as to the province of Imagination,
431; limits it to objects of sight, ib.;
as to sympathetic imitation and the
game of bowls, iii. 130; as to Instinct,
275; as to the parental instinct of
brutes, 277; his opinions in regard
to instinct vague and inconsistent,

278.

Agesilaus, his saying in regard to educa-
tion, iii. 163.

Akenside, quoted as to the effect of
Opinion in moral actions, i. 341;
noticed as observing that the Second-
ary Qualities of Matter, and specially
Colour, as apprehended by the mind,
do not exist in bodies, 496, (N.B. But
a reference to the Dissertation, p. 583,
omitted, where an error of memory is
acknowledged as to this observation,
which ought to have been referred to
Addison, not to Akenside,) quoted, iii.
223; biographical notice of, 374.
Albinus, quoted as to Final Causes, ii.

344.

Alembert, see D'Alembert.

Algebra, the symbols of, as illustrating

the nature of General Terms, i. 22,
178-182, 203, seq., ii. 88; as an instru-
ment of thought, 82; the algebraic
calculus vaguely and inaccurately
styled the Analytic method, ii. 283.
Alison, referred to as founding taste on
Association, i. 321.

Alliteration, as connected with Associa
tion, i. 262, 277.

American anonymous authors quoted,
iii. 17, 18.

Analogy, as a principle of Association, i.
263, seq.; evidence of, what and how
it differs from that of Experience, on,
in general, ii. 171-179, 284-298;
argues from similar to similar, as Ex-
perience from same to same, 172; how
connected with our expectation of
natural events, 176, seq.; in language,
178; how it differs from Resemblance,
287, 288; is a resemblance of relations
not merely of objects, ib.; Buffon and
Cuvier quoted in illustration, 392,
393; analogy and unity of design are
often nearly synonymous, 289; the
anatomical knowledge of the ancients
from reasoning, 297; analogy rests
ultimately on the evidence of experi-
ence, 301; word analogy in mathe-
matics, how used, 320, 321; that be-
tween galvanism and electricity, 321,

397.

Analysis and Synthesis, (Geometrical,)

i. 84, seq., ii. 263-271, also 272-283;
mathematicians often use the terms
Analysis and Synthesis vaguely to de-
note as contrasted, the algebraic cal-
culus and ostensive geometry, 283.
Analysis and Synthesis, (Philosophical,)
ii. 249, seq., 263, 272-283.
Ancient philosophers, their method of
reasoning, i. 207, seq.

Antoninus, quoted on the influence of
Association and Phantasy, i. 341.
Aquinas, (St. Thomas,) a Realist, i. 183,
et alibi.

Aristides, quoted as to high and low in
musical notation, i. 498.

Aristotle, opinions of his school in refer-
ence to Universals, i. 169, seq.; his
doctrine of the principles of Associa-
tion, 261; notices the connexion be-
tween genius and melancholy, 459 ;
quoted as to the first principles of
Reasoning, ii. 46; as to first truths,
&c., 59; as to the errors arising from
Language, the instrument of thought,
99; probably suggested that Mathe-
matical evidence is resolvable into
identical propositions, 123, 124; his
doctrine, that "in mathematical quan-
tities equality is identity," 125, 377;
quoted as to the Syllogism, 189, 192;
as at once asserting that demonstra-
tion is only of eternal truths, and that
demonstration is founded on induction
from sense, 194, sec also 195; on his
assertion that Definitions are the first
principles of all demonstration, 195,
196; his authority during the schol
astic ages vouched by Bayle, 203;
quoted as to presence of mind, 221;
his Organon an imperishable monu-
ment to the powers of his mind, 223;
his originality in regard to logic is
not to be doubted; did not borrow it
from the Indian Brahmins, 224-229;
on this point the statement in the
book of Sophisms is decisive, 227,
228; quoted as to Causation and scien-
tific knowledge, 232; his division of
Causes into Efficient, Material, For-
mal, and Final, an error, 233, 234; the.
nature of his Observation or Expe-
rience, that it did not include ex-
periment, 243, 244; quoted as to the
nature of his Induction as opposed to
that of Bacon, 257; a text of his
quoted, in which he employs the term
sophistical, 260; his division of Quan-
tity, 378; quoted as to children at
first calling all men and women fathers

and mothers, 382; quoted and repre-
hended for an expression in the sup
posititious treatise imputed to him, Of
the World, 388; quoted as to the
love of Imitation, iii. 118; his char-
acter as a critic by Pope, 235; quoted
as to his calling instinct the imitation
of human life, 276; as to the human
Hand, 281, 288, 289.
Armstrong, quoted as to the remedy for

a too enthusiastic imagination, i. 458.
Arnauld, (Anthony,) quoted to shew
what is meant by Reason, ii. 13.
Arrian, quoted as to the Brahmins, iii.
104.

