to the Sheephead Shoals, opposite the mound. The line was something over two miles long; the monitors on their extreme right, heavy vessels and light draught to the left, the position being taken to concentrate a heavy fire on the main work, which commands the bar, and to enfilade as well as possible the land front and the batteries covering the channel. The fire from the whole line was kept up with great fury, but little effect, until 5.30 p. m., when the fleet withdrew, no attempt, as far as known, having been made to land above the forts nor to pass the bar. The rapidity and weight of fire was extraordinary. From observations made repeatedly during the day it was maintained at the rate of forty to fifty shots per minute. Probably 10,000 projectiles were thrown on the point during this day's work.

The garrison served their guns with great deliberation and coolness, and as the fleet in general were at a distance of one and one-third to two miles, used only the longest range guns. They were so well covered that our loss was small, the casualities on the 24th being none killed, 1 mortally, 3 seriously, and 19 slightly wounded. Beyond the defacing the slope the damage to the works was nothing. The flagstaves were shot away and the quarters almost entirely destroyed. In the armament 4 carriages were disabled and 2 columbiads dismounted by recoil.

After the enemy withdrew dispositions were made to repel any attempt during the night. By morning I succeeded in throwing 133 Regulars and 300 Junior Reserves into the garrison.

At 10 a. m. on Christmas day the fleet advanced as before, the Ironsides leading. The day was very fine, a westerly wind making a smooth sea. The monitors appeared to be somewhat nearer than the day before, but very little-in no case within one mile. The bombardment opened and was continued with as great rapidity and fury as before. The garrison were instructed to fire very slowly-not oftener than once in fifteen minutes-from long-range guns. The land and many of the channel batteries were ordered to be held ready to openthe first on any land approach, the second on any attempt to pass the bar.

At 2 p. m. it appeared as if they were about to try the entrance. The flag-ship approached and sent out small boats on the bar, while the lighter draught vessels were observed closing up. A few well-directed shots from the Brooke guns drove the boats off, however, and the flagship withdrew-it is supposed from the shot of the Armstrong gun. Several ships were apparently driven out of action by concentrating fire upon them, but we could not ascertain the effect of our guns.

At 3.30 p. m. the steamers on the Sheephead Shoals sent nine boats over the reef. At the same time they extended much farther on the shoal than I supposed they could go-perhaps to try and enfilade Battery Buchanan at very long range. The object of the small boats does not appear. They might have been reconnoitering or looking for torpedoes. They were soon driven back, three well-directed shots from Lieutenant Chapman's naval battery cutting one of them in two and forcing the rest off.

At 4 p. m. my aide, in charge of the telegraph, reported all communication gone; whether from effect of fire or a landing is not knownprobably both, as the approach of the enemy on land was shortly reported, and the following is the last dispatch sent to General Bragg:

A large body of the enemy have landed near the fort, deploying as skirmishers. May be able to carry me by storm. Do the best I can. All behaving well. Order supports to attack.

This was the most critical moment, as it was difficult at first under the furious fire to get the Junior Reserves out of the galleries. They soon recovered, however. Colonel Tansill was ordered to the command of the land front. Colonel Lamb hastened from the Armstrong battery to the front. The gallant Major Reilly, with his battalion, who had served the guns on the curtain during the entire action, poured with the reserves, cheering, over the parapet and through the sally-port and manned the line of palisades. The enemy had occupied the redoubt (an unfinished outwork) and advanced into the post garden. A fire of grape and musketry checked any farther advance. Darkness coming on the fleet withdrew. The garrison continued to man the outworks and channel batteries during the night, exposed to a pelting storm and occasionally exchanging musket-shots on the land side.

The fire had been maintained for seven hours and a half with unremitting rapidity. Our casualties during this storm of iron amounted to 3 killed, 2 mortally, 7 severely, and 26 slightly wounded; total, 38; for both days, 61 in all. Damages to the armament during entire bombardment: Two 32-pounder guns and carriages disabled; one 10-inch columbiad gun carriage and chassis disabled, the trunnion wrenched off; one 10 [-inch] columbiad dismounted and pintle broken by premature discharge; one 8 [-inch] carriage and chassis disabled. Some other trifling damage was done, but readily repaired in a short time. A serious accident occurred during the last day. One of the Brooke guns served by the navy burst at 2.30 p. m., the other at 4. These were both guns from the Raleigh. The first gun burst at the third fire, the other at the eighth. No effect on the works beyond rendering the superior and exterior slopes rather rough for walking.

During the 21st [25th?] the garrison expended 600 projectiles, bringing forty-four guns into action. The enemy's projectiles were of all kinds and sizes. Shrapnel was used in large quantities, but with no effect.

