PART III.-Importance.

The third circumstance I took notice of was importance, the appearance of which always tends, by fixing attention more closely, to add brightness and strength to the ideas. The importance in moral subjects is analogous to the quantity of matter in physical subjects, as on quantity the moment of moving bodies in a great measure depends. An action may derive importance from its own nature, from those concerned in it as acting or suffering, or from its consequences. It derives importance from its own nature, if it be stupendous in its kind, if the result of what is uncommonly great, whether good or bad, passion or invention, virtue or vice, as what in respect of generosity is godlike, what in respect of atrocity is diabolical: it derives importance from those concerned in it, when the actors or the sufferers are considerable, on account either of their dignity or of their number, or of both: it derives importance from its consequences, when these are remarkable in regard to their greatness, their multitude, their extent, and that either as to the many and distant places affected by them, or as to the future and remote periods to which they may reach, or as to both.

All the four remaining circumstances derive their efficacy purely from one and the same cause, the connection of the subject with those occupied, as speaker or hearers, in the discourse. Self is the centre here, which hath a similar power in the ideal world, to that of the sun in the material world, in communicating both light and heat to whatever is within the sphere of its activity, and in a greater or less degree, according to the nearness or remoteness.

PART IV.-Proximity of time.

First, as to proximity of time, every one knows, that any melancholy incident is the more affecting that it is recent. Hence it is become common with story-tellers, that they may make a deeper impression on the hearers to introduce remarks like these; that the tale which they relate is not old, that it happened but lately, or in their own time, or that they are yet living who had a part in it, or were witnesses of it. Proximity of time regards not only the past but the future. An event that will probably soon happen, hath greater influence upon us than what will probably happen a long time hence. I have hitherto proceeded on the hypothesis, that the orator rouses the passions of his hearers, by exhibiting some past transaction; but we must acknowledge that passion may be as strongly excited by his reasonings concerning an event yet to come. In the judiciary orations there is greater scope for the former, in the deliberative for the latter; though in each

kind there may occasionally be scope for both. All the seven circumstances enumerated are applicable, and have equal weight, whether they relate to the future or to the past. The only exception that I know of is, that probability and plausibility are scarcely distinguishable, when used in reference to events in futurity. As in these there is no access for testimony, what constitutes the principal distinction is quite excluded. In comparing the influence of the past upon our minds, with that of the future, it appears in general, that if the evidence, the importance, and the distance of the objects be equal, the latter will be greater than the former. The reason, I imagine, is, we are conscious, that as every moment, the future, which seems placed before us, is approaching; and the past, which lies, as it were, behind, is retiring, our nearness or relation to the one constantly increaseth as the other decreaseth. There is something like attraction in the first case, and repulsion in the second. This tends to interest us more in the future than in the past, and consequently to the present view aggrandises the one and diminishes the other.

What, nevertheless, gives the past a very considerable advantage, is its being generally susceptible of much stronger evidence than the future. The lights of the mind are, if I may so express myself, in an opposite situation to the lights of the body. These discover clearly the prospect lying before us, but not the ground we have already passed. By the memory, on the contrary, that great luminary of the mind, things past are exhibited in retrospect: we have no correspondent faculty to irradiate the future: and even in matters which fall not within the reach of our memory, past events are often clearly discoverable by testimony, and by effects at present existing; whereas we have nothing equivalent to found our arguments upon in reasoning about things to come. It is for this reason, that the future is considered as the province of conjecture and uncertainty.

PART V.-Connection of place.

Local Connection, the fifth in the above enumeration, hath a more powerful effect than proximity of time. Duration and space are two things, (call them entities or attributes, or what you please,) in some respects the most like, and in some respects the most unlike to one another. They resemble in continuity, divisibility, infinity, in their being deemed essential to the existence of other things, and in the doubts that have been raised as to their having a real or independent existence of their own. They differ in that the latter is permanent, whereas the very essence of the former consisteth in transitoriness; the parts of the one are all successive, of the

other all co-existent. The greater portions of time are all distinguished by the memorable things which have been transacted in them, the smaller portions by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies: the portions of place great and small, (for we do not here consider the regions of the fixed stars and planets,) are distinguished by the various tracts of land and water, into which the earth is divided and subdivided; the one distinction intelligible, the other sensible; the one chiefly known to the inquisitive, the other in a great measure obvious to all.

