In its first sense, as representing merely the increased and increasing activity of the Federal Government along constitutional lines, the centralization of federal power is the necessary result of the progress of the country and the growing complexity of the conditions of society, and furnishes no legitimate ground of concern. The introduction of railways, steamboats, the telegraph and telephone, the great daily newspapers, and all the elements that in modern times make possible a rapid carriage of news, of persons, and of goods from one part of the country to another, were unknown in the earlier days of the republic, nor is it surprising that the use of such great forces should compel a corresponding expansion of governmental activities, both State. and Federal, within legitimate constitutional limits.

But this very quickness and ease of communication, whereby the bounds of commercial and business intercourse have been so extended, has given rise to an impatience of the existence of the multiplied State lines and of the checks and restrictions imposed by State Legislation, which constitutes a comparatively new and most important element in the clamor for further centralization of the Federal power, using the term in its second and more sinister sense.

It has not been long since Mr. Root, then Secretary of State, doubtless upon the initiative of his chief, made the startling statement in a public speech that unless the States perform more satisfactorily the duties allotted them in the scheme of our government, means shall be found, by construction of the Federal constitution, to take from them and confer upon the general government control of such subjects (now admitted to be reserved to the States) as touch upon the common interests of the American people.

This timely warning, or thinly veiled threat, whichever it be, uttered by one of such high station and authority in the counsels of the country, should tempt us to pause and take stock of the shortcomings of our State Governments, and consider whether further centralization of Federal power is the only or the best way to deal with the situation. If, in this process of aggranddizing the Federal power, the limit of safety has been already reached or passed, as most of us in the South believe, it would be

disastrous indeed could we find no other means of amending the conditions confronting us.

That there are many points wherein State Legislation, even when within the reserved rights of the States, may prejudice the freedom of trade, the personal liberties and the property rights of citizens of other States, it is needless to demonstrate to this body. In the incorporation and control of corporations proposing to do an interstate business, in the regulations affecting streams, forests and other natural resources of the State, in the pollution of waters, in sanitary and quarantine regulations, in the laws taxing and otherwise affecting trade, commerce and business, ample opportunities are afforded to work injury to the rights of other States and their citizens.

It is the want of due wisdom and efficiency in the State regulation and administration of such matters that has called forth the statement from Mr. Root, just adverted to. Nor is this all. Since the delivery of that address, the country has beheld the launching of a new political creed, that of the "New Nationalism," which advocates as one of its chief tenets the centralization of Federal power by construction. Among its supporters are men who have occupied high posts under the government, even at its very head, and who have in the past stood well in the esteem of the people. True, the dogma appears to have met defeat in the elections of last November, but it remains to be seen whether that defeat was real or apparent only. It is certain that the leaders command a considerable and widespread following throughout the country, and constitute a force that must be reckoned with.

In a government like ours,-a republic of republics,-where certain powers are granted to the General Government, and the rest reserved to the States or the people, the preservation of a just balance between the State and Federal Governments is of the first importance. That balance is now gravely threatened, if indeed it has not already become unstable. Criticisms of State inefficiency, as compared with Federal efficiency, are on many tongues, and there seems to be an increasing contempt of State authority coupled with a constantly growing respect for that of the United States. Every failure of the State to cope

successfully with some evil condition creates an instant clamor on the part of many, more well disposed than wise, to turn the matter over to the Federal Government, upon the assumption that that government is so much more wisely and efficiently administered than are the States, that it can readily devise the means of curbing the evil and can energetically enforce its regulations. And indeed, I take it, all must admit the superior efficiency of the general government within its legitimate sphere.

It is then of great importance to the future existence of the States as sovereign entities and to the prosperity of their people to inquire into the causes of the superiority of the Federal Government, not with a view to lessen its efficiency, but to increase that of the States.

