are obliged to refer each one to his own internal experience; but with a full conviction at the same time, that this reference will fully answer the purpose, and cannot leave him in doubt.

On the supposition, therefore, that each one as fully understands what is meant by enthralment as by freedom, and that there is no mistake or doubt in either case, we repeat again, that, whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always a greater or less degree of enthralment. This want of harmony, this internal jarring and conflict, this aggression and resistance of the mental powers will always exist, whenever any appetite, propensity, or passion of whatever character swells over its allotted limits, and becomes unduly and inordinately powerful. If we may be allowed to use such expressions, every part of the mind instinctively knows its appropriate place, and will not suffer itself to be thrust from it without much remonstrance and resistance. If such resistance is not successful, and if some one inward principle, without regard to the original constitution of the mind and the equitable admonitions of conscience, usurps an undue control over others, we are conscious of what we may properly term mental slavery; at least in respect to that particular part or faculty, which especially suffers under this usurpation.

§. 191. The nature of mental enthralment illustrated by a refference to extorted promises.

It may possibly be found difficult for the reader at first to apprehend the view here given, (and the same may be said perhaps of various other topics which have come under our notice,) in consequence of such apprehension depending so much on his own internal reflection. That he must look within, and consult what takes place there, is true. And as it is undoubtedly desirable, that such internal reflection

should be called into exercise as much as possible, we will endeavour to aid it by some instances.-We will take the case of a man, who is travelling through an extensive forest, and unexpectedly meets with robbers. They suddenly present their pistols to him, and threaten him with immediate death, unless he promises to deposit a certain sum in a specified place on a certain day. He promises that he will do it. And it is an obvious question here, what is the view, which men of plain common sense and the community generally take of such a transaction? They evidently do not consid'er it on the same footing with a promise made under other circumstances; they do not regard it as a BONA FIDE promise and morally binding, even when they judge it expedient, in view of some incidental circumstances, that it should be fulfilled. They always make a distinction, (and it is a distinction which is fully recognised in law both Municipal and International,) between an extorted promise and a free promise. And if an extorted promise is actually different from a free one, it must be because extortion implies a degree of enthralment. And this is the fact.

When the question of life and death is placed before a man at once, and without giving him time for reflection and for strengthening his resolves, the fear becomes so excessive that there is no sort of proportion between the strength of the motive, and that of other principles within him, which might furnish the elements of resistance. Those supports,upon which the will is wont to rely in seasons of trying assault and great emergency, are suddenly overthrown; and it is prostrated and carried away captive almost without a conflict. The person himself, if the circumstances are of a nature so decisive as has been stated, experiences no convictions of guilt for subsequently violating a promise made under such a mental pressure, nor is he condemned by the moral sense of the community at large. They perceive almost instinc

tively, that by a sudden conjuncture of circumstances, for which the individual is not himself responsible, the due balance and harmony of the powers of the mind has been destroyed; and that it is unreasonable in such a state of things to expect results, which can properly be the subjects either of praise or blame.

§. 192. Illustration of the same subject from cases of torture.

We may propose another illustration, which will help to make the subject more fully and clearly understood. In former ages it was no uncommon practice to put persons to the torture, in order to obtain their testimony. They were first subjected to the darkness and privations of a dungeon; and after being worn down by this gradual form of suffering, their feet were applied to heated plates of iron; their flesh was burnt and torn by pincers; their limbs were wrenched and almost forced asunder; and in these, and in various other ways they were compelled to endure almost every possible degree of misery. And it was not unfrequently the case, that persons under this extremity of suffering uttered what was untrue. But no one thinks of condemning the moral delinquency, if it existed at all under such circumstances,as equalling the aggravation of a falsehood uttered in ordinary cases. In all such cases every body perceives and feels, that the due balance and harmony of the mind is destroyed. Such an extreme pressure is brought to bear upon the mind in a particular direction, that its parts become, for the time being, dislocated, and utterly incapable of any just and accountable action. In other words there is an utter slavery of the voluntary power, and as the individual is not the cause of putting himself in this situation, we often only sympathize and pity, when we should otherwise condemn. It is indeed possible for us to condemn in some degree, when the suffering does not appear to be extreme; but the con

demnation is always mitigated, and in many cases does not exist at all.

"The common sense of mankind, says Mr. Stewart, pronounces men to be accountable for their conduct, only in so far as they are understood to be morally free. Whence is it, that we consider the pain of the rack as an alleviation of the falsehoods extorted from the criminal? Plainly because the motives presented to him are supposed to be such as no ordinary degree of self-command is able to resist. And if we were only satisfied, that these motives are perfectly irresistible, we would not ascribe to him any guilt at all."*_This is undoubtedly the true philosophy in this matter.

§. 193. Historical illustrations of the subject.

And here, with the permission of the reader, we will introduce a piece of literary history, which we find in D'Israeli, who, in his attempts to interest the curiosity and to give pleasure, has in various passages thrown much light upon the human mind. In the reign of Charles First of England, a man by the name of Felton, the assassinator of the Duke of Buckingham, was menaced with torture for the purpose and with the expectation of extracting from him the names of his accomplices. The communication, that it was the king's pleasure, that he should be put to the torture, was made to him by Lord Dorset, who accordingly gave him notice to prepare for the rack. Felton, after solemnly affirming that his purpose to commit the crime was not known to any man living, said; " but if it be his majesty's pleasure, I am ready to suffer whatever his majesty will have inflicted upon me. Yet this I must tell you by the way, that if I be put upon the rack I will accuse you,my Lord Dorset,and none but yourself."+

*Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix I. §. 3.

† D' Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, Vol. III.

Here is a text in ethical casuistry, affording abundant food for meditation. Felton foresaw, that it would probably be impossible for him to endure the suffering which would be inflicted; that he would be under a mental necessity of accusing somebody; and he considered it of but little consequence whom he should name under such circumstances, inasmuch as it could not rightfully be regarded either as a proof of falsehood in himself or of guilt in others. And was he not essentially right? Can a man be considered as justly accountable for what is extracted from him under the pressure of the intense sufferings of the torture.

In Fox's well known History of Christian Martyrdoms, a book where fiendish cruelty is arrayed side by side with transcendant virtue, there is an account of a Portuguese young lady resident in the city of Lisbon, who was taken up by the inquisitors and ordered to be put to the rack. Unable to endure the torments that were inflicted, she confessed the charges brought against her. "The cords were then slackened, says the historian, and she was reconducted to her cell, where she remained till she had recovered the use of her limbs; she was then brought again before the tribunal, and ordered to ratify her confession. This she absolutely refused to do, telling them that what she had said was forced from her by the excessive pain she underwent. The inquisitors, incensed at this reply, ordered her again to be put to the rack, when the weakness of nature once more prevailed, and she repeated her former confession. She was. immediately remanded to her cell: and being a third time brought before the inquisitors, first and second confessions. She answered as before, but added, "I have twice given way to the frailty of the flesh, and perhaps may, while on the rack, be weak enough to do so again; but depend upon it, if you torture me a hundred

they ordered her to sign her