desertion proves a property in the village, since otherwise it must be irrelevant; hence property in the sacrificial fees and the like vests in the wife as owner, and afterwards is acknowledged to vest in the substituted priest, because otherwise the sacrificer's rites could not be complete: the law it is said, does not declare it an offence to forsake the wife of an officiating priest; for she is an ignorant person. That is denied; because, the decendants of an officiating priest having the same right to the office which they have to inheritance in general, (on the admission of property in that office,) the forsaking of an ignorant person is limited to the actual performance of the rites. It is no where seen, that, a wife and a daughter's son being left by an officiating priest, the wife shall be entitled to the remainder of the estate, and the daughter's son be entitled to the perquisites of the office.

If this argument be proposed, the answer is, the same text which declared that hereditary priests should not be forsaken, except ignorant persons: and that authority avails not, in this case, to confer property on one who is not a learned priest. As for what is alleged, that the wife is entitled to the wealth, and that there is no settled usage entitling the daughter's son to take the office; the parity between the wealth and the office may arise from favour shown by the daughter's son and by the sacrificers, or from mistake : usage alone is no authority, unless it be confirmed by construction of express ordinances.

On this point it is argued, that, as the rites cannot be performed by an ignorant or disabled person, the law directs that he shall be forsaken, intending that the rites should be performed by means of a substitute; but the ignorant person has property in the sacrificial fees and the like, as the owner of a slave has property in the wealth acquired by the slave and this construction should be settled on the strength of the admission of a property vesting in the heir. The text which ordains that a person unable to act shall appoint another to act for him," is the foundation of this construction : but the property of an outcaste, or other person disqualified for solemn rites, is absolutely lost, in the same manner with his right to the paternal gold, silver, and the like. This will be explained in the fifth book, on Inheritance. Wives and others, disqualified by sex for the performance of holy rites, cannot appoint a substitute; as a defiled person cannot perform a solemn act ordained by the Védas: therefore wives have no property in the office of priest. If the daughter of an officiating priest have a son, has that son a property in the office? If the daughter's son have such a right, then should a daughter likely to bear a son, and a son of the maternal greatgrandfather's daughter, be left, he would be entitled to the office but that is not supported by usage, nor by common sense; and there would be no certainty in regard to what should follow, if a daughter's son be afterwards born. If it be said, the daughter's son has not such a property; then the reason of the law is transgressed for there is nothing to prevent the property of the daughter's son in his maternal grandfather's wealth, if it be not resisted by a right vested in some other heir, the male descendant, the wife, or the daughter of the last possessor; and this office is absolutely similar to wealth.

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The text which forbids the dismission of an hereditary priest, does not imply that his heir shall not be dismissed, but implies that a person appointed by the grandfather or other ancestor shall not be forsaken thus no difficulty affects the terms of the text. That is denied ; for the practice is not such.

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Therefore the difficulty is thus reconciled; women are entitled to that only for which they are qualified. In regard to the assertion, that women, being disqualified, cannot appoint a substitute, this must be understood: being disqualified for solemn acts ordained by the Védas, they cannot appoint a substitute for such acts; but, qualified for worldly acts, nothing prevents their appointment of a substitute for temporal affairs and the right should devolve on the next in succession, under the text quoted in another place (Book 5, v. 477), and because women are dependent on men. Grain and similar property may be consumed by a woman entitled to the succession; but gold, silver, and the like, should be preserved: if she cannot guard it, let it be intrusted to her husband's heir, as will be mentioned under the title of inheritance. Here, since a woman cannot preserve the office, it should be executed by her husband's daughter's son, or other heir: but the produce should be enjoyed by the woman. However, should the daughter's son be at variance with his maternal grandmother, it may be executed by another person: he is not entitled to his maternal grandfather's property, if that grandfather leave a wife: and should the maternal grandmother litigate, it must be amicably adjusted.

The usage in regard to 'Agraháricas and others has been briefly discussed. No more express ordinance is found to determine, consistently with usage, the suits which arise on these subjects. If ordinances alone be received, there is no authority for establishing the right of their heirs: and many excellent persons do not admit the rules of inheritance in these cases.

