court. It will be noticed that among the schools which do not maintain a practice court are several which have the reputation of being very carefully organized. In total amount of time given to procedure (pleading and practice), Dickinson, with its enormous amount of practice court work, easily leads. Pennsylvania, with her separate practice courses, is second. Vanderbilt, Michigan, Yale, and others follow. Possibly Harvard would prefer to consider that the lead is determined by offering the smallest number of hours. At all events, she has that distinction. Maine and Boston follow closely. Apparently New England is averse to training young men to quibble over niceties of practice. Des Moines and Texas are curiously in the same class.

The inquiries which I made in my printed questions were not confined wholly to the number of hours devoted to each kind of procedure work. A summary of the replies to the other inquiries follows:

To the question, "Is all the pleading work required?" twenty-two out of twenty-nine replies were, "Yes." Four others, from the context, apparently meant "Yes," without expressly saying so. Two schools, Pennsylvania and Columbia, require only common-law pleading. Chicago, seemingly alone, requires

none.

In the twenty-two schools requiring all the pleading courses for graduation, and in the four schools which apparently require all, all the pleading work is taken by every student. In Columbia, over one-half the class takes the unrequired pleading courses. In Pennsylvania, all code state students take code pleading, and about one-third of all the students take equity pleading. At Chicago, fully ninety-five per cent. of all the students take pleading; but until

this year there has been but one course on pleading-a combined course, mainly common-law and code pleading. The student had to take this, or no pleading at all. Obviously all who expected to practice law desired some knowledge of pleading. In the future, from present appearances, students expecting to practice in code states will take code pleading; students expecting to locate in common-law states will take commonlaw pleading. How many will also take equity pleading is uncertain.

A third inquiry asked how far a choice of pleading courses depended on the locality the student expected to settle in. From schools where all pleading courses. are required there could be no answer to this question. As appears above, there is a tendency in the direction of choosing along this line at Pennsylvania, as all the code state students there take code pleading. There is no such tendency at Columbia. At Chicago, probably, there will be such a division among the students. We are beginning this year with three separate, purely elective

courses.

From the answers to another question it appears that in only four schools is there an attempt to combine two or more systems of pleading in one course. Two of these, Trinity (North Carolina) and Western Reserve (Ohio), are probably simply giving a course on code pleading, but with elaborate reference to the development of code pleading out of common-law and equity pleading. Harvard teaches common-law and code pleading together. Columbia this year undertakes the same combination. Nebraska and Chicago, having tried the combination method for some time, are turning back to the separate course plan. The opinions of the various teachers were asked as to the relative merits of a combination course and of three separate cours

es. Twenty approved of the separate courses. Three thought the combination course better. Of these three it is probable that two were really approving merely of a course on code pleading, with constant indication of how the rule under discussion has grown out of the common-law or equity pleading as the case may be. Many of those who favor a separate treatment of the three systems insist that there should be constant reference in each course to the solutions of the like situation in the other systems of pleading. Dean Ames of Harvard is the most prominent advocate of a combination system. His view is that there should be two courses-the first on common-law pleading, and including code pleading, so far as the code pleading rules have developed from the commonlaw system; the second on equity pleading, and including code pleading, so far as the code rules have come from equity pleading.

It appears that, out of thirty who replied, sixteen are using text-books in teaching common-law pleading, nine are using cases, two teach by lectures, and three combine two methods. I have counted those who use a text, which they illustrate by cases which the students are supposed to read, as simply using a text work. In teaching equity pleading, twelve use a text, seven use cases, four use lectures, and one combines lectures and cases. In teaching code pleading, twelve use texts, seven use cases, three use lectures, and two use a real combination of cases and text.

The teaching of pleading and practice together is fully adopted in three schools. Nine schools adopt this idea partially. The remaining seventeen schools that replied regarding this point keep their work in pleading and practice as separate as possible, consistent with using the available books on pleading.

Questions were asked concerning the actual drafting of pleadings by the students from statements of fact given to them. At Illinois Wesleyan, 144 hours is given to this work. Kansas follows, giving 54 hours. But these are exceptional figures. Seven schools give no time to it. Seven schools give "some" time to it. In these schools it was evidently a small amount of time, rather hard to estimate. The remaining schools give a few hours to it, varying from three to thirty-six. Twenty instructors believed the work of value. thought it of very great value. Two thought it worthless. One of these said that having students prepare unreal pleadings was about as valuable as having a student of pedagogy teach wooden dummies for practice in teaching.