Hence perhaps it arises, that the latter is considered as a firmer ground of relation, than the former. Who is not more curious to know the notable transactions which have happened in his own country from the earliest antiquity, than to be acquainted with those which have happened in the remotest regions of the globe, during the century wherein he lives? It must be owned, however, that the former circumstance is more frequently aided by that of personal relation than the latter. Connection of place not only includes vicinage, but every other local relation, such as being in a province under the same government with us, in a state that is in alliance with us, in a country well known to us, and the like. Of the influence of this connection in operating on our passions, we have daily proofs. With how much indifference, at least with how slight and transient emotion, do we read in newspapers the accounts of the most deplorable accidents in countries distant and unknown? How much, on the contrary, are we alarmed and agitated on being informed, that any such accident hath happened in our neighbourhood, and that even though we be totally unacquainted with the persons concerned?

PART VI.-Relation to the persons concerned.

Still greater is the power of relation to the persons concerned, which was the sixth circumstance mentioned, as this tie is more direct than that which attacheth us to the scene of action. It is the persons, not the place, that are the immediate objects of the passions love or hatred, pity or anger, envy or contempt. Relation to the actors commonly produces an effect contrary to that produced by relation to the sufferers, the first in extenuation, the second in aggravation of the crime alleged. The first makes for the apologist, the second for the accuser. This, I say, is commonly the case, not always. A remote relation to the actors, when the offence is heinous, especially if the sufferers be more nearly related, will sometimes rather aggravate than extenuate the guilt in our estimation. But it is impossible with any precision to reduce these effects to rules; so much depending on

the different tempers and sentiments of different audiences. Personal relations are of various kinds. Some have generally greater influence than others; some again have greater influence with one person, others with another. They are consanguinity, affinity, friendship, acquaintance, being fellowcitizens, countrymen, of the same surname, language, religion, occupation, and innumerable others.

PART VII.-Interest in the Consequences.

But of all the connective circumstances, the most powerful is interest, which is the last. Of all relations, personal relation, by bringing the object very near, most enlivens that sympathy which attacheth us to the concerns of others; interest in the effects brings the object, if I may say so, into contact with us, and makes the mind cling to it, as a concern of its own. Sympathy is but a reflected feeling, and therefore, in ordinary cases, must be weaker than the original. Though the mirror be ever so true, a lover will not be obliged to it for presenting him with the figure of his mistress, when he hath an opportunity of gazing on her person. Nor will the orator place his chief confidence in the assistance of the social and sympathetic affections, when he hath it in his power to arm the selfish.

Men universally, from a just conception of the difference, have, when self is concerned, given a different name to what seems originally the same passion in a higher degree. Injury, to whomsoever offered, is to every man that observes it, and whose sense of right is not debauched by vicious practice, the natural object of indignation. Indignation always implies resentment, or a desire of retaliating on the injurious person, so far at least as to make him repent the wrong he hath committed. This indignation in the person injured, is, from our knowledge of mankind, supposed to be, not indeed universally, but generally so much stronger, that it ought to be distinguished by another appellation, and is accordingly denominated revenge. In like manner, beneficence, on whomsoever exercised, is the natural object of our love; love always implies benevolence, or a desire of promoting the happiness of the beneficent person; but this passion in the person benefited, is conceived to be so much greater, and to infer so strong an obligation to a return of good offices to his benefactor, that it merits to be distinguished by the title gratitude. Now by this circumstance of interest in the effects, the speaker, from engaging pity in his favour, can proceed to operate on a more powerful principle, self-preservation. The benevolence of his hearers he can work up into gratitude, their indignation into revenge.

