The valley of the Columbia is ours; ours by discovery, by settlement, and by the treaty of Utrecht! And has too often been so admitted by Great Britain, to admit of her disputing it now. I do not plead our title to that great country. I did that twenty years ago, when there were few to repeat or applaud what I said [see No. 65, p. 259]. I pass over the ground which I trod so long ago, and which has been again so much trodden of late, and take up the question at a fresh place the admissions of Great Britain! and show that she is con[ex]cluded by her own acts and words from ever setting up any claim to the river and valley of the Columbia, or to any part of the territory south of the 49th degree. . . . Up to that line, if it becomes necessary, I am willing to fight; but before fighting I want to talk to talk understandingly, with a knowledge of the subject. . . . It is not new talk with me. Twenty-eight years ago, I wrote what I now speak. Eighteen years ago, and when I had already been eight years a member of this body, I submitted a resolution in relation to this Oregon question, which I have seen no reason to retract or modify since that time, and which may stand for the text of my speech this day. It was in these words. . . . "Resolved, That it is expedient for the government of the United States to treat with his Brittanic Majesty, in reference to their claims and boundaries, west of the Rocky Mountains, upon the basis of a separation of interests, and the establishment of the 49th degree of north latitude as a permanent boundary between them, in the shortest possible time." It was in the session of 1827-28, and before the ratification of the second partnership convention 1. the one we are now determined to get rid of even at the price of war - and with the view of preventing the ratification of that convention, that this resolution was submitted. It presented my view of the settlement of this question, namely, no partnerships, the immediate establishment of a boundary, and the 49th parallel for that boundary. . . . It is the line of all the American statesmen, without exception, twenty and forty years ago. It was the line of Mr. Canning in 1 See p. 322, note. 1823. It is the line for the rejection of which by Mr. Packenham, without reference to his Government, Sir Robert Peel has lately, and publicly, in the face of the world, expressed regret.1 It is 1 The gist of the intricate Oregon negotiations is as follows: In the summer of 1844 (in spite of the "re-occupation” plank in the Democratic platform) Calhoun was corresponding with Packenham to secure the settlement of the Oregon boundary at 49°. The English rejected the terms, desiring the Columbia valley. Again, in July, 1845, Secretary of State Buchanan offered the boundary line of 49°, and again Packenham rudely rejected it, "without reference to his government." Buchanan then (August 30, 1845) withdrew the offer of 49°. As the Mexican trouble deepened, both the United States and England wished to avoid a clash of arms in Oregon. Sir Robert Peel, the British prime minister, expressed his regret for Packenham's hasty refusal, and several influential English newspapers spoke with favor of the line 49°. Finally (June 6, 1846) Buchanan received from the British minister a project for a treaty dividing Oregon at 49°; and Polk, after securing a favorable opinion on it from the Senate, concluded the bargain. In spite of Polk's "blustering announcement" in his inaugural address, claiming the whole of Oregon to 54° 40′, there are many indications in his Diary (see introduction to No. 78, p. 328) that he was at heart in favor of compromising on the line 49°. First, on October 24, 1845, he submitted to Benton (a well-known and determined advocate of 49°) the correspondence between Buchanan and Packenham, and told Benton that he had "reluctantly yielded his assent" to Buchanan to make the offer of July, 1845 (Diary, Vol. I, p.69). Second, on December 9 he told Buchanan, who was anxious to settle with England on the line of 49°, that if the British government made the offer he "would consider what action it might be proper to take"; and that "he did not desire war" (Diary, Vol. I, p. 120). Third, on December 27 he secured from his cabinet the unanimous opinion that "if Mr. Packenham offered the 49° or a proposition equivalent to it," he should refer the offer to the Senate (Diary, Vol. I, p. 147). Fourth, on February 24, 1846, he listened to the plan of a group of Southern senators to bring forward resolution asking him to compromise the Oregon question, and resented the threat of Senator Allen, a fifty-four-forty man, that if he compromised on Oregon he would injure his chances for reëlection in 1848 (Diary, Vol. I, pp. 246, 248). Fifth, on April 9 he promised Benton, who called with a British map on which parallel 49° was marked with dotted lines, that he would submit to the Senate any proposal from England to renew negotiations (Diary, Vol. I, p. 324). Sixth, finally, on May 3, he told Benton - the avowed champion of 49°—- that " he would be gratified" if he would "take the matter in hand and press the Oregon jurisdiction bill through the Senate" (Diary, Vol. I, p. 377). ... a line which we have never presented as an ultimatum; which we have often proposed gently, and which the British have as often gently shoved aside. . . . But now all this gentle and delusive work is done with. The joint use is to terminate — events advance — and the question must be settled now by reason and judgment, or it will soon settle itself by chance and arms. Fortynine is the right line with me; and acting upon the second half of the great maxim: Submit to nothing wrong! I shall submit to no invasion or encroachment upon that line. . . . It is the line of right, which gives to us the Olympic district and its invaluable waters, and secures to us the river and valley of the Columbia. It is the fighting line of the United States. The UNION can be rallied on that line! 78. Leaves from Polk's "Diary": the Mexican War, 1846 1848 [342] THE MEXICAN WAR On August 25, 1845, President Polk had a conversation in his cabinet with his Secretary of State, James Buchanan, on the Oregon question. "This conversation," says Polk in his "Diary," just a year later, "was of so important a character, that I deemed it proper on the same evening to reduce the substance of it to writing. . . . It was this circumstance which first suggested to me the idea, if not the necessity, of keeping a journal or diary of events and transactions which might occur during my Presidency. I resolved to do so and accordingly procured a blank book for that purpose on the very next day, in which I have every day since noted whatever occurred that I deemed of interest." 