and shall have power to embody the militia to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, and enforce the execution of the laws.

Nothing is said about the organization or training of the militia, or the selection of military officers beneath the rank of commander-in-chief, all of which matters are properly left to the determination of the General Assembly.

2. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION.

In the department of Education, the Virginia Constitution has made some attempt to concentrate power in the hands of a central Board of Education which, with its executive officer, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, has been given a large measure of control over the public school system of the State.

This centralization of authority is certainly a great improvement over the old system, which left the control of the public schools almost entirely in the hands of local boards and officials,-a system under which little co-ordination was possible, and State-wide policies scarcely to be thought of. The good effects of this centralization are already cl'arly seen in the widely increased activities of the department.

But even the present system leaves much to be desired, both in the organization of the controlling board and in the scope of its authority. Save as one of eight members of the Board of Education, in the choice of whom, as well as in the selection of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, he has no part, the Governor has no control of the educational system nor the enforcement of the laws relating thereto. There is no co-ordination between this and the other executive departments, nor even between the different parts of the educational system itself. No dominion whatever is exercised by the State over schools and colleges upon private foundations, and each of the State institutions of higher learning is left to the absolute control of its own separate and independent board, the members of which, while for the most part appointed by the Governor for terms fixed by law, are not removable by him nor responsible to him for their acts. So far as the higher education of the State is concerned, instead of one single co-ordinate and articulated system, we have

half a dozen divergent and antagonistic systems, involving waste of energy, time and money.

3. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND IMMIGRATION.

In the department of Agriculture and Immigration also, the Virginia Constitution has leaned towards centralization,-a change followed, as in the case of the department of Education, by greatly increased activity and efficiency. The executive functions comprised under this head are vested in a board whose members, though appointed by the Governor, are not removable by, nor responsible to, him. The chief executive officer of this department, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Immigration, is elected by the people of the State, and is responsible neither to the board nor to the Governor. Here again there is no co-ordination or connection between this and the other departments of executive power. Each acts independently of all the rest, and without that impetus to a common goal attainable only where there is a single head or commander-in-chief, who holds in his hand all the threads of the complex skein.

4. DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATION CONTROL.

Centralization has also shown its head in the department of Corporation Control, as organized in the latest Virginia Constitution, and with the happiest consequences for all, save perhaps the corporations themselves.

The constitution vests all executive, and much legislative and judicial control of these important and often complex organizations in the Corporation Commission, the three members of which are appointed by the Governor. They are not responsible to him; nor should they be in principle, since their duties are legislative and judicial, as well as executive. It is wisely required that the commission shall make annual reports to the governor, in which it shall recommend from time to time such new or addi·tional legislation in reference to its own powers and duties, or the creation, supervision or control of corporations, or to the subject of taxation, as it may deem wise. The requirement of

such annual reports and recommendations might well be extended to embrace every department of executive activity.

From this brief summary of the four principal departments of executive power, which the Constitution itself has organized and centralized, it will be readily seen how valuable are the results of the concentration of such power in the hands of one or a few, as opposed to the distribution of it among many. This conclusion is re-enforced when we compare the efficiency of the departments just considered with that of the departments left by the constitution in a decentralized condition. Of the latter it will suffice briefly to review three.

THE REVIEW DEPARTMENT.

The first of these is the department of Revenue, dealing with the assessment of property for taxation and the collection of

taxes.

A most important element in the efficiency of a State consists in its ability to raise ample revenue for its needs, and yet to impose the burden of taxation uniformly and justly upon the people's resources. The first condition of uniformity in any administrative matter is that there be a single rule or policy observed throughout the territory administered. Otherwise there will be different rules or policies in the several localities, and in the assessment and collection of taxes this means unequal and unjust burdens cast upon certain communities.

In the valuable paper read two years ago before this Association by the late Captain Old, whose recent death Virginia deplores, it was shown that the conditions in this State are such as have been last described. The rules for the listing and valuation of personal property differ radically in the several counties and cities of the State. Each commissioner of the revenue is in large measure a law unto himself, both in the method of listing and in the valuation of the property to be taxed. In one community the owner's own description of the amount and value of his property or income is accepted without question; in another, it is listed and valued upon the personal investigation of the commissioner. Here, the owner of personalty is questioned

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under oath as to his property; there, he receives his tax list by mail, signs the unadministered oath and returns it without ever seeing the commissioner; or he throws it into the wastebasket and is assessed as of the preceding year.

If we turn to the Virginia Constitution we shall find the explanation of much of this confusion, inequality and lack of uniformity. Instead of placing the Governor at the head of this essentially executive branch of the government, making him responsible for the proper enforcement of the tax laws through officials appointed by him, removable by him, and responsible to him, that instrument confers this power upon commissioners of the revenue locally elected, and responsible to none but the people of the locality, a very ineffectual check in case of local offices of this sort, where the officer's failure to perform his duty relieves his constituents pro tanto of their share of the burden. Yet his failure, however popular at home, re-acts upon the people of the whole State who, neither by their own votes nor by the act of their representative, the Governor, have a voice in the administration of this important function.

With respect to the assessment of land taxes the situation differs but little,-chiefly, in that the Constitution has not fixed the system, but has left it to the legislature. But as that body has given the appointment of land assessors in each county to the courts, we have much the same result. In one circuit the court may instruct the assessors to value lands at their market value; in another, to value them at some fraction of that value; in another, no instructions at all may be given, and the assessors left to value them according to their own system or lack of system. Thus we have much the same confusion and inequality that exists in the case of personalty, and for the same reason,—the want of a single head to lay down uniform rules for the conduct of the business throughout the State, and to hold the local officials responsible for the proper observance of those rules.

2. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

A second instance of a decentralized executive department is found in the department of Justice. The Virginia Con

stitution gives the Governor no supervision whatever over the prosecution of crimes nor the violations of State laws. The Attorney-General is elected by the people, not appointed by the Governor, nor responsible to him. Indeed the power is not even centralized in the Attorney-General, save to a limited extent in appeal cases, but is vested almost exclusively in the local Commonwealth's Attorneys, elected by the people of the several counties and cities.

Under no other responsibility than is afforded by the chances of elections, which as often perhaps tempt to neglect of duty as to its performance, subject to no central organization or direction, without the aid and comfort afforded by the knowledge that the whole executive power of the State is behind them, it is highly creditable to our Commonwealth's Attorneys as a class that the administration of justice is as excellent as it is, but it certainly yet leaves much to be desired. That is not the fault of the attorneys, but of the system.

Thus the administration of justice in the State at large is deprived of uniformity, and is made to depend in considerable degree upon the views or temperament of the local prosecuting attorney. In one county or city the lottery, prohibited by the Constitution itself,-perhaps in the form of the "grab-bag" or the "raffle," so widely and favorably known at church fairs,— is sternly repressed; in another, it flourishes like the green baytree. And so with violations of sanitary and other police regulations, the game laws, the misfeasance or non-feasance of legal officers, and with such crimes as perjury, bribery, etc.

It sometimes happens also that our Commonwealth's Attorneys are young and inexperienced, and hardly able to cope with important cases that may arise within their jurisdictions, wherein the ablest counsel of the State may be ranged on the side of the defense. If the young man recognizes his deficiencies, he may call in others to aid him, or he may prefer to learn by his mistakes at the expense of the administration of justice.

Again, obscure crimes must be solved, if at all, by the local constabulary or police, or else the expense of expert detective assistance must be borne by the local community or by private persons.