

Di Cellere raises various objections of which Miller takes note, and after further parleys Orlando declares that, under the circumstances, the plan of direct negotiations with the Jugoslavs must be considered to have failed. "But Mr. Johnson (known as a supporter of the Jugoslav cause), intervening, attempts to reopen the case, betraying his partiality by defending the point of view of our adversaries" and proposing new solutions which the Italians decline to consider. Johnson leaves and Miller comes back to report that House is still in conference with Trumbich. When House finally appears a meeting for late that evening is proposed, but Orlando desires to know if Wilson approves the plan presented by Miller, for, otherwise, further discussion would be a waste of time. House cannot say and turns to Miller who replies, "that after Wilson's proclamation he dictated a report maintaining that if Wilson should have receded from his opposition regarding the eastern boundary of Istria, he would not only have seen no difficulty, but would have looked upon the matter with favor". House then promises to see Wilson and a new meeting is fixed for the morrow. At the adjourned gathering (attended by House, Miller, Frazier and Beer for America, and by Orlando, Di Cellere and Scordia for Italy), House explains that though he has seen Wilson "he foresees that another interview with him will be necessary". That afternoon Di Cellere learns that "House had planned to go to Lloyd George to instigate (istigarlo) him to convince Wilson to accept the program formulated by Miller", and the next day he is told by Orlando of an interview the latter had had with Lloyd George, who "was surprised that Wilson should have any difficulty in accepting the [Miller] proposal with the Italian addenda. He did not think it possible, so conciliatory did the plan appear". But the British premier thought the Italians were making too much fuss over Fiume.