Art, what, how distinguished from In-
stinet, i. 36, iii. 251; implies intelli-
gence, perception of an end, and the
choice of means, iii. 267.
Arthur, (Professor,) adduced as to the
arrangement of ancient and modern
languages, iii. 52.

Association of Ideas, on, in general, i.
23-25, 252-347; influence of custom
and habit in forming, 23, 25, 258;
some regulative circumstances, 24,
253, seq.; influence of the will in de-
termining, 24, 25; importance of
Association in morals, 25; influence
of contrast as an associating prin-
ciple, 254, 264, seq.; of perceived
objects in Association, 255, 256; As-
sociation of Ideas not an unexception-
able denomination of the fact, 257,
seq.; relation of Association to Habit,
258, 259; Habit may be resolved
into Association, as well as Associa-
tion into Habit, ib.; sometimes im-
properly called Imagination, 259, 499;
Hobbes calls the train of thought
series imaginationum, ib.; by older
English writers expressed by Phan-
tasy or Fancy, 260; principles of As-
sociation, in general, 261-266; these
principles according to Aristotle, 261;
according to Hume, ib.; distinction of
these principles into two classes, viz.
the obvious and the recondite, 263;
distinction of philosophical and poeti-
cal associations, 263, seq.; ; alliteration
as an associative principle, 262, 277;
difference in different individuals in
regard to the facility of Association,
265; of the power exercised by the
mind over the train of thought, 266,
seq.; this train depends on causes
operating in a manner inexplicable by
us, 266; this power principally found-
ed on our habits of thinking influen-

cing the laws of Association, 268, seq.;
illustrated especially in regard to Wit,
270-274; to Rhyme, 274-278; to Poe-
tical Fancy, 278-282; to Invention
in the Arts and Sciences, 282-289;
Dreaming as connected with Associa-
tion, 289-305; three questions to be ex-
plained, 289, seq.; the mental train in
sleep subject to the general laws of As-
sociation, 295-299; the mental train
during sleep supposes also the suspen-
sion of the will, 299-305; states of Som-
nambulism and Madness as subject to
the same influence, 304; influence of
Association on the intellectual and
active powers, in general, 305-347;
more especially in relation to our spe-
culative conclusions, 305-321; Asso-
ciation of ideas, not necessarily con-
nected, becomes by habit intimate or
even indissoluble, as between Colour
and Extension, 306, 496; Space and
Time, 306; certain notes of music
and high or low, ib.; Sensations and
Perceptions, 307; the term Associa-
tive is improperly applied to all na-
tural and necessary conjunctions, and
should be limited to what is fortuitous
and habitual, 499; errors founded in,
308, seq.; as that events synchron-
ously occurring are naturally con-
nected, 309; hence many popular
superstitions, 310; that what are ac-
cidentally associated are necessarily
related, 311, seq.; hence a large class
of prejudices, 313; importance of phi-
losophy for their cure, 314, seq.; in-
fluence of this principle in giving to
errors the appearance of truths, 316,
seq.; in relation to our judgments in
matters of taste, 321-334, 339; in re-
gard to dress, 323, seq.; to fashions,
325, seq.; Association renders objects
of taste pleasing in two ways, ib.; its
influence on language noted, ib.; on
literature, 327, seq.; on statuary and
painting, 328, seq.; on poetry and
poetical diction, 329-334; on our
moral judgments, 334-341; on our
happiness, 340; Association of ideas
resembled to Attraction in physics by
Hume, 336; applied to explain all
our moral principles, and in general
all our intellectual pleasures and
pains, and by what philosophers, 336,
seq.; in opposition to this view,
342, seq., 346, seq.; how it contri-
butes to the enjoyment of objects of
beauty and sublimity, 339, seq.; As-

sociation and Imagination contrasted,
498.
Attention, as an intellectual operation,

