defeated while another, no less meritorious is gained. Its tendency is to array one class of the community against another. It crowds the dockets of the court, and calls for too much jury service. It entails a great expense on the people. The employe is not benefitted in proportion to the burden placed for the time being upon the employer. Its benefits are not fairly or equally distributed. Its tendency is to place judges and lawyers in classes in the public mind thereby leading to distrust and impairing their usefulness. It lowers the professional standard by exciting the race of diligence between the claim-agent and the case-chaser. It tends to perjury. It creates an unwholesome atmosphere about the courts by the presence of jury-fixers.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

If we can not find a remedy in extending the employers liability act, there is but one thing left. That is a "Workmen's Compensation Act." This act should be so drawn as to have the compensation bear the proper proportion to the loss sustained. The methods for collection should be simple, expeditious and inexpensive. By this act substantial justice would be attained. Those who suffer the losses would receive the benefit. Employers unable financially to carry the risk could protect themselves by insurance. The employe might well be required to contribute towards its purchase. In case the risk should be covered by insurance its proceeds would be paid to those who purchased its benefits and have sustained the losses, instead of being dissapated in expenses connected with prolonged litigation, the real object of which is to defeat those who have purchased it and entitled to its benefactions. 'The passage of a workmen's compensation act would lessen, if not remove, many of the evils pointed out. The enactment of this law would not be in any sense an experiment. been in force in England for nearly twenty years. It has worked well, given general satifaction, for that length of time, has been frequently amended and enlarged but there has never been a serious effort to repeal it. At least a dozen states of the Ameri

Such a law has

can Union have workmen's compensation acts. Ohio has em· bodied it in her Constitution. Such an act was declared unconstitutional in the State of New York. To overcome this constitutional difficutly a constitutional amendment in that state is now pending. The State of New Jersey was led to adopt such an act by her then Governor and now President of the United States, Honorable Woodrow Wilson. Nearly all of the Canadian provinces have acts of this kind, as well as Germany. Alabama need not hesitate in the enactment of such a law. To longer delay would be to place Alabama in the unenviable light of being reactionary. I suggest that the sense of this Association be taken on this important question and if favorable that a Committee be appointed to draft a bill and present and urge its passage before the next Legislature.

The occasion presents an opportunity for our profession to again show its unselfishness, its humanity, especially those of us who have been pecuniarily benefitted by litigation growing out of present conditions. From what I know of my brethren I am sure that we can unite in this effort to aid humanity, uplift the profession by removing from amongst us this apple of discord which is dividing into factions a once united brotherhood. If these suggestions can be made of service in inducing this Association to deal with conditions so fraught with weal or woe to the people of Alabama, I will feel that its action in exalting me to the position which I now occupy, would to some extent be justified.

ADOPTION OF NEW RULES.

The matter of greatest importance to the Association occurring since its last meeting, is the work of the Supreme Court in amending the old, and establishing new rules of practice. While I am not required by the Constitution or By-Laws to bring this subject before you, I feel that I am neverthless justified in doing so on account of the changes wrought in the practice by the adoption and enforcement of these rules.

Taking them in numerical order we will first present some suggestions with reference to Rule 10 of the Supreme Court. That rule as now written works great changes in the preparation of briefs, the chief of which is the requirement of an abstract of the evidence as shown by the transcript. This rule, as supplemented by Rule 11, transfers much labor and responsibility from the members of the court to the lawyers. This is as it should be. This labor and responsibility is theirs. By reason of their greater familarity with the case they can accomplish the task with less labor to themselves. Their interest in the case will stimulate them to a thorough performance of the duty of abstracting the record, while the impending scrutiny of their adversaries will tend to make them accurate and careful. The presence of the abstract will enable the members of the court to eliminate from their consideration all of the record except such portions as are questioned by the abstracts. On having an outline of the case presented to them while entering upon its consideration will enable them to utilize a habit acquired while practicing law, of getting the facts from the client before advising him or reaching a conclusion as to the merits of the case. The scheme of the two rules leads to precision in presenting the points in controversy, and will expedite the decision of cases, and will have the effect of improving decisions, as well as lawyers.

