« PreviousContinue »
Among the Writers of the Articles in the Three Volumes,
are the following:
EDWARD ATKINSON, Boston, Mass.
FREDERICK BASTIAT, the famous French Econ- HENRY FAWCETT, M. P., Professor of Political
HENRI BAUDRILLART, Member of the Institute of
MAURICE BLOCK, Statistician, Political Economist
J. C. BLUNTSCHLI, one of the editors of Blunt- JOSEPH GARNIER, Professor of Political Econschli & Brater's Staatswörterbuch. omy, Member of the Institute of France. GEROLAMO BOCCARDO, Editor of the Dizionario HENRY GEORGE, Author of "Progress and PovUniversale di Economia Politica e di Commercio, erty," New York. Italy.
D. C. GILMAN, President of Johns Hopkins Uni-
JACQUES DE BOISJOSLIN, Paris, France.
GASTON DE BOURGE, Advocate, Paris, France.
T. T. BRYCE, New Haven, Conn.
EDWARD CARY, New York.
E. CAUCHY, Member of the Institute of France.
A. E. CHERBULIEZ, Political Economist, contrib-
JAMES F. COLBY, Counselor-at-Law, New Haven,
ROYER-COLLARD, Professor of the Faculté de
EUSTACE CONWAY, Counselor-at-Law, New York.
CHAS. COQUELIN, one of the Editors of the Dic-|
School of St. Cyr, France.
CHARLES DUNOYER, France.
CL. DUVERNOIS, French Ex-Minister.
DORMAN B. EATON, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, New York.
E. L. GODKIN, Editor New York Nation.
LOUIS GOTTARD, Publicist, France.
JULES GRENIER, Publicist, France.
W. E. GRIFFIS, Author of "The Mikado's Empire," Schenectady, N. Y.
F. P. G. GUIZOT, France.
ARTHUR T. HADLEY, Instructor in Political
FAUSTIN HÉLIE, Member of the Institute of
XAVIER HEUSCHLING, Minister of the Interior,
J. E. HORN, Writer on Finance, Member of the
E. J. JAMES, University of Pennsylvania, Phila-
JOHN A. JAMESON, Author of "The Constitutional Convention," Chicago, Ill.
PAUL JANET, Member of the Institute of France.
JOHN JOHNSTON, Banker, Milwaukee, Wis.
GUSTAVE KOERNER, Ex-Governor of Illinois.
LOUIS LECLERC, France.
A. LEGOYT, France.
T. E. CLIFFE LESLIE, the eminent English Political Economist.
WM. ROSCHER, Professor of Political Economy at
HENRY D. LLOYD, Financial Editor of the Chi- M. ROTHE, Professor at Sorö, Denmark.
J. B. SAY, France.
LEON SAY, Economist, France.
L. SCHWARTZ, Germany.
JULES SIMON, Member of the French Academy.
HAYDN SMITH, Chicago Times.
A. R. SPOFFORD, Librarian of Congress, Wash-
SIMON STERNE, Counselor-at-Law, New York.
A. M. SULLIVAN, M. P., London, England.
E. LÖNING, Professor University Dorpat, Russia.
ALFRED BISHOP MASON, Counselor-at-Law, Chi-
D. H. MASON, Chicago, Ill.
CHARLES DE MAZADE, France.
J. R. M'CULLOCH, the English Economist.
G. DE MOLINARI, Editor of the Journal des Débats, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France.
M. MONJEAN, France.
E. MONTEGUT, France.
MICHEL NICOLAS, Professor, Montauban, France.
M. ORTOLAN, Lawyer, France.
A. OTT, France.
E. PAIGNON, France.
ESQUIROU DE PARIEU, Member of the Institute
H. PASSY, France.
JULES PAUTET, French Vice-Prefect.
M. POEZL, Professor at the University of Mu-
FRED. POLLOCK, Cambridge University, England.
GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, New York.
JOHN P. TOWNSEND, one of the Vice-Presidents
FRANCIS A. WALKER, Mass. Institute of Technology, Boston, Mass.
J. D. WEEKS, Editor of the Iron Age, Expert and Special Agent (Tenth Census U. S.) for Wages in Manufacturing Industry, Pittsburg, Pa. DAVID A. WELLS, the eminent American Economist, Norwich, Conn.
HORACE WHITE, New York.
FREDERICK W. WHITRIDGE, Counselor-at-Law,
TALCOTT WILLIAMS, The Press, Philadelphia,
M. RABUTAUX, Publicist, France.
ERNEST RENAN, Member of the Institute of FRED. H. WINES, Springfield, Mass.
LOUIS REYBAUD, Member of the Institute of
LEON DE ROSNY, France.
H. B. WITTON, Inspector of Canals, Hamilton,
L. WOLOWSKI, Paris, France.
THEO. S. WOOLSEY, Professor at Yale College.
POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY,
AND OF THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.
on oath: perhaps the oath on the part of witnesses was generally voluntary. (Demosth., Ipòs | ̓́Αφοβον Ψευδ, c. 16; Κατὰ Κόνωνος, c. 10; and Meier and Schömann, Att. Process., p. 675.) - In the Roman jurisprudence an oath was required in some cases from the plaintiff, or the defendant, or both. Thus the oath of calumny was required from the plaintiff, which was a solemn declaration that he did not prosecute his suit for any fraudulent or malicious purpose. The offense of false swearing was perjurium, perjury; but it was considered a less offense in a party to a suit when the oath was imposed by a juder than when it was voluntary. It does not appear that in civil proceedings witnesses were necessarily examined on oath; but witnesses appear to have been examined on oath in the judicia publica, which were criminal proceedings. The title in the Digest, "De Testibus" (22, tit. 5), makes no mention of the oath, though it speaks of punishment being inflicted on witnesses who bore false testimony. — The law in America and England, as a rule, requires evidence or testimony for judicial purposes to be given on oath. A Jew, a Mohammedan and a Hindoo may be sworn as witnesses, but they must severally take the oath in that form which is sanctioned by the usage of their country or nation, and which they severally consider to be binding. The offense of declaring what is false when a witness is examined upon oath, constitutes perjury. Declarations made by a person under the apprehension of immediate death are generally admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings, when properly verified; for it is considered that the circumstances in which the person is placed at the time of making the declaration furnish as strong motives for veracity as the obligation of an oath. Quakers also, in all
ATH. Oaths have been in use in all coun
Otries of which we have any exact information,
civil cases, were allowed by the statute 7 & 8 Wm. III., c. 34, to give their evidence on affirmation; and now the affirmation of Quakers and Moravians is admissible in all judicial proceedings, both civil and criminal. — As oaths may be either voluntary or may be imposed by a political superior, so they may be imposed either on extrajudicial or on judicial occasions. Oaths which are imposed on occasion of judicial proceedings are the most frequent, and the occasions are the most important to the interests of society. The principle on which an oath is administered on judicial occasions is this: it is supposed that an additional security is thereby acquired for the veracity of him who takes the oath. Bentham, in his Rationale of Evidence," on the contrary, affirms that, “ whether principle or experience be regarded, the oath will be found, in the hands of justice, an altogether useless instrument; in the hands of injustice, a deplorably serviceable one;" "that it is inefficacious to all good purposes," and "that it is by no means inefficacious to bad ones." -The three great sanctions or securities for veracity in a witness, or, to speak perhaps more correctly, the three great sanctions against mendacity in a witness, are, the punishment legally imposed on a person who is convicted of false swearing, the punishment inflicted by public opinion or the positive morality of society, and the fear of punishment from the Deity, in this world or the next, or in both. The common opinion is, that all the three sanctions operate on a witness, though they operate on different witnesses in very different degrees. A man who does not believe that the Deity will punish false swearing | can only be under the influence of the first two sanctions; and if his character is such that it can not be made worse than it is, he may be under the influence of the first sanction only. Bentham affirms that the third sanction only appears to exercise an influence in any case, because it acts in conjunction with "the two real and efficient sanctions," "the political sanction and the moral or popular sanction;" and that if it is stripped of those accompaniments, its impotence will appear immediately. Bentham's chief argument is as follows. "that the supposition of the efficiency of an oath is absurd in principle. It ascribes to man a power over his Maker. It supposes the Almighty to stand engaged, no matter how, but absolutely engaged, to inflict on every individual by whom the ceremony, after having been performed, has been profaned, a punishment (no matter what) which, but for the ceremony and the profanation, he would not have inflicted. It supposes him thus prepared to inflict, at com mand, and at all times, a punishment, which, being at all times the same, at no time bears any proportion to the offense." Again: "either the ceremony causes punishment to be inflicted by the Deity in cases where otherwise it would not have been inflicted; or it does not. In the former case the same sort of authority is exercised by man over the Deity, as that which, in English law, is ex
ercised over the judge by the legislator, or over the sheriff by the judge. In the latter case the ceremony is a mere form without any useful effect whatever."-The absurdity of this argu ment hardly needs to be exposed. He who administers the oath, by virtue of the power which he has to administer it, and the political superior who imposes the oath, may either believe or not believe that the Deity will punish false swearing, and it is quite immaterial to the question which of the two opinions they entertain. That which gives the oath a value in the eyes of him who ad ministers it, or of that political superior who imposes it, is the opinion of the person who takes the oath; and if the individual who takes the oath believes that the Deity, in case it is profaned, will inflict a punishment which otherwise he would not inflict, the object of him who enforces the oath is accomplished, and an additional sanction against mendacity is secured. It matters not whether the Deity will punish or not, or whether he who enforces the oath believes that he will punish or not: if he who takes the oath believes that the Deity will punish false swearing, that is sufficient to show that the oath is of itself
a sanction. The fear of legal punishment is admitted by Bentham to be a sanction against mendacity. But the legal punishment may or may not overtake the offender. Legal punishment may follow detection, but the perjury may not be detected, and therefore not punished. Is the oath, or would a declaration without oath be, "a mere form without any useful effect whatever," because the legal punishment may not, and frequently does not, overtake the offender? When a Greek or a Roman swore by his gods, in whose existence he believed, and who, being mere imaginations, could not punish him for his perjury, was not his belief in their existence and their power and willingness to punish perjury a sanction against mendacity? All antiquity at least thought so. - There are occasions on which oaths are treated lightly, on which he who imposes the oath, he who takes it, and the community who are witnesses to it, treat the violation of it as a trivial matter. Such occasions as these furnish Bentham with arguments against the efficacy of oaths on all occasions. Suppose we admit, with Bentham, as we do merely for the sake of the argument, that "on some occasions oaths go with the English clergy for nothing;" and this, notwithstanding the fact, which nobody can doubt, "that among the English clergy believers are more abundant than unbelievers." The kind of oaths "which go for nothing" are not mentioned by Bentham, but they may be conjectured. Now, if all oaths went for nothing with the clergy, or with any other body of men, the dispute would be settled. But this is not the fact. If in any way it has become the positive morality of any body of men that a certain kind of oath should go for nothing, each individual of that body, with respect to that kind of oath, has the opinion of his body. He does not believe