with all the nations represented at the Conference. Germany accepted, however, the principle of obligatory arbitration, and expressed its willingness to conclude special conventions with powers of its own choice, as it had already done in several instances. It was for Germany to decide this question for itself, and it decided against obligatory arbitration. In so doing, Germany should not be made the subject of criticism. Germany refused, however, to permit those Powers that wished to conclude a general treaty of arbitration, insisting that every act of the Conference should be unanimous, or substantially so, and that nothing should enter the Acte Final against the opposition of a single state, even although this single state was not to be bound thereby. A few Powers shared this view, and we thus have the spectacle of a minority blocking the outspoken and energetic desire of the majority of the nations of the world. It would seem that, if the majority cannot coerce the minority, the minority should not possess the power to coerce the majority. Feeling ran high, and threats were made of withdrawal, to prevent which the majority capitulated; for a treaty of arbitration concluded under circumstances of irritation and indirectly jeopardizing the calling of future conferences would have been but a sorry victory.

The majority, however, was unwilling to let the question drop, lest it lose the benefit of its votes in favor of obligatory arbitration. Therefore the following declaration was drawn up and unanimously agreed to:

"The Conference, conforming to the spirit of good understanding and reciprocal concessions which is the very spirit of its deliberations, has drawn up the following Declaration, which, while reserving to each one of the Powers represented the benefit of its votes, permits them all to affirm the principles

which they consider to have been unanimously accepted.

"It is unanimous:

"1. In accepting the principle of obligatory arbitration;

"2. In declaring that certain differences and notably those relating to the interpretation and application of international conventional stipulations are susceptible of being submitted to obligatory arbitration without any restriction."

The declaration registers an advance; not the advance hoped for, but, nevertheless, a distinct gain. In 1899 arbitration of questions of a juridical nature was recognized as the most efficacious and the most equitable method of settling international disputes unsolved by diplomatic means. The declaration of 1907 establishes the principle of obligatory arbitration and all Powers subscribed to this declaration. The ordinary treaty of arbitration exempts questions affecting the independence, the vital interests, and the honor of the contracting countries. The declaration of 1907 solemnly affirms that:

"Certain differences, and notably those relating to the interpretation and application of international conventional stipulations, are susceptible of being submitted to obligatory arbitration without any restriction."

The declaration is thus a recognition, not merely of the desirability, but of the feasibility, of arbitration. It is not an obligation to submit any or all international controversies to arbitration. The mere existence, however, of the declaration will exert a moral pressure, and it can be asserted confidently and without fear of contradiction that no Power in the future will accept a brief against obligatory arbitration. The present has cleared the way for the future, and we can well await it without fear and with a manly heart.

It may not be generally known, indeed, it does not seem to be suspected, that the Conference laid the foundations broad and deep for a permanent court

of arbitral justice, composed of judges appointed for a definite period, namely, twelve years, and acting under a sense of judicial responsibility. The language of the Acte Final is clear and definite:

"The Conference recommends to the signatory Powers the adoption of the project hereunto annexed of a convention for the establishment of a court of arbitral justice, and its putting into effect as soon as an agreement shall be reached upon the choice of the judges and the constitution of the court."

An analysis of this simple, but important, paragraph shows that the recommendation is not to consider the advisability of the establishment of a court of arbitral justice, but the adoption of the project annexed for the organization of the court. In the next place, the project of convention is to be put into effect and the court definitively constituted as soon as the Powers have agreed upon the method of selecting the judges thus constituting the court. The Conference therefore recommends for adoption a carefully considered project, annexed and made a part of the recommendation, to serve as a basis of the proposed court, and this project, when the judges are appointed, is to be the organic act of the court.

Passing to the project, we find that it consists of thirty-five articles dealing with the organization, the jurisdiction, and the procedure of the court of arbitral justice. The purpose of the framers, as well as the nature of the court, appears clearly and concisely from the first paragraph:

"In order to advance the cause of arbitration, the contracting Powers agree to organize, without interfering with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a court of arbitral justice, free and easy of access, composed of judges representing the different judicial systems of the world, and capable of assuring the continuity of arbitral jurisprudence."