The two last mentioned circumstances, personal relation

and interest, are not without influence, as was hinted in the enumeration, though they regard the speaker only, and not the hearers. The reason is, a person present with us, whom we see and hear, and who by words, and looks, and gestures, gives the liveliest signs of his feelings, has the surest and most immediate claim upon our sympathy. We become infected with his passions. We are hurried along by them, and not allowed leisure to distinguish between his relation and our relation, his interest and our interest.

SECTION VI.-Other passions, as well as moral sentiments, useful auxiliaries.

So much for those circumstances in the object presented by the speaker, which serve to awaken and inflame the passions of the hearers. But when a passion is once raised,

To illustrate most of the preceding circumstances, and shew the manner of applying them, I shall take an example from Cicero's last oration against Verres, where, after relating the crucifixion of Gavius, a Roman citizen, he exclaims, 1. "O nomen dulce libertatis! o jus eximium nostræ civitatis! o lex Porcia, legesque Semproniæ! o graviter desiderata, et aliquando reddita plebi Romanæ tribunicia potestas! 2. Huccine tandem omnia reciderunt, ut civis Romanus in provincia populi Romani, in oppido fœderatorum, ab eo qui beneficio populi Romani fasces et secures haberet, deligatus in foro virgis cæderetur?" 3. Sed quid

ego plura de Gavio? quasi tu Gavio tum fueris infestus, ac non nomini, generi, juri civium hostis, non illi inquam homini, sed causæ communi libertatis inimicus fuisti. 4. Quid enim attinuit, cum Mamertini more atque instituto suo, crucem fixissent post urbem, in via Pompeia; te jubere in ea parte figere, quæ ad fretum spectat; et hoc addere, quod negare nullo modo potes, quod omnibus audientibus dixisti palam, te idcirco illum locum deligere, ut ille qui se civem Romanum, esse diceret, ex cruce Italiam cernere, ac domum suam prospicere posset? 5. Itaque illa crux sola, judices, post conditam Messanam illo in loca fixa est. 6. Italiæ conspectus ad eam rem ab isto delectus est, ut ille in dolore cruciatuque moriens, perangusto freto divisa servitutis ac libertatis jura cognosceret; Italia autem alumnum suum, servitutis extremo summoque supplicio affectum videret. 7. Facinus est, vincire civem Romanum, scelus verberare, prope parricidium necare, quid dicam, in crucem tollere? verbo satis digno tam nefaria res appellari nullo modo potest. 8. Non fuit his omnibus iste contentus. Spectet, inquit, patriam, in conspectu legum libertatisque moriatur. 9. Non tu hoc loco Gavium, non unum hominem, nescio quem, civem Romanam, sed communem libertatis et civitatis causum in illum cruciatum et crucem egisti. 10. Jam vero videte hominis audaciam: Nonne enim graviter tulisse arbitramini, quod illam civibus Romanis crucem non posset in foro, non in comitio, non in rostris defigere. 11. Quod enim his locis in provincia sua celebritate simillimum, regione proximum potuit, elegit. 12. Monumentum sceleris -audaciæque suæ voluit esse in conspectu Italiæ, prætervectione omnium qui ultro citroque navigarent." 13. "Paullo ante, judices, lacrymas in morte misera atque indignissima navarchorum non tenebamus: et recte ac merito sociorum innocentium miseria commovebamur. 14. Quid nunc in nostro sanguine tandem facere debemus? nam civium Romanorum sanguis conjunctus existimandus est.”15. "Omnes hoc loco cives Romani, et qui adsunt et qui ubicumque sunt, vestram severitatem desiderant, vestram fidem implorant, vestrum auxilium requirunt. 16. Omnia sua jura, commoda, auxilia, totam denique libertatem in vestris sententiis versari arbitrantur."- -I shall point out the pathetic circumstances exemplified in this passage, observing the order wherein they were enumerated. I have numbered the sentences in the quotation to prevent repetition on referring to them. It must be remarked first of all, that in judiciary orations, such as this, the proper place for plausibility is the narration; for probability, the confirmation or proof: the other