i. 21; on, in general, 120-143; are
sensible phænomena which we have
not attended to, unperceived or only
unrecollected? 120, seq.; dependence
of Memory upon attention, 122, seq.,
352; importance of attention in ge-
neral, 123, seq.; attention in relation
to Custom and Habit, 124, seq.; diffi-
culty in regard to the operation of the
Will in respect of our habitual actions,
125-139; Attention as distinguished
by Reid from Consciousness, 134;
difference between men of speculation
and men of practice in regard to, 138,
seq.; can we at the same moment at-
tend to more than a single object, 140-
143; voluntary and involuntary, the
distinction vague, 143; illustrated by
the example of the American calcu-
lating boy, ii. 376.
Atterbury, (Bishop,) quoted, iii. 11.
Augustin, as to the
"Homo sum,"

&c.

of Terence, iii. 170.
Axioms, not the first principles from
which, even in Mathematics, its more
recondite truths are deduced, ii. 26;
not mere equations, 28, 29; what
Euclid calls axioms are propositions
of various kinds, 32, 369, 370; the
name improperly applied by Bacon
and Sir Isaac Newton to general pro-
positions gained by induction, 34,
236; Axioms and Principles contrast-
ed, 38-40, 46, 47.

BABBAGE, (Mr.) ii. 396.
Bacon, first person who recognised that
the proper object of physics and philo-
sophy in general was not Causes, but
constant conjunctions, ii. 231; quoted
thereto, i. 5 or 6, ii. 236, 238; quoted
as to the influence of Language
upon thought, 9; as to the slow pro-
gress of past, and the hope of more
rapid progress in future philosophy,
9, 10; as to the definition of Art, 36,
iii. 251; his merits as to the proper
object of philosophical speculation, 50,
seq., 52, seq.; on renunciation of pre-
judice, 68; on prevalent errors in
philosophy, 80; quoted, 82; influ-
ence of, 83; quoted on jugglers, 133;
as to practical skill and speculative
wisdom, 219; on theory in politics,
223; as to Time, the great political

innovator, 229; how the understand-
ings of men are equalized by a regu-
lated method, 245, 288; quoted in
favour of political progress, 247; as
to sleep and dreaming, 291; as to
Association, 316, 320; in regard to
the dependence of Memory upon At-
tention, 352; in regard to the effect
of system upon Memory, 370; as to
the selection of objects to be remem-
bered, 417; as to the saying, "speak-
ing makes a ready man," 429; no-
ticed as inadequate in his theory of
Causation, 478; quoted as to the uni-
formity of certain cycles in the sea-
sons, ii. 167; as to the utility of
Logic, 203, 204; as to the dependence
of Syllogism upon words, 206; cor-
rects the error of the ancients in
regard to the object of Physics, which
is not necessary but constant conjunc-
tion, 231; his notion in regard to the
relation of Cause and Effect; not, how-
ever, peculiarly correct, 234, 235; his
misapplication of the term axiom, 236;
held by Hume to have been ignorant
of Mathematics, -as only pointing out
at a distance the road to true philoso-
phy, and as inferior to Galileo and to
Kepler, ib.; how far this is true, ib.; his
saying that Knowledge is Power,"
241; quoted, as to the absence of ex-
periment in the philosophy of the
ancients, 244; as to Analysis and
Synthesis, 249; used many old words
in new significations, and quoted to
that effect, 254, seq.; quoted as to the
employment of the term form, 255,
256; does not coincide with Plato in
regard to the proper object of science,
256; quoted as to his Induction and
its method in contrast to that of Aris-
totle, 256, 258, 261, 262; as to Analy-
sis, 274; as to the total symmetry of
science, 298; as to experimenta luci-
fera, &c., 302; as to the use of Hypo-
thesis, 305, 306; as to the omission
of a merely rumoured experience, 327;
as to his apparent rejection of an in-
quiry into Final Causes, 335-339;
defence of, 337, seq.; quoted as to the
slow progress of evolution of the
sciences, 364; as to Final Causes and
their abuse, 399; as to sympathetic
imitation, iii. 147; as to the force of
custom in education, 165; as to the
effect of mathematical study, 203;
alleged as to the latitude in the use
of the word Poet, 222.

