THE NAPOLEON MEMOIRS.*

In a former number, in taking a review of "Las Cases' Journal,” we slightly glanced at the first part of these Memoirs, of which important production four parts are now published-two dictated to General Gourgaud, and more immediately and strictly historical-two more dictated to the Count de Montholon, entitled "Historical Miscellanies,” containing notes and observations upon several modern French publications which reached Napoleon at St. Helena, and gave false or imperfect views of his personal conduct, or of the political and military events of his reign.

When Napoleon, having ceased in 1814 to be Emperor of France, was about to depart for the Island of Elba, his farewell promise to the remnant of his old companions in arms who witnessed that extremity of his fortune, was, that he would prepare a record of the great transactions they had achieved together. The events that so rapidly ensued interfered with the design,—but the final and not inglorious struggle to be once again the foremost man of the world having failed, and he himself doomed to a sentence that extinguished every hope, he no longer deferred its execution. On the passage to St. Helena he commenced the present work, and was constantly occupied upon it during the six years that he continued to hold out against the miseries of exile, and the climate, and the governor of St. Helena. The quantity of matter condensed in these volumes is so great, and the subjects so various, that it would be quite impossible, in such a notice as the present, to give any thing like a perfect analysis of their contents. A large space is dedicated to accounts of battles, with minute and elaborate critical remarks upon military evolutions, which we profess our incompetency to appreciate, or at all times to follow-though, doubtless, this portion of the work will be deemed by many to be the most interesting and instructive; we shall therefore confine our extracts and observations to such passages as serve to illustrate the character and policy of this extraordinary man, who, by the force of his genius and ambition, raised himself (he repeatedly asserts "without a crime") from the station of a military adventurer to be the imperial chief, the creator and director of the most formidable combination of political resources that modern Europe has seen confederated against the stability of hostile thrones and institutions.

One of the first great events recorded in these volumes is the Revolu tion which placed Napoleon at the head of the French government-the celebrated scene of the 18th and 19th Brumaire. It is given in that minute detail which always imparts so much light and interest to the narrative of a great transaction.

He was in Egypt when information of the increasing inefficiency and unpopularity of the existing government reached him. The men whom the accidents of the Revolution had called to rule the affairs of France were distrustful of each other, and had lost all public confidence and respect. The French people felt that they were misgoverned, and were prepared by that impression, and by their recent familiarity

* Memoirs of the History of France during the Reign of Napoleon, dictated by the Emperor at St. Helena, &c. 2 Livraisons, consisting of 4 volumes.

with innovations, for any change that should promise a more effectual consolidation and management of the national resources. Under these circumstances Napoleon, confiding in his talents and in the influence of his fame, formed the hardy project of crushing the factions that agitated the country, and of raising himself upon their ruins to the summit of his ambition. He consigned the command of the Egyptian expedition to Kleber, and repaired to France. His unexpected arrival was hailed with demonstrations of general joy. By the time he had reached the capital, he had seen enough to satisfy him that what he projected might be achieved.

"The nature of past events had informed him of the general condition of France, and the intelligence that he had procured on the road (from Frejus to Paris) had made him intimately acquainted with all that he required to know. His resolution was taken. What he had not even wished to attempt upon his return from Italy, he was now determined to effect. His contempt for the government of the Directory, and for the political intriguers of the day, was extreme. Resolved to assume the chief control in the state, and to restore to France her days of glory, by giving an energetic impulse to public measures, it was for the execution of this project that he had come from Egypt; and all that he had just witnessed in the interior of France had only served to confirm his determination."

In the prosecution of this bold design he proceeded with caution. He went rarely into public-he admitted the visits of none but a few select friends, with whom he conferred upon the relative strength of the different parties, and the respective proposals that were tendered to him by each. Bernadotte, Augereau, and other leaders of the Jacobins, offered, on certain conditions, to place him at the head of a military dictatorship;—a more moderate party, consisting of Regnier, Boulay, &c. were for committing to him the direction of the government as it then stood. The Directory was divided-Siéyes was for abolishing the present Constitution (La Constitution de l'an III.) and substituting one that he had framed. His views were supported by the Director Roger-Ducos and the majority of the Council of Ancients. The remaining three Directors, Barras, Moulins, and Gohier, proposed that Bonaparte should resume the command of the army of Italy. The two latter were sincere; but Barras, who was then intriguing for the restoration of the Bourbons, thought of nothing but retaining his present ascendancy. After deliberating over these several proposals, Napoleon was finally hesitating between those of Siéyes and Barras, when the following occurrence betrayed the duplicity of the latter:

"On the 8th Brumaire (October 30th) Napoleon dined with Barras. The company was small. In the course of conversation after dinner, 'The Republic,' said the Director, is going to ruin—the present system will never do,—the government is without energy-we must have a change, and appoint Hedouville President of the Republic. With regard to you, General, your intention is to repair to the army; and as for myself, sick, desponding, and exhausted as I am, I am good for nothing but to retire to a private station. Napoleon looked at him intently, without uttering a word-Barras sunk his eyes and was confounded:-the conversation ended there. General Hedouville was a man of extreme mediocrity. Barras said not what he thought; his countenance betrayed his secret.

