that the legislature might act more wisely because it would act upon fuller information, and the executive might duly place before the sister branch of the government its plans, its difficulties and its needs.

Aside from the peculiar benefits to the State itself, this system of centralization would seem to be one to which the States must finally turn if they would escape destruction as sovereign bodies from the all devouring usurpations of federal power. That the encroaching tide is slow does not make it the less sure, and its progress is likely to become more rapid as the depletion of the powers of the States becomes more pronounced.

There are two extra constitutional institutions of recent origin wherein are perhaps concealed the germs that shall yet restore the States to their rightful influence and prestige. I refer to the Commission of Uniform State Legislation and the Conference of Governors.

The first has already accomplished much in the direction of uniformity of State legislation along business and commercial lines, and may in time succeed in eliminating or minimizing one of the great causes of federal centralization, that is to say, the burdens imposed upon business and commerce by the multiplicity of State lines and the corresponding diversity of State regulations.

The other agency, the Conference of Governors, is yet in its infancy. It is not given us to foresee its destiny, but its possibilities are great, provided its members be clothed with the real power and influence of the States they represent. Should the governors return from these conferences fired with suggestions for administrative improvement and uniformity of procedure and possessing the power to carry them into effect, or even to investigate and recommend them, much good would accrue to the States; and should they discuss and conclude upon measures tending to check the growth of the Federal Colossus, the institution might become of still greater value. But to both of these results it is essential that the executive power of the States be centralized in their Chief Executives, and those States which have so centralized will hold a position of vantage and superior influence in the Conference.

But the decentralizing tendency in the States has not been altogether confined to the executive department, though chiefly apparent there. It has also been extended in some measure to the judiciary. It shows itself in the election of judges by the people, in the short terms of office, in the new proposition for the recall of judges, in the comparatively small salaries paid them, all of which tend to weaken both the occupant and the influence of the judicial office; but chiefly perhaps does it show itself in the undue weight accorded to the jury in trials at common law. Even if it were not true that many of the more intelligent citizens of each State are by law exempt from jury service, and it were always possible to secure a jury, all the members of which were intelligent and well trained, we should still have a body as likely to be swayed by passion and prejudice as by reason and law.

Three methods have been devised for the correction of these tendencies incident to jury trial. They are found in the instructions of the court to the jury; the setting aside of verdicts as contrary to the evidence; and the court's summing up of the evidence before verdict.

Of these the last is not usually required, nor even permitted, in the State courts, it being the usual practice of State appellate courts to remand a case for new trial if the judge has commented before the jury on the weight or credibility of the evidence. The jury is left to its own devices in drawing conclusions of fact from the testimony, without the benefit accruing from the comments and criticisms of a competent and experienced judge. It is submitted that this practice should be discontinued, and it be made the court's duty to sum up the evidence to the jury before the verdict. Such is the practice in the English and Federal Courts, and it has done much to give the administration of justice in those courts the superiority over that in the State courts which is so generally recognized.

The decentralization of the judiciary shows itself also in the well-nigh universal custom of the States to elect justices of the peace by popular vote. While the power of these magistrates is limited in extent, their incompetence, injustice or extortion is apt to affect the mass of the people more nearly even than that

of the courts of record. It is of great importance therefore that the best way be adopted of securing men of intelligence, honesty and ability to fill these offices.

So far as Virginia is concerned, since her constitution admits the unwisdom of the election of judges by the people, it would seem logically easy to establish the equal viciousness in theory of the election of justices by the people. But to prove the superiority of the selection of justices through appointment by the governor we need only turn to the early history of this Commonwealth, illuminating our path with the torch of our own experience. Aforetime the most intelligent and responsible men of the several counties were wont to accept the post, administering justice among the people with admirable wisdom. True, the office carried with it the further dignity of constituting its occupant a member of the quorum or county court; but, even without that added honor and responsibility, it would appear that the sense of civic duty, the enhanced dignity of the office and the freedom from political campaigning that would follow if it were appointive, would even now attract many of the same class to accept it. The framers of the present constitution have left the door open for this change, placing the whole matter in the hands of the General Assembly.

A last instance of the decentralization of the judiciary is seen in the election of court clerks by the people of the local communities rather than their appointment by the judges themselves, who are surely more competent than the local voters to choose men well fitted for their tasks.

This hasty review of a typical form of State Government would seem to show that the American people, in drawing their State charters, have tended to abandon the principle of representative government, to which our revolutionary sires gave their allegiance, substituting in its place, not the pure democracy of all the people, but a localized and sectionalized democracy, whereby the people of each community undertake to select officials in whose functions the whole State is concerned. This is not local self-government, but local State-government, or the local government of other people, bearing in its train the seeds of weakness, injustice and unprogressiveness.