Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of ConsciousnessThis book proposes a novel view to explain how we as humans -- contrary to current robots -- can have the impression of consciously feeling things: for example the red of a sunset, the smell of a rose, the sound of a symphony, or a pain. The book starts off by looking at visual perception. Our ability to see turns out to be much more mysterious than one might think. The eye contains many defects which should seriously interfere with vision. Yet we have the impression of seeing the world in glorious panavision and technicolor. Explaining how this can be the case leads to a new idea about what seeing really is. Seeing is not passively receiving information in the brain, but rather a way of interacting with the world. The role of the brain is not to create visual sensation, but to enable the necessary interactions with the world. This new approach to seeing is extended in the second part of the book to encompass the other senses: hearing, touch, taste and smell. Taking sensory experiences to be modes of interacting with the world explains why these experiences are different in the way they are. It also explains why thoughts or automatic functions in the body, and indeed the vast majority brain functions, are not accompanied by any real feeling. The "sensorimotor" approach is not simply a philosophical argument: It leads to scientifically verifiable predictions and new research directions. Among these are the phenomena of change blindness, sensory substitution, "looked but failed to see", as well as results on color naming and color perception and the localisation of touch on the body. The approach is relevant to the question of what animals and babies can feel, and to understanding what will be necessary for robots to become conscious. |
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Why Red Doesn't Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness J. Kevin O'Regan No preview available - 2011 |
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action activity actually adaptation areas aspects auditory Auvray Bach y Rita behavior blind spot body motions change blindness cognitive access Cognitive Sciences color conscious access cortex cortical Daniel Dennett Dennett Descartes emotions environment example experience explain eye movements fact feel of red fingers grabbiness harmonica homunculus human hypnosis idea illusion imagine impression inattentional blindness insubordinateness involved light look machine mental modes of interaction move mysteries neural neurons Neuroscience Noë normal notion O'Regan object one’s optics Oxford pain particular perceived perception philosophers photoreceptors picture Porsche Porsche driving problem proprioception qualia raw feel Rensink representation retina richness robot rubber hand saccades scene scientists scotoma seems sensation sensorimotor approach sensory feel sensory input sensory presence sensory substitution smell social somatosensory map sponge squishing stimulation suggest surface tactile theory things thought tion touch TVSS vestibular sense vision visual field visual system