"This conversation was decisive. A few moments after, Napoleon went to Sieyes. He informed him that for ten days past the several parties had been addressing themselves to him-that he had resolved to proceed in concert with him (Sieyes) and the majority of the Council of Ancients, and that he now came to give him a positive assurance of this intention. It was agreed that the change could be effected between the 15th and 20th Brumaire."

The sequel is equally curious and characteristic of the men and the times :

"When Napoleon returned home, Talleyrand, Fouché, Ræderer, and Réal, were there. He told them with entire simplicity, and without any movement of countenance that could betray his own opinion, of what Barras had just been saying. Real and Fouché, who were attached to that director, felt at once all the impolicy of his dissimulation, and repaired to his house to remonstrate with him. About eight o'clock on the following morning, Barras came to Napoleon, who had not yet risen-he insisted upon seeing him, entered, and said that he fear ed his meaning had been misunderstood the night before-that Napoleon alone could save the Republic-that he came to place himself at his disposal to do whatever Napoleon should desire, and act any part that should be assigned him and earnestly entreated to have an assurance that if he had any project in view, he would count upon Barras. But Napoleon had already taken his part: he answered that he desired nothing-that he was fatigued and indisposed-that after the arid climate of Arabia, he found his frame affected by the moist atmosphere of Paris, and by similar common-places he put an end to the interview."

Such were some of the petty matters that preceded and accelerated the momentous crisis that was at hand. The remaining particulars are given with the minute fidelity of an historian relating what he had actually witnessed ;*-but we must refer our readers to the work itself. The final result was, that the plans which Napoleon, in concert with Sieyes, adopted completely succeeded. The Directory was abolished. Napoleon, Sieyes, and Roger-Ducos were named provisional Consuls until a new Constitution should be framed. The new Constitution, from which however the subtleties contained in the portfolio of Sieyes were as much as possible excluded, was proclaimed on the 24th of the following December; and Napoleon, as first Consul of the French Republic, took his place among the sovereigns of Europe.-As such, his character and actions now form one of the most interesting topics in the range of historical investigation.

When a deputation from the town of Capua waited upon Terentius Varro, with an address of condolence upon the defeat at Canna, the beaten Consul, in his reply, implored them to be firm in their fidelity to Rome, and among other arguments, did not omit to assure them that Hannibal was altogether a most fiendlike personage—that he was in the habit of building bridges and mounds of human bodies, and had actually initiated his savage troops in the practice of feeding upon human flesh. During the fourteen years of Napoleon's formidable ascendancy, it was a standing point of policy to cheer the efforts of his enemies by similar calumnies in proportion as we became alarmed, we became abusive; every new victory, or master-stroke of policy on

:

*The day before the final blow was struck at St. Cloud, to which the sitting of the Legislative Chambers had been transferred by a decree of the 18th Brumaire, Augereau, who was secretly opposed to Napoleon, presented himself at the Tuileries where the troops were passing in review; Napoleon advised him to absent himself from St. Cloud on the following day-to keep quiet, and not cancel the services he had already rendered his country, for that no effort could counteract the intended movement. Augereau assured him of his entire devotion, and his desire to march under his orders. "Eh bien, General," said he, "est-ce que vous ne comptez pas toujours sur votre petit Augereau!" Next day, however, when a rumour reached Paris of the proceedings at St. Cloud, le petit Augereau posted thither, and imagining from the tumultuary scene there that Napoleon was lost, approached him and observed, “ Eh bien! vous voici dans une jolie position !”

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his part, was the signal for fresh levies of libels upon ours; and to such an extreme of contumely had we arrived, and so popular had this mode of carrying on the war become, that ten years ago every man who wished to be considered a friend to his king and country, felt bound to admit that Bonaparte was a monster in human shape-that he poisoned his soldiers, murdered his prisoners, betrayed his friends, was brutally insulting to subjugated kings and queens-in a word, that he was so irretrievably and inordinately vicious, that, for example-sake, no well-conducted person should ever mention his name without a thrill of execration. But he has since fallen, and is now in his grave, and his character and actions may at length be spoken of with something like the impartiality which the future historian will not refuse the most extraordinary being of the modern world.