Bailly, quoted on the sagacity and in-
stincts of the lower animals, i. 200,
iii. 292, seq.; in the case of Leibnitz,
as to the effect of writing in strength-
ening the memory, 369; as to Attrac
tion in the months of the ancients,
and in general in regard to the import
of words and their change of meaning,
ii. 254; as to the simplicity of nature,
300; as to the probability of an hypo-
thesis from its simplicity, 312; as to
the connexion of the Irish Ogham
with the Persepolitan characters, iii.
69; as to Animal Magnetism, 150.
Balfour, (Dr.) quoted as to the acquaint-
ance with Aristotle's logic in the
East, ii. 226.

Barclay, (Apologist for the Quakers,)
quoted, iii. 154, 169.

Barrow, quoted for a statement of Cause
and Effect, i. 476; controverted as to
the nature of geometrical principles,
Definitions, Axioms, Postulates, &c.,
ii. 121, 122; quoted as to equality
and identity in Mathematics, 127,
128, seq.; as to mathematical super-
position, 149, 150; as to Common
Sense, 374.

Batteux, (Abbé,) adduced as to the power
of arrangement in language, iii. 45, 46.
Baxter, (Andrew,) his opinion in regard
to dreams, i. 301; quoted as to Final
Causes, ii. 342; his strictures upon
Maclaurin, 387; his coincidence with
Malebranche, 388.

Bayer, quoted as to the derivation of
Indian science and language from the
Grecks of Bactriana, iii. 80, 81, 99-
101.

Bayle, quoted to show the legitimacy
of the "appeal to Common Sense"
against the logical sophistry by which
the general beliefs of mankind are
assailed, ii. 57, 58; on the authority
of Aristotle during the middle ages,
203, 224; as to the scholastic sub-
tlety and love of disputation shown
by the Irish, 211, see also 58; as to
the knowledge of the books of Aristotle
in the East, 226; as to the faculties
of brutes, iii. 250.

Beattie, shows that Hume's enumeration
of the principles of Association was
anticipated by Aristotle, i. 261;
quoted as to high and low in musical
notation, 498; as to the meaning of
the term Reason, ii. 50, 64; not a
plagiarist, 63; his doctrine of Com-
mon Sense, 64, 65; his statement of

the argument from Common Sense
contrasted with that of Reid, 66, 67;
his explanation of a passage in Horace
rejected, iii. 50; noticed as an ex-
ample of the incompatibility of poe-
tical and metaphysical thinking, 232.
Beddoes, (Dr.) noticed for his attempted
reduction of Mathematical evidence
to Experiment and Observation, ii.
142, seq.
Bergmann, quoted as to the mode of
reforming the language of Chemistry,
i. 347.

Berkeley, his theory of the non-exist-
ence of Matter, i. 19; quoted as to
Habit, 127; a Nominalist, 185, seq.,
et pluries, ii. 91, seq.; his theory of
Cause and Effect quoted, 477; his
interview with Clarke, ii. 53; noticed
as maintaining that his Idealism was
conformable to the "Common Sense"
of mankind, 55, 56; quoted as to the
true object of Physics. 239; as to the
errors arising from the language of
Psychology being borrowed from the
language of Physics, 315.

Berlin Essayist, quoted as to equality or
Identity in Mathematics, ii. 128, seq.
Bernouilli, (Daniel,) noticed in illustra-
tion of the illogical application of
mathematical principles, iii. 204.
Biffin, (Miss,) intelligent, though born
without extremities, iii. 285.
Blacklock, (Dr.) referred to as to the

pleasure proposed by Poetry, i. 446.
Blair, quoted as to the power of arrange-
ment in language, iii. 45.

Blane, (Sir Gilbert,) referred to in re-
gard to Sympathetic Imitation, iii.

149.

Bodily frame, (our,) accommodated to
our intellectual faculties, i. 17, iii.

281, seq.

Body, notions of, merely relative, i. 17.
Boileau, quoted, iii. 224.

Bopp, (Francis,) adduced as to the San-
scrit, iii. 80.

Bos, (Abbé de,) adduced, iii. 9.
Boscovich, mistakes the proper object
of physical philosophy, i. 50; his dy-
namical theory of matter referred to,
107, 108, 110, 343, ii. 233; thinks it
curious that Extension should have
three dimensions, and Duration only
one, 306; quoted as to Observation
and Experiment, i. 6, ii. 243; in
favour of Hypothesis, 305, 395.
Boswell, quoted as to the connexion of
imagination and memory, iii. 230.

in

Boufflers, (M. de,) quoted as to sympa-
thetic imitation in women, iii. 124.
Bourne, (Vincent,) quoted, in illustra-
tion of poetical fancy, i. 279.
Boyle, (the Hon. Mr.) quoted, i. 312;
favour of Final Causes, ii. 340, seq.,
345, 346; as to the mechanical skill
displayed in the universe, and cen-
sured, ii. 387, 388.
Braidwood, (teacher of the deaf and
dumb,) adduced, iii. 16.
Brain, our extremely limited knowledge
of its functions as acknowledged by
Cuvier, iii. 387, 388.

