Drake University College of Law: E. B. Evans and C. A. Dudley. Leland Stanford Jr. University Law School: C. H. Hubrich. Michigan University School of Law: E. C. Goddard. Minnesota University Law School: Henry Deutsch. Missouri University School of Law: S. P. Spencer and T. A. Street. Nebraska University Law School: W. G. Hastings. Northwestern University Law School: Geo. P. Costigan, Jr., and Samuel Scofield. Syracuse University College of Law: James B. Brooks. Pennsylvania University Law School: William Draper Lewis. Texas University Law School: John C. Townes. Trinity University Law School: R. G. Anderson. Western Reserve University Law School: Walter T. Dunmore. Wisconsin University Law School: John B. Sanborn. (435) Yale University Law School: Simeon E. Baldwin, Wm. R. Vance, Geo. D. Watrous, and George E. Beers. The following papers were read: PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS "Organization and Operation of a Law School" By JOHN C. TOWNES Conception of a Law School. From discussions which occur from time to time among the teachers of the law, it might well be concluded that three distinct ideas exist as to what constitutes a law school: First, that it is an institution in which law is taught; second, an institution in which law is studied; and, third, an institution in which law is both taught and studied. It is more than probable that the expressions from which the first and second conceptions are gathered are rather evidences of the heat of debate than of deliberate opinion, and that the real differences among us are matters of emphasis, as to which of the two functions, teaching or studying, is the more important, and the more to be provided for in the organization of the school and its actual conduct. These matters of emphasis, however, are too important to be overlooked, as they unavoidably express themselves in the practical organization and conduct of each particular school. Conception of Law. Another matter upon which there are differences which also may be perhaps more apparent than real is, What is the law? What is it that the teacher is to teach and the students are to study? Is it a science, capable of systemization and co-ordination, or is it a confused mass of arbitrary and adventitious, if not inconsistent, rules? Are there fundamental principles which are the matrix of the particular rules of action which we are accustomed to call law, basic ideas from which these rules of action proceed, forcing themselves upon our attention as standards of propriety in all the varying conditions of life, and of which the announced and seemingly arbitrary rules of conduct are imperfect, though unmistakable, representatives? Or, on the other hand, is the law simply an historically developed series of affirmations and negations, which come into being as the result of human experience, representing no fundamental notions of propriety, but standing for what seems most politic at the time the respective rules are adopted? Under the first view the law of any people among whom popular government prevails is formulated and announced public conscience, limited by considerations of practicability. Under the second view, the law is a mass of rules developed by conforming to, and embodying in themselves the experience of the particular people among whom it obtains, representing the growth of the people, rather than its present conscience. Under these two conceptions are marshaled the hosts which carry on from generation to generation the irrepressible conflict between principle and precedent. As an individual holds or inclines to the one or the other of these views, so will his conception of a law school and its proper functions be. There are few who deny all ethical basis for law, and perhaps fewer still who maintained that the law represents purely ethical ideas, unlimited and unaffected by historical development and practical considerations. Still, while the great majority of us believe in both ideas, there are important differences as to the prominence which should be given to each in the process of teaching the law. He who stresses the ethical idea will seek to impress upon the mind of his student the propriety of the rule of conduct under consideration making that the major thesis, and dealing with the empirical as incidental to it, while he who stresses the empirical will treat the subject historically, dealing with the ethical idea as incidental to that. These different ideas unavoidably enter into the purpose of a law school, and, as every rational effort is largely controlled and determined by the purpose to be attained, consciously or unconsciously they enter into its organization and operation, and influence more or less the conduct of each individual taking part in either. Definition of a Law School. It is probably impossible to define a law school to the satisfaction of all persons. May I venture to suggest, as a fair compromise statement, that a law school is an institution in which to teach and to study the different rules of conduct promulgated and enforced by political authority and the fundamental principles from which these rules proceed. How should such an institution be or ganized and operated? This is a question far too broad for exhaustive discussion on an occasion such as this. All that can be done is to briefly advert to many matters of interest and discuss hurriedly others which demand or at least seem to demand more attention. Constituent Bodies. In every law school there are four bodies of individuals whose functions are more or less distinct, though they fre In quently overlap, if they do not conflict with, each other. These are the general governing board, the administrative officers, the faculty, and the student body. It is probably safe to say that the lines of separation between these several bodies are not drawn with unmistakable clearness in any single institution, and that the indistinct boundaries which do exist between them are in no two institutions absolutely identical, though in most they are substantially the same. In some schools the control of the governing board is very extensive, running down into the details of the work. others this board deals only with the broad policies of the institution, and, even as to them, consideration is given to the views of the administrative officers and faculty. In some schools the faculty exercises powers which in others pertain to the president or dean. Sometimes members of the governing board hold administrative offices or designated administrative officers are ex officio members of the governing board. There are few institutions now in which teaching is done by the president; still it is a common, if not the universal, rule for the dean to do a reasonable amount of classroom work. The lack of complete segregation