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this subject to the Permanent Advisory Commission. The conclusions of the Commission were: 1. The use of gases is cruel, though not more so than some other methods used in warfare, and their employment against non-combatants is "barbarous and inexcusable." 2. Prohibiting or limiting their manufacture in time of peace would not restrict their use in time of war. 3. Neither can laboratory experiments be prohibited. 4. International prohibition of the use of poison gases is "a question of international law and a problem for humanity", and not within the competence of a technical commission like itself. 5. But if the League should decide to maintain this prohibition, as previously agreed to, their use should be examined "to provide against their eventual illicit employment". The Sub-Committee of Assembly Committee No. 6 likewise felt that the more immediate task of preparing the way for the reduction of armaments was "so formidable and complex that the [Permanent Advisory] Commission should not at present be invited to deal with the revision of the laws of war," involving other than military problems. This was in disregard of the wish of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which had said in a letter of November 23: "It is certain that if the League of Nations supported these proposals with the weight of its authority, its decision would secure the execution of these humanitarian measures." 3

The private manufacture of arms, a practice that has long been recognized as having many attendant evils, is so avowed by Article 8, which places upon the Council the duty of investigation. The Permanent Advisory Commission seems so far to have given little attention to the matter. The Assembly subcommittee, however, showed anxiety for a speedy inquiry, in view of the large accumulation of war stocks. The Assembly, being of a like mind, toward the close of its first meeting asked the Council to have a speedy investigation undertaken by the Permanent Advisory Commission. It should be remembered

1 Report of the P. A. C..

to the Council, L. of N. D. 23, p. 5. Report of Comm. No. 6 to the Assembly, A. D. 199 [223], p. 3.

A. D. 137.

A. D. 199 [223], p. 2 and A. D 238, p. 2.

in this connection that a nation's military strength depends not simply upon its stock of war materials, but also upon its economic resources.

M. Bourgeois, at the Council session on February 25, 1921,' said that the responsibility for the execution of the treaty clauses for the disarmament of the defeated powers lay not with the Council of the League, but wholly with the powers that signed the treaties. The League could only begin an investigation when disarmament has been carried out. Apparently the time has not yet come, under the reduction that has been enforced in large measure by the Supreme Council, for the Council of the League of Nations to see to it that Germany, while having sufficient forces for police purposes, is carrying out her obligations, so that she herself can not become militaristic and so that other nations may gradually dispense with their competitive armaments. Nevertheless the Council through its Advisory Commission is investigating the constitution and composition of the organization with which the Council is to exercise the right of investigation authorized by the various treaties.

In making its report to the Council on the military, naval and air conditions of the states which have asked to be admitted to the League of Nations, the Permanent Advisory Commission found in each case that these countries were not contemplating forces which would prove a menace to the peace of the world, and they were permitted provisionally, subject to later disarmament agreements made by the League, to keep forces which may be regarded essentially as police forces.2

In attempting to control the traffic in arms, "particularly to prevent the vast surplus of munitions of war . . . . . from passing into the disturbed regions of the world, and so creating fresh embarrassment and trouble," 3 two obstacles presented themselves. One was the lack of statutory control over exports from the United States. Mr. Barnes said "that the

1 Minutes, p. 16.

See L. of N., Report of the P. A. C.. to the Council [A. D. 84].

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Mr. Fisher, reporting for Comm. No. 6 to the Assembly, W. P. F., L. of N., vol. IV, no. 1, p. 175 (Feb., 1921).

13 United States Government and the United States people are exporting arms to such an extent as to justify that reference". The other hindrance was the nearly general failure to ratify or to live up to the convention signed at St. Germain on September 10, 1919. Within certain partly-developed areas, to be sure, the attempt to regulate the traffic in arms seems to have succeeded; but the adoption of the convention did not prevent the general exportation of arms. The League, therefore, found itself confronted with the double problem of inducing the nations to ratify this international agreement and of establishing a central administrative bureau. The outcome was an attempt to persuade the governments to ratify this convention; and, in lieu of a separate bureau under the League, the Council proposed that the international bureau established at Brussels in 1890 should continue to look after the arms traffic, but under the supervision of the League. This proposal was accepted by the Belgian government on March 21, 1921.2

The last paragraph of Article 8 is an agreement by the members of the League of Nations to exchange "full and frank information" about their armaments. No reduction, of course, has been agreed upon as yet; but the Permanent Advisory Commission worked out an elaborate questionnaire to be used when the Council deemed conditions auspicious for requesting information from the governments.3 On April 25, 1921, the Secretary-General sent a letter asking the members of the League for information concerning their military, naval and air budgets. The facts thus secured will be available for the consideration of the Permanent Advisory Commission and the Temporary Mixed Commission.

