Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal MindCan neurophysiology ever reveal to us what it is like to smell a skunk or to experience pain? In what does the feeling of happiness consist? How is it that changes in the white and gray matter composing our brains generate subjective sensations and feelings? These are several of the questions that Michael Tye addresses, while formulating a new and enlightening theory about the phenomenal "what it feels like" aspect of consciousness. The test of any such theory, according to Tye, lies in how well it handles ten critical problems of consciousness. Tye argues that all experiences and all feelings represent things, and that their phenomenal aspects are to be understood in terms of what they represent. He develops this representational approach to consciousness in detail with great ingenuity and originality. In the book's first part Tye lays out the domain, the ten problems and an associated paradox, along with all the theories currently available and the difficulties they face. In part two, he develops his intentionalist approach to consciousness. Special summaries are provided in boxes and the ten problems are illustrated with cartoons. A Bradford Book Representation and Mind series |
Contents
The Ten Problems | 3 |
Why the Problems Run So Deep | 37 |
Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains? | 71 |
The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences | 93 |
What What Its Like Is Really Like | 133 |
A Theory of Perspectival | 161 |
Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can? | 183 |
Blindsight | 209 |
References | 231 |
| 245 | |
Other editions - View all
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind Michael Tye No preview available - 1997 |
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind Michael Tye No preview available - 1997 |
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind Michael Tye No preview available - 1995 |
Common terms and phrases
afterimages behavior beliefs blind field blindsight blue bodily sensations brain Cambridge causal changes chapter claim cognitive color cortex creature deny essence event example experiences and feelings experiential explanation explanatory gap external fact felt quality fudgefeel functional duplicates given grouped array H₂O higher-level hypothesis identical imagine input intentional content introspect intuitively Inverted Earth inverted spectrum itches located look lower-level McGinn mechanism mental metaphysically possible Michael Tye microfunctional microphysical Ned Block neurons nonconceptual nondoxastic normal optimal conditions pain PANIC theory particular perspectivally subjective phantom limbs phenome phenomenal character phenomenal concepts phenomenal consciousness phenomenal experiences phenomenal objects phenomenal qualities phenomenology Philosophical Philosophical zombies physical physicalist plausible present problem processes Qualia realized receptors relevant represent representational content seems sense sensory modules sensory receptors sensory representations simultanagnosia smell sort stimuli suppose surface Swampman things tion token true undergo visual experiences visual field