To resume: At 3 a. m. on the morning of the 26th the pickets reported the advance of some boats outside the bar. The channel batteries opened a very heavy fire of grape and musketry. I am myself inclined to think that this was a false alarm, but the enemy may have been guided by the light of the burning quarters, and an attack was fully expected by the men, who showed great spirit and discipline, though much worn by the two days' action and exposed to very severe weather. A heavy storm had set in.

The morning of the 26th broke dark and foggy. The fleet some four miles off and rather nearer the beach. Our communication was cut off. Our scouts reported the enemy intrenching in force near Anderson, and some could be seen not over 1,400 yards from the curtain. Two prisoners who had been taken the previous evening reported a division as landed, but the spirit of the men never flagged. They went to work at repairs and replacing guns with hearty good will. Early in the afternoon we received the welcome message from the general commanding announcing his arrival at Sugar Loaf; that communication would shortly be restored, and that he would support. The night passed quietly, except the shelling of the woods above by the enemy.

Tuesday, the 27th, being clear, we perceived the fleet at daylight from three to five miles off, some ten or twelve transports being very close in near Battery Anderson, with a large number of small boats plying to and fro. Several vessels were engaged in shelling the woods. We could see the men on the beach in considerable force, but could not make out for some time whether they were landing or embarking troops.

At 12 m. the general commanding, accompanied by Major-General Hoke, reached the garrison and examined the work and the movements of the enemy. General Hoke sent to our support Graham's gallant regiment of South Carolina, the men of Wagner, and no further thought was bad of assault by night or day. It soon become evident the enemy was abondoning the land. In what force he landed I can only conjecture; certainly we observed them six hours taking off their troops. Not the least remarkable event of this affair was the arrival during Tuesday night of the steamer Wild Rover, and the entrance at 7 a. m. on Wednesday of the fine steamer Banshee. Four blockaders in sight of the main body of the fleet making a feeble effort to interrupt her, Colonel Lamb opened on them with the Whitworth, but they kept far out of range. During the day many of the fleet left, and by Thursday morning none remained but the usual blockaders. Thus ended this extraordinary movement-extraordinary in the magnitude of the preparation, the formidable character of the fleet, the severity of the fire, and the feebleness of the enemy's effort on land.

I have a few remarks to add to this account which may not be out of place. The movements of the enemy are not clear to me. At the long range we could not have damaged them so seriously as to cause this rapid abandonment of the attack. Still, I do not think the fleet could have maintained such an extraordinary fire for another day from the enormous expenditure of ammunition. The landing was effected precisely at the point so often indicated in my reports to the War Department as the true point of attack, and this demonstrates not only the necessity of the works commenced in the vicinity of Sugar Loaf, but the still greater need of a strong supporting force and a strong garrison for the fort. That great and irreparable disaster did not overtake us ..we owe to God. The constant storms which prevailed from the time the enemy sailed until the 24th alone saved us. Contrary to repeated warnings and remonstrances, the supporting force had not only been entirely withdrawn, but the very garrisons of these important works reduced one-half. The enemy was undoubtedly aware of this fact and probably not aware of the approach of the troops of General Lee. What ever the power of resistance of the fort, and it is great, no doubt the delay due to the heavy weather of Wednesday and Thursday after arrival of the fleet was its salvation, the small number of artillerymen then present being totally inadequate to so extensive a line. This delay enabled three battalions of reserves to be thrown into the fort, together with the small number of regulars I obtained by stripping the other forts, and the commanding general to push forward the slowly arriving troops from the Army of Virginia. The appearance of a garrison after such a bombardment, intact and ready to repel assault, no doubt intimidated them, while the advance of Hoke's division completed their discomfiture; but we cannot always hope for such aid from weather or the blunder of the enemy manifest here from his not landing and occupying the work before he commenced his bombardment, and I trust the lesson will not be lost.

The experience gained is satisfactory as to the great power of resistance in these heavy earth-works to the most formidable and sustained fire I have known of; the effectual protection afforded by the huge and elevated traverses and high interior crests against both enfilade and direct fire, and the advantage of distributed guns and detached batteries as against a stationary sea attack-by which I mean one like this, when a large fleet takes position to attempt to overpower by its force and shell out the garrison; but the question as to attempting to pass the forts

while engaging at close action under press of steam is not all affected, and I maintain, as heretofore, the necessity of obstructions to detain the enemy under fire. A passage of the forts necessarily makes their reduction but a question of time. On the other hand, to obstruct prevents the use of the port and makes the position useless and expensive. Here is a problem requiring careful consideration. I had hoped our iron-clads would have solved it, but they have so far failed.