Some

The discussion of forms or precedents of pleadings seems to be employed very rarely. Nine schools use this method "some." Others did not answer the question, or else said that they did not discuss forms at all. Eleven thought such work valuable. One thought it useless. The others expressed no opinion. To the question whether forms of pleadings should be included in a case work. eighteen said "Yes," and four said "No." One of these four made the interesting suggestion that students should only study "horrible examples" of pleadings, which they should be told to criticise; the instructor, if necessary, pointing out the defects which the students had not found.

No question was put to discover the general usage and opinion regarding the inclusion of pleading in the first-year work. This was an oversight. The catalogues have been examined on this point. Forty-seven schools begin their pleading work in the second year. Thirty-nine schools begin it in the first year. Two postpone it to the third year. Of

those that begin pleading work in the second year, several are schools with two-year courses. Also a few of them have some sort of court work in the first year, while putting their real pleading courses in the second or second and third years.

Such are the facts about the teaching of pleading in the United States, if these inaccurate statistics are accurate enough to show any facts. What do they indicate? Majority rule may easily be a failure in settling questions of educational policy. This likelihood of error is even greater, when many of those who make up the electorate are not primarily educators but lawyers or judges. But, looking merely to the judgment of the majority, we would have to say: (1) That pleading should be taught in three separate courses, but with some reference in each course to the rules in the other systems of pleading; (2) that the entire three courses should be required work; (3) that pleading and practice should be entirely divorced; (4) that text-books should be the basis of instruction, with a use of cases merely for illustration; (5) the drafting of pleadings by the students and the criticism of their efforts by the instructor should be a part of the work, though several thought this could be better done in connection with the practice court; (6) some discussion of forms or precedents of pleadings should be a part of the course, and such forms should be included in the text or case book which is the basis of instruction; (7) the courses on pleading should begin in the second year, or at least not in the first year; (8) about 48 hours should be given to common-law

pleading; (9) about 24 hours should be given to equity pleading; (10) about 48 hours should be given to code pleading; (11) about 72 hours should be given to practice courses; (12) about 108 hours should be given to practice court work.

In the judgment of the writer, most of these conclusions are sound. Number (2) is certainly open to doubt. Every student will elect at least one course in pleading. In this he will get the general notions and many detailed applications. If he desires to study his other pleading work by himself, and devote his law school time more fully to learning substantive law, I, for one, would not prevent him. Number (4) is wrong. Pleading, of all subjects, can only be understood when its application to concrete facts is constantly before the student's mind. The case system accomplishes this most fully. No doubt the law of inertia is largely the cause of the failure of many schools to change from the text to the case system. Pleading has been especially handicapped by the lack of good case books. The only objection to number (5) is the great time required to correct the drafts of pleadings. Certainly the instructor in charge of the course would require an assistant, if this work is to be well done. According to number (10), code pleading should have 48 hours. This is right, if common-law pleading is a prerequisite. But if a student may elect code pleading alone, as at Chicago, more time must be allotted to it, or the instructor will be unable to trace the code rules back into their common-law and equity pleading originals.

"I'm talkin' about the law bizniss," said O'Soolivan. “I was convarsin' wid an auld lier the other day and he was that gloomy over the situashun he was thritenin' to drop his law books and take to farmin'. He said he didn't know which bizniss he could lose the most money in, but he'd take a long shot at the crops.

"It's worse than bad, it's demoralized," said the auld lier. "There wuz a time ye could come down to yer affice in the mornin' and find the hall full av people waitin' for ye. Howiver, I can't say there's much change in that respict, for the hall's shtill filled wid waiters, all av thim armed wid bills.

"As I wuz sayin', in the auld days ye could come down to yer affice in the mornin' and find a crowd av litigants waitin' for ye. While the affice boy was givin' thim numbers like they do in the barber shops, ye sat down and smoked yer pipe and read yer paper. Thin ye called number wan and Rafferty came in and towld ye a harrd luck shtory about havin' thrubble wid his wife.

"Misther Murphy," says Rafferty to the lier, "me wife ud anger a saint." "What for?" says the lier.