It is due in part, doubtless, to the greater resources of men and money at its command, but chiefly, I am constrained to believe, to the wonderful executive organization of which it is capable under its constitution, which makes the President the supreme head, within constitutional limits, of the entire executive branch of the government, and which gives him the power of appointment and removal of all the principal executive officers, who are responsible to him and to him alone. Their acts are his acts, and he is responsible to the people for them. Through the department of State he makes treaties with foreign countries and conducts our foreign relations; through the Army and Navy departments he prepares for and conducts war; through the department of Justice he may control the prosecution of any criminal, be he a private person or a powerful trust, and may put behind the prosecution the whole resources of the country to meet those employed in the criminal's defense; through the Treasury department he directs the collection and conservation of the revenues. Through these and the departments of the Interior, Post Office, Agriculture, and Commerce, the President holds in his hand the thread of all executive activities. The efficiency of these departments is effectually placed under the President's control through his power of appointment and removal. Thus practically the entire executive power is committed to the President, and with it the full responsibility for the proper conduct of that branch of the government; his

responsibility in turn being secured by the suffrages of the people and by the power of impeachment vested in Congress.

Such an organization cannot fail to be active and energetic in carrying out the wishes of the people, as evidenced by the legislation of Congress and the judgments of the courts. It is the result of the concentration of executive power in one man as the Chief Executive, rather than a distribution of that power among many, elected by the people or by legislatures, and responsible only to the aggregate bodies choosing them, the necessary fruit of which is distraction of policy, want of energy, waste of effort and unprogressiveness.

It would seem obvious that the most natural check upon a strong central government would be strong State Governments. Centralization, and only centralization, can hold its own against centralization. The inevitable consequence of the attempt to balance a strong and efficient Federal Government against weak and inefficient State Governments is the solemn judgment pronounced in Holy Writ. "Take the talent from him and give it unto him which hath ten talents. For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." (Matt. XXV., 28, 29.)

Yet the tendency, from the beginning of our constitutional history, has been to decentralize, to emasculate, the executive power of the States. To attempt to place before you the constitutional provisions of all the States, and thus demonstrate this tendency, would extend this paper beyond reasonable bounds. But the Virginia Constitution is one of the newest of these instruments, and we may fairly assume that it is representative of the tendencies of the American people. I shall therefore confine myself to a consideration of that document. I shall tabulate some of the principal executive functions of a State Government, noting how these are distributed by the Virginia Constitution. It will be seen that, while two or three of the departments have been partly centralized, with highly encouraging results by the way, neither the most, nor perhaps the most important, are vested in the Chief Executive or in appointees responsible to him. True, the Constitution provides (Art. V,

$73) that the Governor, "during the recess of the General Assembly, shall have power to suspend from office for misbehavior, incapacity, neglect of official duty, or acts performed without due authority of law, all executive officers at the seat of government, except the Lieutenant-Governor;" but this does not constitute these officials the agents of the Chief Executive in any sense, nor make him responsible for the conduct of their departments; and in any event, at the next session of the legislature they may be restored to office over his protest.

The Constitution further provides that certain officials and members of administrative boards shall be appointed by the Governor, but in every case, I believe, the provision is accompanied by another fixing their terms of office, which deprives the Governor of the power to remove them until the end of their

terms.

The departments of State executive activity are susceptible of division into three principal classes:

I. Those which are expressly organized in the Constitution itself, and which are more or less centralized by that instrument; II. Those organized in the Constitution, but not centralized;

and,

III. Those which are not organized in the Constitution, but which have been, or may hereafter be, organized by the legislature.

To the more or less centralized departments organized in the Constitution itself belong (1) The military department: (2) The department of education: (3) The department of agriculture and immigration: and (4) The department of corporation control.

1. THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

In the case of the military department, which is here used to embrace the executive control of the armed forces of the State in time of invasion or public disorder, the Virginia Constitution has reached the highest point of centralization to be found in the instrument. It merely provides that the Chief Executive shall be the commander-in-chief of the land and naval forces of the State,