of these separate bodies is further illustrated by the fact that not infrequently some person or number of persons who are members of either the teaching or administrative force are also members of the student body. Under such conditions, it is impossible to draw hard and fast lines, and say with assurance that these lines separate the different bodies in the law schools as they now exist. In this uncertainty in the realm of the practical it would be presumptuous to contend that the proper theory on the subject could be successfully announced. The most that can be done is to call attention to the fact that the processes of growth through which our various law schools have passed have resulted in substantial uniformity of function in the various bodies mentioned, though the lines of separation between them are often dim and difficult to trace. To the governing board pertain the functions of determining and outlining the general policy of the school, of legislating on its broader and more general matters, and of providing for its main tenance. To the faculty pertain the duties of teaching in its various phases and of legislating on the more detailed matters within the general policy as declared by the governing board, but as to which no specific rules have been announced by it. To the administrative officers pertain the function of executing and enforcing the rules made by the governing board and the faculty within their respective jurisdictions. The functions of the student body need not here be considered. There is no time for further discussion of the duties of the governing board and the administrative officers. Still I dislike to pass by the administrative officers without one note of warning against the tendency, seeming or real, on their part to exercise legislative functions. Law making should be done by the governing board and the faculty, and neither president nor dean nor the two in conjunction should undertake to prescribe rules of conduct except in cases of real emergency. Legislation in the great majority of cases will be wiser and more just if the whole faculty have a part in it; but, even if the rules made by the faculty are no better than those which would be promulgated by the administrative officer, they rest on a broader basis and are better understood and more readily accepted and enforced. Faculty. By the term "faculty" as used in this paper is meant the law faculty. It can have no other meaning in schools which have no connection with other departments going to make up the complete institution. In these latter I favor separate departmental government so far as practicable. The most important matter in the law school is the quality of the teaching and studying done. This depends largely on the character and qualifications of its faculty. It is impossible to have a good law school with a poor faculty. It is almost impossible to have a poor law school with a good faculty. Equipment in other respects can help or hinder greatly, but the paramount thing is the teaching force. Qualifications of a Professor. The first thing essential to a good law teacher, that on which all else rests, and without which all else is useless, is good character. I do not mean every teacher of law should be puritanical and straight laced, for unfortunately these characteristics are sometimes but poor evidence of genuine nobility of soul, but I do mean that every law teacher should possess the sterling virtues essential to genuine manhood in its highest development. He should not have a maudlin sympathy that wipes out the distinction between guilt and innocence, but an enlightened benevolence which recognizes justice tempered with mercy, as true kindliness. should have wisdom to truly apprehend the conditions which exist within and about him and to discern between the irritating peccadilloes, which are but the exuberance of youth and those deeperseated wrongs which show fundamental weakness or viciousness of character. He should have the courage to carry out He that which benevolence suggests and wisdom approves, unswerved from the path of rectitude, either by the fear of loss or the hope of gain, uninfluenced alike by the thought of popularity or unpopularity, either with the governing board or the student. We hear much about the teaching of ethics in law schools. This is well. But it is exceedingly difficult to harangue morality into unwilling ears. The best and most effective course of ethics ever given in any law school is the daily life of a faculty whose members are without fear and without reproach. Teaching ethics is good; living ethics before one's classes is incomparably better. After moral character should come a reasonable amount of legal information; the more the better, provided it be properly assimilated and has not been acquired at the cost of practical common sense. There is no ailment quite so fatal to the would-be teacher as mental dyspepsia, that condition of mental weakness. which results from crowding the mind with the unassimilated ideas of other people. No man should undertake to teach secondhand; that is, to be a dispenser of other men's thought, which he has not himself so incorporated into himself as to make it part of his own being. The purveyor of thought of other men undigested by himself is out of place in the professorial chair. Every law teacher should be an enthusiast, filled with an absorbing and abiding love for the law in general and the topics which he teaches in particular. This love of the law and a corresponding love of his students should be his inspiration. Most of us must live by teaching while we teach, because we must earn our daily keep, but it is exceedingly unfortunate for one's motive in teaching to be mercenary. The high plane in this A most serious question exists as to the best training for a teacher. Should he come direct from the graduating class of some of the better law schools, or should he have had a fair amount of experience at the bar or on the bench? No answer of universal application can be given. Some poor practitioners make good teachers, and we all know some fine practitioners who would be execrable professors. Perhaps the matter may be fairly stated thus: In most instances an individual will make a better teacher for having had both collegiate training and subsequent practice. Yet it often happens that, when we compare two teachers, we find that the one lacking one or the other of these opportunities is superior to the other who has had both. Teaching is largely an individual matter, and it may be said of teachers as of the ancient poets, they "are born, not made." It is doubtless a good policy in this regard to have a composite faculty, embracing within it some members who have had experience at the bar or on the bench and others who have come direct |