"She's always naggin' at me and says. I don't give her enough money to dhriss the childher," says Rafferty.

"That's nawthin'," says the lier, "my wife does the same and I'm gainin' in weight right along."

"How do ye manage it?" says Rafferty.

"I'm a lier," says the lier.

"Ye luk it," says Rafferty undher his breath.

"And me ideas cost money," continued the lier.

"What's the answer," says Rafferty. "I have a case here in the 49th Oklahoma on all fours," says the lier. "Is it a dog or a horse?" says Rafferty.

"It's a case in pint," says the lier. "Most people like a case in quarts," says Rafferty.

"Undher the rulin' in that case ye must go home and apoligize to yer wife for livin'. The fee is $46.80 in advance," says the lier.

"Afther that a woman comes in and she says she's been goin' wid a man for tin years and that he's been promisin' to marry her once a week durin' that time and ray fuses to keep his promise.”

"What'll I do?" says the woman. "That's a very serious matther," says the lier, "and I'll have to consult the authorities. In the mane time did ye bring yer wallet wid ye, not for publication but as an ividince av good faith?"

"I have tin doollars in bills and some silver," says the woman.

"I'll take the bills, you keep the silver," says the lier.

"Then the lier raches out and dhrags down a large book and says:

"I have here 'Dillon on Corporations,' a very imminint authority on the law av breach av promise. Dillon was backhalf for sivril years at Princeton. He

knows the signals like a book and anny informashun from him ye can rely on." "Here on page 131," says the lier,

"Dillon says:

"Ivery person who be force, minace or duress shall compel a man to marry him shall be punished by imprisonmint in the shtate prison for not more than three years nor less than thirty, or be a fine av not more than $1,000 or both." "I'm up agin it," says the woman. "Sthrictly," says the lier.

"Thin comes number three, who says her husband neglicts her and shtays out late nights."

"Ye say yer husband shtays out late nights?" says the lier.

"Well ye see whin we shtarted in biziniss I brought in all the exshperience." "Yis, I undhershtand, and he furnished all the money," says the lier. "Now I've lost all me exshperience." "Yis and yer partner's lost all his money," says the lier.

"That's it, now I want to recover for me lost exshperience."

"Yer barred be the shtatute av frauds me man," says the lier, "I don't think there's a jury in the land that wouldn't give ye at laste tin years."

"What's the damages," says the sthranger.

"Twenty-five dollars," says the lier. "That wuz the way things wint in the

"I'll tell ye what we'll do," says the lier, "we'll bring him into coort on a writ av ne exeat."

"He ought to be brought in on a shutter," says the woman.

"If he don't respond to the ne exeat a subpoena duces tecum ought to fetch him," says the lier.

"A policeman, divil take him ud suit me," says the woman.

"This proceedins in the nachur av a quo warranto," says the lier.

"I like grape fruit betther," says the

woman.

and money so privilint that a ler could hardly escape bein' hit in the face wid it on the way to his affice unless he tuk to the alleys. About ivery other wan ye met had a case av wan kind or other. If it wuzn't shlander, it wuz receivin' shtolen property, and if it wuzn't shmall pox, it was masles.

"But now iverything's changed. It's all pirsonal injury bizniss and a ginril practishuner has about as much show as a rabbit. The lier that isn't up on the law av nigligince might as well hang up the fiddle.

"The time whin the heartliss corpora

"me fee's only $15.83."

"Keep me lynx furs for security-I have no money," says the woman.

"This is so sudden," says the lier. "Thin number four's announced, and in walks a fat man who is religious on Sunday and a plain, ivery-day scoundhrel the rest av the week. Says he: "Murphy, I'm havin' thrubble wid me partner."

"What's the dif-fi-kulty?" says the lier rachin up and dhraggin' down from the shelf, 'Daniels on Musical Insthrumints.'

and disthroy his chance for irning $25,000 as a sthreet shweeper is gone by. They must answer to an outraged public sintimint and a pirsonal injury lier. The day whin a large railroad could take a thramp shtalin' a ride on the boompers be the nape av the neck and ordher him aff in loud and sthridint tones is passed. Aven Weary Willie has rights that must be respicted.

"The time whin ye could lave yer coal hole open on the sidewalk has dayparrted. In the auld days, if a man came