Napoleon's talents have been seldom questioned. They were of so high and rare an order, that finding no one of his own age with whom to compare him, we must resort to the few great names of the human race-Hannibal, Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne-conquerors, legislators, founders of empire-men of universal renown. The conspicuous qualities of his mind were energy and sagacity-intellectual hardihood to conceive vast designs, and boundless fertility in creating and applying the means to attain them. He was equally eminent in war and policy; and his achievements in both were marked by far less of accident and adventurous experiment than was once imagined. He went into battle with an assurance of success founded upon previous, and for the most part unerring calculations. This was the secret of his confidence in his fortune. He compared, as if it were an abstract scientific question, the physical and moral forces of his troops with those arrayed against him, and where he found the former preponderate, gave the word to march and conquer. The most unskilled in military science may collect this from the general tenor of the volumes before us. Throughout, when discussing the various battles he had won, he appears to claim credit, not so much for having been actually victorious when once the conflict had begun, as for having by previous arrangements and combinations brought the certain means of victory to the field. He was persuaded, and could not afterwards divest himself of the conviction, that he had done this at Waterloo; and hence his expression, so much ridiculed by those who mistake its real import, that he, and not Wellington, ought to have gained the day.

The same qualities of mind, the same preparatory forethought in speculation, and energy in action, and for a long time the same success, distinguished him as a statesman. His boldness here, as in the field, was the result of profound calculations, through which none but the most penetrating and combining intellect could have passed. His saying was, that in all his great measures, "he marched at the head of large masses of opinion." This military allusion illustrates the genius of his civil policy. In all his projects, whether foreign or domestic, he marshalled the passions and opinions that sided with him, computed their numerical and moral force, and where he found they must prevail, advanced at the charge-step to his object. In a word, he manœuvred the national mind as he would a great army; and having had the art of persuading the citizen, as well as the soldier, that he was leading him on to glory, he exacted alike from both, and met with the same measure of discipline and subordination.

Under Napoleon's government there was a suspension of political liberty in France. His maxim was that the few should plan, and the many acquiesce and execute. He established and encouraged free discussion in the cabinet, but he discountenanced all popular interference in state measures, as he would a spirit of mutinous dictation in the camp. We are no advocates for this mode of rule; but in speaking of the despotism of Napoleon as a personal crime, we should in fairness remember that he was accountable for it to his subjects and not his enemies, and that they were content to overlook its rigour for the many benefits it imparted. He asserts that his government was "eminently popular." He surely did much to make it so. He rescued France from the sway of the demagogue. He consolidated the national energies, and forced them into channels that led to national objects. He made talent the surest road to distinction. He was the patron of unbounded religious toleration. Under his reign no Frenchman could be molested and degraded upon the fantastic doctrine, that certain dogmás had certain remote and influential tendencies which should disqualify for the enjoyment of civil rights. He framed a comprehensive and intelligible code of laws (the greatest want of modern nations), in which he justly gloried as a lasting monument of his concern for the public good. These and his other great acts of general utility attached the French to his government, despotic as it was, and rendered them the willing instruments of his schemes of aggrandizement, in the products of which they were themselves to share.

We have stopped to offer these remarks, because we feel that it is not to the glory of England to depreciate this extraordinary man. Her real glory consists in having withstood the shock of his genius-in having so long resisted his imperial pretensions and asserted her own against a confederacy of hostile powers, such as no people uninspired by the pride and energy of freedom could have braved.

We proceed to extract some farther specimens of these Memoirs. The general contents, independently of the martial details, embrace the multiplied objects of his ambitious policy, which may be summarily described to have been, to render France the arbitress, and Paris the capital of the world; to consolidate Italy into a separate kingdom; to transfer the seat of the Papal power to the metropolis of France; to subjugate the several Continental states into obedience, or terrify them into an alliance; and, above all, to break the naval and commercial, and thereby the political influence of England in the affairs of Europe. Upon the subject of these vast designs, the present work supplies invaluable materials for the future historian; but their very importance precludes our entering upon them. Any one of even the subordinate topics connected with them would more than exhaust our limits. We shall, therefore, go on according to our original intention (and without any attempt at regular order) to take up such passages as have interested us by their novelty, and are capable of being compressed into our remaining space.

The following may be adduced as a characteristic example of Napoleon's originality and skill as a political intriguer. In 1800 it was the great object of France to detach the Emperor Paul from the alliance of England and Austria. He was at that time known to be deeply cha grined by the losses his army had sustained in Switzerland, and to be greatly dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies. Napoleon seized the