1 The diary, filling twenty-five "blank books," and covering the period from August 26, 1845, to June 2, 1849, was kept in possession of the Polk family until 1901,2 when it 1 The Diary of James K. Polk, ed. M. M. Quaife, Vol. II, p. 101. 2 Mrs. Polk lent the manuscript to the historian George Bancroft, who had a typewritten transcript made of it, which has been quite widely used, and which, on Bancroft's death, went to the Lenox Library in was purchased by the Chicago Historical Society, by whom it was published, with notes by M. M. Quaife, in four volumes, in 1910. We select some passages touching the Mexican War: Friday, 29th August, 1845-The President called a special meeting of the Cabinet at 12 O'clock, all the members present except Mr. Mason. The President brought up for consideration our relations with Mexico, and the threatened invasion of Texas with [by] that power. He submitted the following propositions which were unanimously agreed to as follows, viz., If Mexico should declare War or actual hostilities should be commenced by that power, orders to be issued to Gen'l Taylor to attack and drive her back across the Del Norte [Rio Grande].... Gen'l Taylor to be vested with discretionary authority to pursue the Mexican army to the West of the Del Norte, and take Matamoras or any other Spanish Post West of that River, but not to penetrate any great distance into the interior of Mexican territory.... Tuesday, 16th September, 1845.- Despatches were read from D' Parrott, the confidential agent of the U.S. in Mexico, giving an account of another threatened Revolution. . . . He gives it as his opinion that there will be no declaration of war against the U.S. and no invasion of Texas.... He is also of the opinion that the Government is desirous to re-establish Diplomatic relations with the U. States, and that a Minister from the U.S. would be received.... The President, in consultation with the Cabinet, agreed that the Hon. John Slidell of New Orleans . . . should be tendered the mission.... One great object of the mission, as stated by the President, would be to adjust a permanent boundary between Mexico and the U. States, and that in doing this the Minister would be instructed to purchase for a pecuniary consideration Upper California and New Mexico. He said that a better boundary would be the Del Norte [Rio Grande] from its mouth to the Passo [El Paso] in latitude about 32° North, and New York. The diary is the most detailed record of a presidential administration in our history, exceeding in fullness even the "Memoirs " of John Quincy Adams during the years of his presidency. thence West to the Pacific Ocean.1. . . He supposed it might be had for fifteen or twenty millions, but he was ready to pay forty millions for it, if it could not be had for less. In these views the Cabinet agreed with the President unanimously. Monday, 10th November, 1845 -... At ten O'clock P.M., .. I signed the Commission of the Hon. John Slidell as Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico. . . . Tuesday, 13th January, 1846— There was a regular meeting of the Cabinet today. . . . Despatches from Mexico which had been received last evening were read and considered. Some other public matters not important were also considered.2. . . Tuesday, 7th April, 1846-A despatch was received by last night's mail from our consul at Vera Cruz, which renders it 1 Let the student compare the actual southwestern boundary of the United States with this proposal of Polk's. The entry quoted is significant as showing the resolve of the administration to have California and New Mexico, even at the expense of $40,000,000, over six months before the Mexican War began. 2 This brief, colorless entry was made on the evening of the day of Polk's most fateful move in connection with the Mexican affair. In his war message to Congress, May 11, 1846, Polk says, "On the 13th of January last, instructions were issued to the General (Taylor) in command of these troops to occupy the left bank of the Del Norte" (Richardson, Messages and Papers, Vol. IV, p. 440). This occupation in arms of the region between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, which was in dispute between Texas and Mexico, was a cause of war in the eyes of Mexico. Polk maintained that the "despatches from Mexico" which rendered this move necessary were rumors of Mexican preparations for the invasion of Texas (see his war message); but the Whig opponents of armed intervention scouted the idea. Representative Alexander H. Stephens said in the House, June 16, 1846: "My first proposition is that the immediate cause of hostilities between our army and the Mexican forces was the advance movement from Corpus Christi on the Nueces River, to Matamoras on the Rio Grande or Del Norte. ... The President had no right, no power, legally, to order the military occupation of the disputed territory on the Rio Grande without authority from Congress ... the question of boundary (was) to be settled and adjusted (by the resolution for annexing Texas) between this Government and Mexico, by negotiation, and not by arms.... Congress can alone constitutionally draw the sword for any purpose" (Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 304, 316). Stephens dubbed the President, for his specious arguments, "Polk the Mendacious." |