"There is no offence in forsaking an unbidden priest who officiates of his own accord (43, 3)." The word is interpreted officiating priest in the Viváda Retnácara and Viváda Chintámeni. If any "Bráhmana, of his own accord, attempt the performance of holy rites for any person, and that person, when informed of it, forbid him, the sacrificer shall not be amerced for subsequent desertion. But it must be considered, that, if the sacrificer, though informed of it, have not at first forbidden him, but afterwards, when some part of the rites has been performed, do forbid him, he shall be amerced; for, not to forbid, is to assent: under this rule, his silence amounting to full assent, the priest is absolutely appointed by himself, and it would be improper to dismiss him from that ceremony. Though it be not mentioned by authors, this is consistent with common sense.

44.

VRIHASPATI :-They are declared to be of three sorts; coming of their own accord, hereditarily employed, and appointed by the sacrificer himself for that turn: even so should the business be performed by them.

"They ;" meaning officiating priests. Coming" voluntarily officiating. "Hereditarily employed;" appointed by former persons. "Even so should the business be performed;" that is, the rites should be performed as abovementioned. Such is the sense of the text. But some consider this text as intending concerns among partners in general: thus, the sense would be, partners are of three sorts; accidentally entering into partnership, hereditarily engaged, (as a son after the death of a father, who was engaged in partnership,) and engaged by the party himself (that is, called in by him at the commencement of the undertaking). "Even so," &c. that is, the business should be adjusted in proportion to the shares, whether equal, less, or greater.

Here it should be considered, that, if five teachers be engaged to read holy books, and one expound the verses, and all the rest be reciting readers, gratuities are separately paid to each of them: and something is given by strangers who hear the recital, to the expounder of verses and the rest, either for the benefit of hearing, or from the satisfaction which their skill in recital affords: and, according to ancient and excellent usage, strangers as well as the employer give something respectively for particular stories; such as the story of LACSHMANA's eating after his long fast, in the recital of the Rámáyana; and the story of the dwarf's begging alms, in the Sri Bhagavata; and the marriage of DRAUPADÍ, in the Mahabharata. In such cases, what is received both by the readers and the expounder should be distributed in shares ; but what is given on account of peculiar excellence, or skill in recital, belongs to him to whom it is given. The shares should be distributed according to the number of readers; and the expounder shall have a half, a quarter, or some other share. At present such a custom subsists in some countries: though not declared by the law, it should be admitted on the strength of custom.

In this case, should the expounder obtain anything by the error of introducing a more excellent story on a less excellent occasion, (as LACSHMANA eating after his long fast, in the recital of the story of the Mahábhárata,) what is the rule? The answer is, if the readers assisted in the mistake, the distribution should be made as in the preceding cases; but if they did not assist in it, the whole belongs to the expounder; or if some of the readers did assist, they are entitled to shares of the reward, and the shares should be distributed according to the number of persons concerned.

From the mention of former persons, or generations, it must be understood, that the family-priest of the paternal grandfather, being superior to others, not the priest of the maternal grandfather, should never be forsaken; but should there be no paternal family-priest, or no paternal wealth, and the man succeed to his maternal grandfather, then it is proper that he should employ his family-priest. This, however, is merely an induction of common sense, not the import of the ordinance.

The known customs at holy places, such as Gayá and the like, and in other countries, should be maintained in judicial procedure.

SECT. III.-On partnership in Loans, in Husbandry, in Arts, and in Plunder.

45.

VRIHASPATI :-The profits of those who jointly lend gold, grain, liquids, or the like, shall be proportioned to their respective shares of the outlay, whether equal, or more, or less: thus is the law settled. 2. Whatever property a man lends, with the assent of many, or whatever business he so causes to be performed, is considered as the act of all the partners.

Advance, or "lend," is explained in the Retná cara, make a written contract with a view to gain. A joint loan on interest is intended: the profits shall be proportioned to the shares in the principal loan; and the same

must be understood of loss: this is the settled rule and practice. What is lent to any person, with the assent of all the partners, is lent by all and a contract which one partner makes with the assent of all, or his acceptance of a written contract of debt from a debtor, is considered as the act of all. Consequently, they all share the gain or loss on that loan; and the borrower, by that written contract, becomes debtor to all the partners: therefore, should any one of them adopt compulsory means for the recovery of the debt, he shall not be punished.

46.