Article 2 provides that the court of arbitral justice shall be composed of judges and of deputy judges chosen

from among persons enjoying the highest moral consideration, and who meet the requirements in their respective countries for admission to high magistracy, or who are jurists of known competence in international law.

Article 3 states that the judges and deputy judges are appointed for a period of twelve years and that their mandate may be renewed.

Article 17 provides that the court of arbitral justice is competent to decide all cases brought before it in virtue of a general stipulation of arbitration or in virtue of a special agreement.

Passing from the nature of the court, its composition, and jurisdiction, Article 14 provides that the court shall meet once a year. It was supposed that the court would consist of approximately fifteen judges and that it might be as expensive as it would be undignified for the court to meet and adjourn without business. It was felt, however, that cases might be ripe for presentation, and that the court should be, as the first article says, free and easy of access. It is therefore provided in Article 6 that the court shall designate annually three judges who shall form a special delega tion (judicial committee), and three others destined to replace them in case the three first delegated cannot attend. The court is to meet at The Hague. Likewise the delegation; but the latter is permitted to meet elsewhere if particular circumstances require it, for the delegation is competent to sit as a Commission of Inquiry, as a Commission of Arbitration or, finally, as a Court in a summary proceeding. Should there be no business before the court, the delegation may dispense with a meeting, and, in case of necessity, the delegation may convoke the court in extraordinary session.

Without entering into further details,

it is seen that this court is to be a court in the judicial sense of the word, with at least one annual session; that the delegation or judicial committee is permanently in session for the trial of small cases that may be submitted to it; that, if the case be of importance, or if there be other sufficient reason, the delegation may convoke the court in extraordinary session, and an express provision requires the full court to be convoked upon the desire of any litigant nation which has a case before it ripe for decision. The judges are permanent judges, acting under a sense of judicial responsibility, chosen in such a way as to represent the various juridical systems and the languages of the world. Having a secure tenure, they are not subject to removal or recall, and deriving their salary (6,000 florins per annum, with traveling expenses, and 100 florins a day during duty at The Hague) from the nations represented in the court, and being forbidden by Article 10 to receive any salary or sum from their own appointing governments, the judges are as free from the fear of dismissal as they are deprived of the hope of financial reward.

The project does not specify the number of states necessary to agree upon the appointment of judges, nor does it prescribe the number of judges to be appointed. It is, therefore, open to the nations desiring the establishment of such a court to agree among themselves to establish the court, which, when established, will be binding upon the parties so constituting it and will have all the prestige of The Hague. As the reporter said in submitting the project to the Conference:

"We have desired not merely to build the beautiful façade of the palace of international justice, we have constructed, and even furnished, the edifice, so that the judges only need enter and be seated."

"Substantial progress was also made towards the creation of a permanent judicial tribunal for the determination of international causes. There was very full discussion of the proposal for such a court, and a general agreement was finally reached in favor of its creation. The Conference recommended to the signatory Powers the adoption of a draft upon which it agreed for the organization of the court, leaving to be determined only the method by which the judges should be selected. This remaining unsettled question is plainly one which time and good temper will solve."

We are now prepared to answer the question whether the second International Peace Conference was in realty a peace conference, and whether it deserves a successor. It was international, because the nations of the world were represented. The first conference invited but a fraction of the independent sovereignties. The present conference invited forty-six nations and forty-four attended. It was a peace conference, because its great measures sought, by preventing a recourse to arms, not only to preserve, but to establish, peace.

First, it revised the convention for the pacific solution of international conflicts, so as to make it more comprehensive and more adequate to meet the purpose for which it was created.

Second, it agreed unanimously to renounce force and to submit to arbitration international difficulties arising out of contract indebtedness.

Third, it established an international court of prize, in order that the captor's acts should no longer be judged under the bias of national prejudice, but should be approved or disapproved and the rights of neutrals safeguarded by an international court, in which the belligerent as well as the neutral interests are represented.

Fourth, it unanimously recognized

the principle of obligatory arbitration, and stated with unanimity that certain great questions of a juridical nature, especially the interpretation and application of international conventions, are susceptible of obligatory arbitration without restriction.

Fifth, it laid the foundations for-indeed, established-a court of arbitral justice, leaving, however, the appointment of the judges to the subsequent agreement of interested nations.

