might interfere with advantage in the internal government of France, we certainly should avail ourselves of every such opportunity, as an operation of the war. Had I, as the right honourable gentleman has contended, disclaimed all such interference in the present war, I should have done what never has been done in any former war. And I have only to remind the right honourable gentleman, of what, upon a former occasion, was his opinion with respect to an interference, which government found necessary to make in the affairs of Holland. When we attempted to defend that measure upon the principles of justice, he contended that we proved too much, and that in order to justify it, it was only necessary to show that it was for the interest of Great Britain. Upon what principle, then, can he now possibly urge that an interference, admitted in every former war, should become unjustifiable in the present, that commenced, on the "part of France, with an interference against ourselves?

Having supposed, then, that all idea of interference was disclaimed, the right honourable gentleman proceeded to bring forward a charge of inconsistency, from the declaration of Lord Hood, at Toulon, and that afterwards published by His Majesty, addressed to the people of France. These declarations, I affirm, are perfectly consistent. That of Lord Hood only promises protection to the people of Toulon, so far as he could grant it, without specifying any particular form of government-they chose to pledge themselves to the constitution of 1789. The declaration of His Majesty offers protection to all the people of France who shall approve of an hereditary monarchy. What, then, do the resolutions, prepared by the right honourable gentleman, call upon you to do?-to counteract all your former sentiments to abandon those principles to which you have pledged yourselves to rescind the measures which you have solemnly adopted and, after having displayed the extent of your resources, and put into the hands of His Majesty means for carrying on the war, to tell him that he shall not avail himself of those means, and abandon every resource, except that

of making peace with France. It is to require you, at the end of the session, to make a recantation of all that you have done in every former part of it-to contradict all your former professions, and to renounce opinions formed upon the most serious deliberation, and confirmed by repeated acts. It is worthy of remark, that the gentlemen on the other side, who are so fond of accusing others of inconsistency, take to themselves the credit of supporting the war to a certain period. Beyond that period they have stated they found it impossible to give it any farther support, though I must observe, looking to their general conduct, if the periods at which they gave it support, and at which they thought necessary to withdraw it, were to be transposed, the difference would be very inconsiderable. What was the period, down to which they take the credit of having given support to the war?-the passing of the French corps bill. Then it was, it seems, that they first discovered that the present was a war for the purpose of an internal interference in the government of France. But it is of little consequence to this House, what are the opinions of individuals, or what the pretences which they may hold out. It is their business to consider what has been their general line of conduct, and what course they are bound to adopt on the present occasion, from a regard to the dignity of their character, and the consistency of their measures. In this point of view they will consider whether they have this night heard any thing to induce them to deviate from these principles, which they adopted on the most mature deliberation. The right honourable gentleman, in order to throw discredit on the object of the war, has had recourse to a confusion of argument. He chooses to confound the subversion of the present jacobin government with the conquest of France, and states, that we have in view nothing less than the entire subjugation of that country. He forgets that the objects are entirely different: we have no desire to conquer France; we wish only to free it from a system of tyranny equally oppressive to itself and dangerous to its neighbours; which can, in the first instance, only exist by the misery of its subjects, and menaces

in its progress the destruction of every regular government. But he states, as an argument against our success, that the force of that government is in the present moment stronger than ever, while he adds, however, by way of parenthesis, no matter whether by terror, or by whatever means. He seems to think that the means by which that power is supported, have nothing to do with the question. I contend that they form the whole; since on those means the permanence and stability of the government must depend. If it is a power acquired by the influence of terror, and supported by a system of coercion, it is neither likely to be solid nor lasting.

Another object which the right honourable gentleman has urged, is, that even if you should succeed in subverting the present government of France, such a measure would be in itself impolitic, and could afford you no prospect of rational advantage. What, says he, would you destroy a government before you have made up your minds what to substitute in its stead? Do you consider the consequence of again setting the minds of men adrift, and how can you be sure that the result will be better than what you at present witness? This is exactly an illustration of the mode of argument adopted by the right honourable gentleman, who, consulting neither the policy nor expediency of the particular question, is always addicted to push his general principles to the extreme. You ought not, says he, to subvert the present form of government, because, if the French are to be left to choose for themselves, you do not know by what other form it may be succeeded, whether an absolute or a limited monarchy, or a different species of republic. In opposition to this reasoning, we can safely decide from experience of its effects, that any form of government which succeeds the present, founded upon jacobin principles, though not the best, must be comparatively good. But as a reason why we ought not to seek the subversion of this jacobin government, or be apprehensive of danger from its existence, the right honourable gentleman has stated, that it has been found perfectly possible for opposite governments to exist together,

without interfering with each other. I grant that this is perfectly possible with respect to any established government, however defective, acting upon certain rules, and from certain principles. But I cannot admit that it is the case with respect to a system such as the present established in France, a system such as never existed before in any country, and to which no analogy can be found in the history of mankind; a system admitting of no modification of its vices, excluding all principles, and bearing in itself the seeds of hostility to every regular government; a system not possessing the means of power for the protection of its subjects, but usurping them for their oppression. Such a system presents no remedy for its vices, or hope of security to its neighbours, but in its entire subversion. On all these grounds I trust that the policy, consistency, and necessity of a vigorous prosecution of the war, will still appear to remain unimpeached.

I have only a few words to say to that resolution of the right honourable gentleman, which suggests that we ought to aim at peace by negotiation. In desiring us to have recourse to negotiation, he contends, that we have at least nothing to apprehend from the experiment, even if it should fail, and that to propose terms can surely be attended with no harm. The answer of my honourable friend to this part of his argument was so full and satisfactory, as to render it unnecessary for me to add any thing farther. My honourable friend stated, in the clearest manner, the little hope we could have of success in any negotiation from the nature of the jacobin system, and the character of the present French rulers, and the still less security which we should have for the performance of any engagement into which they might enter. But the question is not merely whether these persons, now at the head of affairs in France, would be disposed to treat with us, or whether we could have any security for any peace which we might make with them? We are to recollect, that while that system, with which we now

* Mr. Jenkinson.

contend, continues in France, we can have no peace upon any terms short of absolute ruin and dishonour; and that, by an express law of the constitution, any Frenchman who should propose to treat with us, except upon the conditions of abandoning our most sacred principles and our dearest rights, of surrendering our constitution, dethroning our virtuous monarch, and consenting to introduce into this country that horrible system of anarchy which they propose to our imitation, is declared at traitor. What, then, becomes of the argument of the right honourable gentleman, that even if we should enter into negotiation, no harm could possibly be attendant upon our failure? Have we not reason to suppose, that by those who avow such principles, the terms which we should propose would most certainly be rejected? And what, then, would be the consequence? By entering into negotiation we should have dissolved that confederacy, on which we can alone depend for success against the common enemy. To the French we should have given confidence and vigour; and, baffled in our expectations of peace, should ourselves be again obliged to have recourse to war, when war was found to be our only alternative, and when we had deprived ourselves of the means for its vigorous prosecution.

The acquisition of the West-India islands, the right honourable gentleman affirmed, was but of little consequence, as to attaining the object of the war-the subversion of the jacobin government of Paris. I grant that it may appear of little consequence as to its immediate effects: but may it not be supposed to have a collateral influence? Is it indeed of little consequence in the first year of the war to cut up their resources, and destroy the sinews of their commerce? Is the injury to their revenue less fatal, though, from the monstrous and gigantic expedients of finance to which they have had recourse, it may not, in the first instance, be perceived? Is it of little consequence to us in the prosecution of a war for which we do not ourselves possess sufficient military force, and in aid of which we must have recourse to our pecuniary resources, thus to procure the means of increas