Breadthless lines, the author maintains
cannot be perceived or conceived, i.
163, 164; ii. 84.

Brosses, (the President de,) referred to
as to the formation of language, iii.
34; as to the common meaning of
certain sounds in all languages,
72, 73.

Broussonet, his case quoted, as illustrat-

ing partial failures of memory, i. 359.
Brown, (Dr. Thomas,) noticed with
commendation, i. 491; as an instance
of the incompatibility of poetical and
metaphysical thinking, iii. 231; stric-
tures on his philosophy, 375-377.
Brown, (Rev. David,) quoted as to the
Sanscrit, iii. 79.

Browne, (Bishop,) quoted, as to the
theory of Causation, ii. 389.
Brucker, his account of Ideas in the
Platonic and Aristotelic schools, i.
170; quoted touching the Nominalist
controversy, 189; touching Plato's
doctrine of Ideas, 481; as to the
Universals, of Stilpo and the Megaric
sect, ib.; as to Roscelinus, the Nomi-
nalists, &c., 481, 482; as to the ap-
plication of the term Association only
to conjunctions, fortuitous and habi-
tual, 499; as to the ultra-nominalism
of Hobbes, ii. 152.
Brutes, held by the Cartesians to be

mere machines, i. 37, iii. 279, seq.; by
modern materialists to be only less per-
fectly organized than man, ib.; Brutes
and men, see Men and brutes.
Buchanan, (Dr. Francis,) quoted as to
the Brahmins, &c., iii. 105; as to the
low antiquity of Brahminic manu-
scripts, 113.

Buchanan, (George,) his Franciscanus
quoted, iii. 85.
Buckinger, intelligent, yet born without
extremities, iii. 284.

Buffier, praised for the precision of his

employment of the term Idea, i. 167 ;
as to the conditions of a legitimate
employment of the argument from
Common Sense, ii. 61; not fairly ap-
preciated in France, 63; his English
translator praised and dispraised, 65,
66; on his saying "that there is one
species of madman who makes an ex-
cellent logician," 209, 210; quoted as
to the ground of our belief, 1° of
other existences besides self, 2o of
the reality of design, wisdom, truth,
&c. 404.-

Buffon, quoted as to the necessity of
Ideas in Perception, i. 106; as to
analogy and resemblance, ii. 392; as
to the Imitation which he calls me-
chanical, iii. 117, 118; as to corpo-
real sympathy in eloquence, 158, 159;
agrees with Helvetius as to intelli-
gence being the result of organiza-
tion, 282; quoted as to the two kinds
of perfectibility in man and brutes, 297.
Burke, quoted as to the use and abuse
of abstract principles in politics, i.
216; as to the study of Law, 426; its
good and evil influences, ii. 207; as
to the mode in which the pleasurable,
the end proposed by Poetry, is effected,
i. 444, seq.; his opinion on this con-
troverted by the author, 447, seq.;
quoted as to Definition, ii. 119; as to
Sympathetic Imitation, iii. 117; as to
the connexion of bodily movement
and mental affection, 140; on one dis-
advantage of metaphysical studies,
198.

Bussy, (Rabutin, Comte de,) quoted as to
the remedy of time, ii. 110; iii. 190.
Butler, (Bishop,) quoted as to the plan of
study, i. 409; as to his theory of Cause
and Effect, 476; as to the effect of
Imagination in the formation of moral
habits, 503, 504.

CABANIS, quoted as against Final
Causes, ii. 344; as to Sympathetic
Imitation, iii. 144; adduced as to the
difference between the sexes, 239.
Cæsar, quoted as to the effect of writing
in weakening the memory, i. 25, 368.
Cambridge: Mathematical studies
scarcely known in that university till
towards the middle of the 17th cen-
tury, ii. 237.
Camerarius, (the younger.) quoted for the
case of Schweiker, intelligent though
born without extremities, iii 285.