Sixth, it provided that a Third International Conference of Peace meet ap

proximatly eight years hence, under charge of the Powers, and that this conference organize and conduct its proceedings under a sense of international responsibility and under the domination of no one nation.

I submit, therefore, that the Second International Peace Conference justified, not only its name, but its calling; that it was worthy of its great predecessor; that its meeting has bettered the world and given mankind a hope for the future; and it therefore deserves

a successor.

ALDEN, Carlos C., Dean of the Buffalo Law School.-Born in Wilmington, Ill., June 4, 1866. Son of Edward Alden and Adelaide Cousins Alden. Is a descendant of John Alden of Puritan fame. Educated in Bangor, Maine, and at New York University, from which he received the degree of LL. B. in 1892, LL. M. in 1893, and the honorary degree of J. D. in 1904. Married Suzanne L. Wiesmer June 29, 1898. Admitted to the Bar of New York in 1893. Professor of Law in New York University, 1894 to 1904. Elected Dean of the Buffalo Law School in 1904. Subjects taught in law school: "Pleading," "Practice," and "Real Property." Author of hand-book "New York Code of Civil Procedure," 1900, "Abbott's Forms of Pleading," Second Edition, 1898, and "Abbott's Practice and Forms," Second Edition, 1907.

ALLING, Charles, Jr., Dean of the Chicago Business Law School.-Born in Madison, Ind., December 13, 1865. Son of Charles Alling and Harriet Scovel Alling. Graduated from Hanover College with degree of A. B. in 1885, and from the University of Michigan in 1888 with the degree of LL. B. Admitted to the Bar of Michigan and Illinois in 1888. Alderman of the Second Ward of Chicago, 1897 to 1905. Lieutenant Colonel and Judge Advocate of the First Brigade, Illinois National Guard, 1902 to 1907. Attorney for the Illinois State Board of Health since 1907. Grand Consul of Sig

ma Chi Fraternity. Dean of the Chicago Business Law School since January 1, 1907. Subjects taught in law school: "Contracts," "Corporations," "Partnership," "Real Estate," "Torts," and "Wills." Author of article on "Waste" in the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, First Edition.

AMES, James Barr, Dean of the Harvard University Law School.-Born in Boston, Mass., June 22, 1846. Son of Samuel T. Ames and Mary Barr Ames. Graduated from Harvard College in 1865, and from Harvard Law School in 1873. Married Sarah Russell on June 29, 1880. Admitted to the Bar of Massachusetts in 1873. Associate Professor of Law at Harvard University, 1873 to 1877. Professor of Law of Harvard University, 1877 to date, and Dean of the Law School since 1895. Subjects taught in law school cover practically the entire course. Author of several case-books, as well as articles in various law magazines.

ASHLEY, Clarence D., Dean of the New York University Law School.-Born in Boston, Mass., July 1, 1851. Son of Ossan D. Ashley and Harriet A. Ashley. Graduated from Yale University in 1873, with degree of A. B. Attended University of Berlin, Prussia, from 1875 to 1878. Received degree of LL. B. from Columbia University in 1880. Married Isabella H. Ripley on August 12, 1880. Admitted to the Bar of New York in

1880. Together with Abner C. Thomas founded the Metropolis Law School in 1891. Secretary of the faculty of this school and Professor of Law from 1891 to 1895. On consolidation of the Metropolis Law School with the New York University was made Vice Dean of the new organization. In charge of the evening department from 1895 to 1896. Dean of the New York University Law School since 1896. Also nonresident lecturer on law at Bryn Mawr from 1899 to date. Subjects taught in law school cover practically the entire course. Author of "Condensed Cases on Contracts," and various articles in legal periodicals.

BENTLEY, Charles Staughton, Dean of the Cleveland Law School.-Born in Chagrin Falls, Ohio, September 5, 1846. The son of Staughton Bentley and Orsey Baldwin Bentley. Graduated from Hillsdale College, Michigan, in 1870 with degree of A. B., and in 1873 with the degree of A. M. Married Isabel Kempton in 1874. In 1888 married Mrs. M. E Logan; his first wife having died in 1877. Admitted to the Bar of Ohio in 1872. Prosecuting Attorney of Williams County, Ohio; City Solicitor of Bryan, Ohio; Judge of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Ohio Judicial Circuit from 1887 to 1895. One of the organizers of the Cleveland Law School in 1897, and has been Dean of the faculty of that school since that date. Subjects taught in the law school: "Bailments," "Bills and Notes," "Corporations," "Criminal Law," "Equity," "Evidence," and "Pleading."