In deliberating upon the above topics and upon other related matters, the League has made less progress than could be desired either by its friends or by other advocates of international cooperation as a substitute for war. A few of the difficulties

Ibid., p. 175 et seq.

'Monthly Summary of L. of N., no. 1, p. 8 (April, 1921). See also a rather full discussion in Annex of L. of N. A. D. 199 [223].

See L. of N. O. 7., vol. II, no. 1, pp. 29-41 (Jan.-Feb., 1921).

that have been met have already been pointed out. Some thoughtful writers, to be sure, are pessimistic as to the possibility of success by any international agreement. But the situation which confronts us is a state of affairs in which international political organization is very incomplete, while inventive genius has produced ever more efficient weapons of destruction. The resulting need for the "salvaging of civilization" from the grave perils that threaten its very existence leads the majority to adopt the more hopeful view and to seek some way out of the morass of the menace of competitive national armaments.

The discouraging features in a situation which in many respects seemed unusually auspicious were pointed out by Mr. Garvin, writing during the Peace Conference:

No long war for the last 200 years has ever ended with a situation less favorable to the immediate reduction of armaments. It is impossible for the time to make that reduction all round to any fundamental degree; or to incorporate into a provisional Peace Treaty, in the course of the next few months, any general and drastic engagements, or at least any such engagements intended to come into early effect. . . . It would seem that any thorough international attempt to deal with armaments all round must be postponed until the League can take it in hand perhaps a year hence or later.'

Secretary Lange also said that the questionnaire prepared for the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1914 shows the complexity of the problem, embracing as it does technical and juridical questions, though fundamentally a political, economic and social question, and differing in its application to countries with varying conditions.

As both Messrs. Fock of Holland and Bourgeois of France said, no nation can be expected to disarm unless others do so and unless there is investigation and control. While Germany could hardly be regarded as any longer a great military and naval menace, it is not yet a member of the League, and adequate means of investigation do not exist to see that she re

1 Economic Foundations of Peace, p. 465.

Procès- Verbaux of Committees of First Assembly, no. 2, pp. 11-12.

mains disarmed. The great Colossus of the North is still an uncertain factor under the Bolshevist régime. Conditions in the smaller states bordering Russia and in the southeast remain unsettled.

But probably the greatest difficulty in the way of the disarmament program was the absence from the League of the United States. Our huge naval building schedule and our recent abstention in large measure from international affairs, caused some of our intellectual leaders to fear lest we should take the place formerly occupied by Germany as the most militaristic nation. A well-known writer on international law remarked early in 1921 that the " Assembly has at least made a hopeful beginning... but can hardly be expected to make much headway as long as the United States holds to its present intransigeant attitude." It has been assumed that Count Ishii had the United States in mind when he said that he felt obliged to abstain from voting on the proposition of disarmament by three stages, since one of the preliminary conditions had not been attained the collaboration of great military powers outside the League. The very strong longing for the cooperation of the United States is shown by the tone of the following invitation:

The Council of the League of Nations, acting on a unanimous recommendation of the Permanent Advisory Military, Naval and Air Commission of the League, passed at its Meeting in Geneva on 25th November, invites the Government of the United States to name representatives to sit on that Commission in a consultative capacity, during the study by the Commission of the question of the reduction of armaments, a study which the Council has requested the Commission to undertake forthwith.

The Permanent Advisory Commission was constituted by the Council of the League at its Meeting in Rome last May, and held its first session in San Sebastian in August. The Commission is at present composed of military, naval and aerial officers of States represented on the Council of the League. Its decisions are purely advisory and not in any sense binding, but they represent the common technical judgment of the experts of many countries.

'Prof. Hershey, "The United States-the Main Obstacle to the World's Peace." Independent, vol. CV, p. 184 (Feb. 19, 1921).

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