hend fully the entire Work which I have entitled Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind; but it may tend to obviate some doubts, and to clear up some difficulties which, as I have found from experience, are apt to present themselves to the inquisitive student.

The Second Volume of these Elements, relating entirely to Reason, or the Understanding properly so called, the subjects of which it treats are of necessity peculiarly dry and abstruse; but they, nevertheless, appear to myself to be peculiarly important; and I, accordingly, many years ago, laboured the whole of the materials which compose it, with all the diligence in my power. An intelligent reader will easily perceive that my great aim in this part of my Work has been, by vindicating the principles of Human Knowledge against the attacks of modern Sceptics, to lay a solid foundation for a rational system of Logic. This object, indeed, I have had in view, in every part of these Elements; and whoever will take the trouble to mark the various passages which bear on it, will find, I trust, that they are neither few nor unimportant. The Fourth Chapter of the same Volume trcats more particularly of the method of inquiry pointed out in the Novum Organum of Bacon; directing the attention chiefly to such questions as are connected with the Theory of our Intellectual Faculties, and the primary sources of experimental knowledge in the laws of the Human Frame. In this point of view, Bacon, impatient to hasten, by the force of a prophetic sagacity, to great practical results, left much to be done by his successors; a logical desideratum which none of them, so far as I know, has till now even attempted to supply. I would willingly indulge the hope, that neither here nor in any other part of my writings, is a single speculation to be found, which, with due attention, may not be easily mastered; and the habit of

patient thought which such studies have a tendency to form is itself an acquisition of the highest value.

If such a measure of health shall be continued to me as shall enable me to devote occasionally a few hours to the revision of my Papers, it is my present intention to begin, in the course of the ensuing winter, to print my Inquiries into the Active and Moral Powers of Man.* They who are aware of my very advanced age, and are acquainted with the infirmities under which I have laboured for a course of years, will not suppose that I look forward with undue confidence to the completion of my design; but, besides that some employment is necessary to beguile the passing hours, it will satisfy my own mind, if, by giving a beginning to the undertaking, I shall render it more easy for others to put into form that part of my task that may be left unfinished.

Nihil agere autem cum animus non posset, in his studiis ab initio versatus ætatis; existimavi, honestissime molestias posse deponi, si me ad Philosophiam retulissem.-Cicero De Officiis. [Lib. ii. cap. i.]

KINNEIL HOUSE,

24th November 1826.

*See vols. vi. vii.-Ed.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

CONTINUATION OF PART SECOND.1

CHAPTER I.-OF LANGUAGE.

HAVING treated at some length of the chief Faculties and Powers which constitute what is commonly called the Human Understanding, I now proceed to the examination of some auxiliary faculties and principles essential to our intellectual improvement, or intimately connected with it.

The form and posture of the human body, and its various organs of perception, have an obvious reference to man's rational nature, and are beautifully fitted to encourage and facilitate the culture of his Mind. A similar remark may be extended to many other parts of our constitution, both external and internal; but there are two which more particularly claim our attention--the power of expressing our thoughts by Language, and the principle of Imitation.

The connexion of language with the subjects which have been under our review in the former volumes of this work is sufficiently obvious. It is to the use of artificial signs (as was formerly shown) that we are indebted for all our general

1 See Preface to Second Volume [of the Elements, &c.]

2 See Philosophy of Human Mind,

vol. i. chap. iv. of Abstraction; also vol. ii. [chap. ii.,] sect. 2 of General Reasoning.

conclusions; and without it our knowledge would have been entirely limited to individuals. It is also to the use of artificial signs, that we are indebted for all that part of our information which is not the immediate result of our own personal experience; and for that transmission of intellectual acquisitions from one race to another, which lays the foundation of the progressive improvement of the species.

In treating of Language, I shall begin with a few remarks on Natural Language, without which (as Dr. Reid has well observed) the formation of an artificial language would have been impossible.1 The justness of this remark appears manifest from the following considerations:-that the establishment of artificial signs must have been the effect of convention; and that, without signs of one kind or another to serve as a medium of communication, no convention could have taken place. It may be laid down, therefore, as a first principle, that the formation of an artificial language presupposes the use of natural signs. These consist in certain expressions of the countenance, certain gestures of the body, and certain tones of the voice. Each of these classes of natural signs well deserves a separate consideration, but I must confine myself here to a few very general and miscellaneous hints.

SECTION I.-NATURAL LANGUAGE.

The language of the face consists in the play of the muscles of which it is composed, particularly of the muscles connected with the eyes and the mouth, and in the change of colour arising from the motion of the blood. The expression of the countenance, therefore, depends partly on colour, and partly on movement; of which two circumstances it may be remarked, by the way, that the former is far less subject to the restraints of the will than the latter, a change of colour often betraying an emotion when the features are perfectly quiescent.

It has been frequently observed by writers on physiognomy, 1 Inquiry into the Human Mind, chap. iv. sect. 2.