BIGELOW, Melville Madison, Dean of the Boston University Law School.Born in Eaton Rapids, Michigan, August 2, 1846. Son of Rev. William E. Bigelow and Daphne Madison Bigelow. Graduated from Michigan University in 1866. Received degree of Ph. D. from Harvard University in 1879, and that of LL. D. from Northwestern University in 1896. Married Miss Alice Woodman. Admitted to the Bar of Tennessee in 1868. Dean of the Boston University Law School since 1904. Author of textbooks on "Bills and Notes," "Estoppel," "Torts," and "Wills."

BRUCE, Andrew Alexander, Dean of the University of North Dakota Law School.-Born in Madras, Indiana, April 15, 1856. The son of Edward Archibald Bruce and Annie McMaster Bruce. Graduated from the University of Wisconsin with the degree of LL. B. in 1892. Married Elizabeth B. Pickett on June 29, 1899. Admitted to the Bar of Wisconsin in 1892. Secretary to the Judges of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin from 1900 to 1902. Leading factor in the enactment and enforcement of Child Labor Laws in Illinois and Wisconsin. President of the North Dakota Board of Bar Examiners since 1895. Professor of Law Chicago Law School, 1897 to 1898. Professor of Law Uni

versity of Wisconsin 1898 to 1902. Appointed Professor of Law University of North Dakota in 1902, and elected dean of the law faculty of that school in 1905. Subjects taught in law school: "Agency," "Criminal Law," "Constitutional Law," "Carriers," "Damages," "Pleading," and "Wills." Author of various articles in law magazines.

BUNN, George L., Dean of the St. Paul College of Law.-Born in Sparta, Wis., June 25, 1865. Son of Romanzo Bunn and Sarah L. Bunn. Graduated from the University of Wisconsin with degrees of A B. in 1885, and LL. B. in 1888. Married Fannie Losey April 2, 1908. Admitted to the Bar of Wisconsin in 1888. Judge of the Second District of Minnesota, 1897 to the present date. Lecturer and instructor in the St. Paul College of Law, 1902 to 1904. Dean of St. Paul College of Law since 1904. Teaches the subject of "Evidence."

BURKE, Edmund W., Dean of the Chicago-Kent College of Law.-Born in Ogle County, Ill., in 1858. Received his education at Northwestern University and the University of Michigan. Married Myra Webster in 1879. Admitted to the Bar of Illinois in 1873. Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 1893 to 1903. Appointed lecturer at Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1893. In 1904 was elected dean of the same school to succeed the late Judge Thomas A. Moran. Subjects taught in the law school: "Equity" and "Roman Law."

BURKS, Martin Parks, Dean of the Washington and Lee University Law School.-Born in Liberty (now Bedford City), Va., January 23, 1851. Son of Edward Calohill Burks and Mildred E. Burks. Graduated from Washington and Lee University with degree of A. B. in 1870, and in 1872 received degree of B. L. from University of Virginia. Married Roberta G. Bell December 31, 1874. Admitted to the Bar of Virginia in 1872. Reporter of the Court of Ap peals of Virginia since 1895. Appointed Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University in 1899, and in 1903 was elected Dean of the law faculty of the same school. Subjects taught in the law school: "CommonLaw Pleading," "Contracts," "Criminal Law and Procedure," "Evidence," and "Torts." Author of a monograph on "Property Rights of Married Women," magazine articles, etc.

CAMPBELL, John, Dean of the University of Colorado Law School.-Born in Monroe County, Indiana, in 1853. Son of James M. Campbell and Nancy Campbell. Graduated from the University of Iowa with degrees of A. B. in 1877, LL. B. in 1879, and M. A. in 1880. Married Harriet J. Parker on June 28, 1881. Admitted to the Bar of Iowa in 1879 and of Colorado in 1880. City and County Attorney at Colorado Springs. Member of the Colorado State Legislature in