Among persons hound jointly and severally, whoever is found may be compelled to pay the debt.*

As a debt must, under this text, be paid by any one survivor among several debtors jointly bound for the same debt; so any one survivor among several creditors jointly advancing a loan, may, consistently with the reason of the law, recover the whole debt: but the heir, or the king, not the partner, ultimately receives the property of the deceased; for the case is parallel to that of partnership in trade. How then may one survivor recover the whole property? If he recover not the whole, the heir of the deceased, or the king, might take the share belonging to the deceased, out of the proportion which the survivor recovered as his own share: therefore, he should endeavour to compel payment of the whole debt. But if the debtor declare, "this I pay thee for thy portion, the shares of the rest shall be paid hereafter;" the portion of the debt received by the survivor cannot be taken from him by any other person. It should not be argued, that, the recovery of a debt due to joint lenders being requisite, like the payment of a debt due from persons jointly bound for it, he shall be amerced if he neglect to recover it; but it is necessary that the heirs of the deceased should assist in the recovery of the debt. If the heirs assisted in the recovery, the debtor could not say, "I now pay thy share :" however, a penalty for not demanding the debt will be mentioned. It should not be argued, that, if the heirs of the deceased reside in another province, then, not being present, they cannot make the demand: the debt should therefore be recovered by the survivor ; and if he accept his own share alone, he shall be amerced. The case being parallel to that of partnership in trade, it is necessary that the king should assist in the recovery of the debt: and here the demand of payment is similar to the custody of stock, in the case of partnership in trade. But if the king violate the law, is there any fault on the part of the heirs, that the loss should ultimately fall on them? No ordinance expressly requiring that it be recovered by the partner, it is a settled rule that the loss must be borne by the heirs. But, in fact, according to MISRA's exposition of the text of NÁREDA (19), the debt should be recovered by the partner, as the stock should be preserved in the case of partnership in trade. To neglect it, though able to recover it, is an offence; and the person who recovers the debt may receive a tenth part of it, as in a case of salvage.

When a loan on interest has been jointly advanced by five persons, if one die, and his heir be present, the heir should conclude the transaction: but if the successor reside in another province, then indeed the surviving partner should give notice to the king through the means of his officers, and the king should depute thither an officer appointed by himself; but if the king omit it, the partner in the loan should conclude the transaction, and

*Book I, v. 174.

send notice to the heir, that he may attend: however, should some cause prevent him from doing so, the partner may follow his own choice; no offence is thereby committed.

If the king conclude the transaction, he shall receive, in the order of the classes, a twentieth part from the property of a Bráhmana, a twelfth from that of a Cshatriya, a ninth from that of a Vaisya, and a sixth from that of a Súdra. The case must necessarily be held similar to partnership in trade. Thus, in answer to the question, "who shall perform his duty if one partner die?" the rule is propounded, "on failure of heirs, the king;" for that is shown in the case of partnership in trade. Is a tax to be paid to the king in consideration of his executing the business? In answer to this question the rule is set forth, "let the king receive a sixth part, &c." (22, 1). But if it be foreign to the king, the difficulty is reconciled from the text before cited; "or, if there be no heir, another partner who is willing and able to act; if there be no such person, all the partners;" (19). However, should the king forbid it, his commands must not be disobeyed: the king forbids not anything without a special cause.

47.

VRĬHASPATI :—To a paternal or maternal kinsman, and to a friend, a loan may be made on a pledge only; to others, with a surety, or on a contract written or witnessed.

This text belongs to the general title of Loan and Payment; for the reason of the law is equally apposite in all cases of loan.

If one of several partners in money-lending, being skilled in business, ask, "shall I singly advance a loan to the proposed borrower ?" in that case, should they assent, the loan advanced is lent by all the partners; as is declared by the preceding text (45, 2). In what mode should the loan be advanced ? in what case? The legislator replies, "to a kinsman, &c. ;" to any kinsman or friend of the partners, it should be advanced on a pledge, and one of sufficient value should be taken (Book I, v. 11.) The grounds of the law are these: if the kinsman do not repay the loan, but say, "I cannot now repay it ;" compulsory means would be a breach of the regard due to him, and therefore the debt may be irrecoverable: but if a pledge be taken, the debt may be recovered, by the sale of it at the expiration of the stipulated period, or at the end of eighty months or the like. From others it is not necessary that a pledge should be taken; he therefore mentions two modes, according to the honesty or dishonesty of the man," to others, &c. :" in default of a surety, a loan may be advanced to a dishonest man, on a contract written or witnessed.

48.

VRIHASPATI :-At pleasure, or without a time limited for payment, may gold or silver be lent; but liquids and grain, for a limited time by the custom of the country must the loan and the payment be regulated.

At pleasure, with or without a time limited for payment, may gold or silver be lent; but, for liquids and grain, a limited time is necessary.

The time must be regulated by the custom of the payment must be regulated by the time agreed on.

The Retnácara. country; and the Under the text of