It remains for me to pay a well-earned meed of praise. This gallant and successful resistance, humanly speaking, is due to the untiring energy, the dauntless resolution, and brilliant courage of Col. William Lamb, of the Thirty-sixth North Carolina, devotedly supported by men that know him and will fight for him anywhere. His thorough knowledge of the post, its approaches, the skill displayed in his constructions, and his remarkable practical resources have brought their best fruit in the confidence of his men and his commanders, and there only remains that his services should be suitably acknowledged. A proper report will be made to the Engineer Department.

Very respectfully,

Lieut. Col. ARCHER ANDERSON,

W. H. C. WHITING,
Major-General.

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Department of North Carolina.

HEADQUARTERS, Wilmington, December 31, 1864. COLONEL: For the information of the general commanding I forward the report of Colonel Lamb, commanding Fort Fisher in the action of the 24th and 25th.

On receiving the information at 1 p. m. on the 24th that the fleet was moving in to take position, I at once ordered a steamer, and reporting to headquarters proceeded to the point of attack, reaching Confederate Point just before the close of the first day's bombardment, which lasted four hours and a half. That of the second day commenced at 10.20 a. m. and continued, with no interruption or apparent slackening, with great fury from over fifty ships until dark. During this day the enemy landed a large force, and at 4.30 advanced a line of skirmishers on the left flank of the land curtain, the fleet at the same time making a concentrated and tremendous enfilading fire upon the curtain. The garrison, however, at the proper moment, when the fire slackened, to allow the approach of the enemy's land force, drove them off with grape and musketry. At dark the enemy withdrew. A heavy storm set in and the garrison were much exposed, as they were under arms all night.

At 3 a. m. 26th a reported advance in boats was opened on with grape and shell. The garrison remained steadily awaiting a renewal of the assault or bombardment until Tuesday morning, when they were relieved by the supports of Major-General Hoke and the embarkation of the enemy.

Colonel Lamb's report, herewith, gives all the details of the action. In an accompanying paper* I will give an account in detail of all matters which fell under my own observation during the action and the three succeeding days, which I beg you will cause to be forwarded for the information of the War Department. As soon as other business

will permit a report in detail of the construction of the works, capacity of resistance, effect of fire, movements of the enemy, improvements suggested, &c., will be made out and forwarded for the information of the Engineer Department.

In this it only remains for me to express my grateful sense of the gallantry, endurance, and skill of the garrison and its accomplished commander. To the latter I have already paid a just tribute of praise, not for this action only, but for his whole career at Fort Fisher, of which this action and its result is but the fruit. His report of the gallantry of individuals I fully confirm from my own observation.

I wish to mention Captain Munn, Lieutenant Latham, Lieutenant Hunter, of the Thirty-sixth; Lieutenant Rankin, of the First Battalion; Captain Adams, of the light artillery, as very active and efficient.

To Colonel Tansill, of my staff, we owe many thanks. To his skillful judgment and great experience the defense of the sand front was committed at the critical moment of assault.

Of Major Reilly, with his battalion of the Tenth North Carolina, who served the guns of the land front during the entire action, I have to say he has added another name to the long list of fields on which he has been conspicuous for indomitable pluck and consummate skill.

Major Hill, chief of staff, and Major Strong, aide-de-camp, here, as always, actively aided me throughout.

The gallant bearing and active labors of Major Saunders, chief of artillery to General Hébert, in very exposed positions, attracted my especial attention.

I present my acknowledgments to Flag-Officer Pinckney, C. S. Navy, who was present during the action, for the welcome and efficient aid sent to Colonel Lamb; the detachment under Lieutenant Roby, which manned the two Brooke guns, and the company of marines, under Captain Van Benthuysen, which re-enforced the garrison.

Lieutenant Chapman, C. S. Navy, commanding Battery Buchanan, by his skillful gunnery saved us on our right from a movement of the enemy, which, unless checked, might have resulted in a successful passage.

The navy detachment at the guns, under very trying circumstances, did good work. No commendation of mine can be too much for the coolness, discipline, and skill displayed by officers and men. Their names have not all been furnished to me, but Lieutenants Roby, Dornin, Armstrong, and Berrien attracted special attention throughout.

To Passed Midshipman Cary I wish to give personal thanks. Though wounded, he reported after the bursting of his gun to repel the threatened assault, and actively assisted Colonel Tansill on the land front. Above all and before all we should be grateful, and I trust all are, for the favor of Almighty God, under which and by which a signal deliverance has been achieved.

Very respectfully,

W. H. C. WHITING,
Major-General.

P. S.-I wish it to be understood that in no sense did I assume the command of Colouel Lamb. I was a witness, simply confining my action to observation and advice, and to our communications, and it is as a witness that I report.

Lieut. Col. A. ANDERSON,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Department of North Carolina.