consistently regard all other existences as identified and embodied in their own, and pronounce every thing, which seemed not to be in themselves, mere unsubstantial images, chimeras, & illusory appearances.Among other pernicious. results of the supposition, that there may be effects without causes, is this, that we are unable to prove in that case the existence of the Supreme Being. The apostle assures us, that the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and godhead, are made known from the things which are created. And who does not assent to this great practical doctrine? Who is able to cast his eye over the expanded face of nature, decorated with countless forms of life and beauty, without every where reading the stamp and signatures of a higher Power? We reason upwards from the things, which are made, to the maker. Nature's works are the foundation and support of a sort of Jacob's ladder, that reaches to heaven; and by means of which even feeble men may climb upward and approach to the Most High, as did the angels of God in the bright and blessed visions of the Patriarch. But how is this done? By what process shall we consummate this approximation to the Divine existence? If it be said, it is done by reasoning, and that reasoning is the ladder of ascent, then we may ask, where is its support? What sustains it? Where does it rest? And all we can say is, that its basis is in this very proposition which we have made the subject of our consideration; in the great and fundamental truth of causation; and without that truth it has not an inch of ground to rest upon. But if on the other hand it be true,that every effect has its cause, then may the universe of effects around us, bound together as it is by the evidences of a pervading unity as well as expansive and pervading wisdom, justly claim for itself in its creation the agency of a Supreme Being, and thus lead our belief upward from the things

that are made to the conception and belief of the great Author of them.

S. 74. The truth of the proposition under consideration implied in the fact of a Supreme existence or Deity.

We may here without impropriety briefly revert to a train of thought, which has been already touched upon in the preceding chapter. We there expressed ourselves to the effect, that, if there is no law, there is no Deity. We may go more into particulars in this connection, and may add further, that, if the law of universal causation in particular be not true, there is no Deity. In making this assertion, however, it is proper to remark, that we employ the term Deity in the sense commonly attached to it, viz, as including the ideas of omniscience and superintendence. But obviously if the proposition of universal causation be not true, there is no basis whatever either for the one or the other of these attributes of the Supreme Being. If effects can take place without causes, if events can happen without being connected in any way with any thing antecedent, then there is evidently no tie, which can effectually unite them either with the Divine mind, or with any other mind. They stand insulated and apart from every thing else; they come & go through the great & universal ordering and arrangement of things, like strangers from an unknown land, whose advent and departure are alike beyond all anticipation and knowledge. The vast and. boundless empire, of which God stands at the head, would be flooded by events, in which He would have no agency, and of which he could have had no antecedent conception. Instead of the harmony and unity, which now every where exist and every where diffuse transcendant happiness, there would be the return of chaos, an universal breaking up of the established system of things, a

complete and utter embroilment, the reign of chance and tumult, of confusion and discord, like the jarring of the infernal doors,." grating harsh thunder." But the law of causality hushes the confusion, arranges the discordant materials, and brings every thing into order.

§. 75. Application of the views of this chapter to the will.

Our object in introducing these views must be obvious. They apply directly to the wILL; and, if we do not misapprehend their bearing, they decisively support the doctrine, that the voluntary power, whatever may be true in respect to its freedom, is still not exempt from law. If there be any primary element of human reason whatever, any undoubted and fundamental truth evolved from the very structure of the mind and exacting an universal assent, it is the one under consideration. But if the will is exempt from the superintendence of all law, if its acts have respect to no antecedent and are regulated by no conditions, then this fundamental proposition is not true, and has no existence. But if, on the other hand, in compliance with the dictates of our nature and the indispensable requirements of our situation, we adhere to this truth in all that unlimited length and breadth, which constitutes its value, we shall of course assign to every act of the will a cause.

.

Let it be noticed, however, that we do not specify here the precise nature of the cause. We use the term cause here, as we have done in all that has been said, in its broadest sense, as meaning, according to the nature of the subject spoken of, either the mere antecedent occasion, or the antecedent combined with power; as expressing either the Effective cause, which truly makes the sequence, or the Preparative cause, which is merely a condition of the existence of such sequence. In the language of President Edwards,

who endeavoured to prevent his being misunderstood, by taking particular precautions in respect to this term, we employ it "to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is, rather than not, or why it is as it is,rather than otherwise."* In this comprehensive sense of the term we hold it to be undeniably true, that there is no act of the will, no volition without a cause. And this being the case, it is of course implied, that the will itself, from which the act or volition originates, is subject to some principles of regulation; in other words, HAS ITS LAWS.

* Edward's Inquiry into the Will, Part II, §. 3d.

CHAPTER THIRD.

LAW OF UNIFORMITY.

§. 76. Belief of men in the continued uniformity of nature's operations.

ANOTHER principle or law of practically universal application, one which like the preceding is considered fundamental to the due exercise of the reasoning power in the ordinary occasions of its exercise, and the truth of which seems to be universally admitted, is this,-That there is a permanency and uniformity in the operations of nature. When we assert, as we cannot hesitate to do,that this principle is accordant with the common belief of mankind, and that it is universally admitted, we are not aware of asserting any thing more than what is obvious every hour in the ordinary conversation and conduct of men. Is not such the case? Does not the slightest observation show it? All men believe, that the setting sun will arise again at the appointed hour; that the rains will descend and the winds blow,and that the frosts and the snows will cover the earth, essentially the same as they have done