Rule 12 is good in that it designates a place where argument may be made, separating it from the brief and will thereby prevent confusion. It properly confines the argument to the points made in the brief.

Rule 13. This rule makes some changes. It contains much that is good. I think however, experience will demonstrate that ten days is not sufficient time for the appellee to examine his opponent's abstract, prepare his own, his brief and present them.

Rules 26 and 27. These rules make material changes in the preparation of transcripts in cases appealed from law courts. They conduce to economy and convenience in eliminating useless matter from the transcript, and especially to convenience in requiring the observance of chronological order with reference to

setting out the pleadings and the rulings thereon, as well as other matters.

Rules 43 and 44 are intended to prevent confusion and discontinuances. With that end in view they are useful.

Rule 45. The adoption of Rule 45 is an epoch in judicial reform. It places Alabama in the forefront of this advancing reformation. It comes to us not only accredited with the sanction of the highest tribunal of the State, but it comes as its product. It is well that it does, as this tribunal might question the right of the legislative department to interfere with its internal policy. It could say at least with plausibility that it is the exercise of a judicial and not a legislative function. This rule changes the presumption heretofore indulged in by reviewing courts, that injury accompanies error. It is a return to common law rule. The rule which the Supreme Court of the State first allowed, and to which it has now returned. It is a change in the administrative policy of the courts. The right of the Supreme Court to make this change can not well be questioned. In doing so it is only casting aside a yoke of its own creation, a burden voluntarily assumed, under which the people latterly began to chafe, and which the court found was impeding and obstructing the administration of justice. The Court gave and the Court hath taken away. The court can be praised, as well as justified for that which it has done. In both instances it was adjusting itself and its procedure to the times. When the former practice was inauguarated, times were very different from what they are today. We were then moving slowly. Jurisprudence was to some extent in a formative state. Correct principles had to be ascertained and declared for future guidance. Precedents had to be made for future adherence. Cases were comparatively few and unimportant. The sole duty of the court at that time was not confined to reaching the ends of justice in a particular case. It may have been impressed with the view that its inclination to expedite trials and reach equitable conclusions in cases under consideration, should yield something to the establishment and perfection of the science. We were then poineers

more interested in posterity than ourselves.

At present the science of jurisprudence has reached a comparatively high state of perfection. Courts are more intent on the speedy administration of substantial justice than in the formation of rules by which it is to be administered. The world is now moving faster. Its litigation is increasing in like ratio. The public demands greater expedition in the disposition of its litigation. The adoption of the new practice is justified by, if not made in response to, this public demand. Under the old rule the courts were blazing the highway for future travel, intent on keeping their course. Under the new they are pursuing their journey on this highway, intent on reaching the journey's end, with time sufficient to read the sign-boards and repair the highway, but not enough to reconstruct it. They must nevertheless confine themselves to the highway provided, and not depart therefrom. It is the only safe and sure way of arriving at the proper destination.

While the change made by the new rule may at first blush appear to be an extreme departure from former practice, it is not so in fact. It does no more than shift the burden of proof in the consideration of cases after they have been tried. Under the former rule injury was presumed to follow error. Under the new rule the presumption will be that error is harmless, but this is only a presumption—it may be found that injury resulted. The adoption of the new practice is not intended in the least to relax the enforcement of legal rules or the adherence to legal principles. In fact the rule does not apply to trial courts until after the case has been decided. This change in the practice should admonish the trial judges, as well as practitioners to be even stricter in the observance of legal rules, and in the enforcement of legal principles, as injustice is more likely to result from their non-observance and non-enforcement on account of the neutralizing effect of this rule on erroneous rulings.

One of the greatest benefits resulting from this change in practice will be its effect in the trial of cases. This effect, if not of first importance, can not be less than secondary. The trial