my intention to move that further instruction should be given to the committee to exercise a full power in forming and digesting a plan for controlling the public expenditure, and to enquire into, and report upon, the best and most practicable means for obtaining a diminution thereof. I therefore, Sir, am not a little surprised, after stating these measures in general terms — measures which I contend have been sanctioned by the unanimous concurrence of the House, in consequence of the appointment of the committee for the professed and acknowledged consideration of those very objects, that the honourable gentleman should now bring forward a motion to the same end, and without any previous notice whatever. The instruction for the committee, the nature of which I had thus before stated in general terms, I held in my hand ready to move, when the honourable gentleman brought forward his motion; for I certainly did not think any new proposition on the same subject could be urged, after an express declaration of my desire that the most speedy and effectual measures should be taken, which went to retrench the great and heavy expenses of war, and were of infinitely superior magnitude to any diminution that might be expected in the salaries of the public offices.

Without entering at this moment into a particular discussion, whether there exist any specific grounds to authorise the House to proceed to a reduction of useless offices, or to a retrenchment of profuse salaries, I can only say, that it is not my wish to oppose an enquiry to that effect. But I feel I shall not do my duty to the House and the public, if I were to agree to any other examination than that which I have proposed, and which has received the concurrence of the House. The honourable gentleman has, however, neglected many important, and, indeed, necessary considerations in suggesting his motion. He seems, in the first place, to have been unmindful that the limits of the proposed reduction should be expressly declared. He next forgets, that the steps which have been already taken to effect the same end, should be submitted to the consideration of parliament, as a guide to direct their measures; and above

all, that no ill-founded hope may be raised without fully looking into the subject on which the decision is to be formed. If it can appear that retrenchment, both in the number and expense of public offices, is calculated to promote the public service, I am convinced there is no man in this House that will oppose it. But the question now before us is, what are the specific grounds on which the honourable gentleman brings forward his motion? It is incumbent on him to point out, in a decisive manner, abuses which are said to exist in the performance of duties, or in payments for services which are not done for the public. I know, Sir, how very easy it is to give credit out of doors to the reports of abuses in sinecure places and pensions; but I really believe it is a subject as much mistaken as any other of a public nature. I therefore think, in whatever way the enquiry may terminate, that it will not be of much utility. If it can be shewn that there are strong grounds for correcting abuses, much may be gained for the public good; but if, on the contrary, it shall appear that there are no specific grounds to warrant a strong measure of that kind,. and that the idea of the prevalence of abuses in the offices of the state is erroneous, much also is gained by removing an opinion, which might otherwise diminish the national confidence. Offices of very different descriptions come within the honourable gentleman's motion; the first which present themselves to notice are absolutely necessary, and in respect to them the enquiry fairly stated is, whether or no the number of offices is more than the different duties of them require; and secondly, whether the reward for the exercise of the various talents and industry necessary for the due execution of them is too great? It might also form a most important consideration, whether the same talents, the same diligence, and perseverance, at present employed in the performance of the duties annexed to these offices, might not be rewarded in an equal or superior manner, were they applied to and exerted in the ordinary pursuits of life? I have, Sir, no hesitation in saying, that it is an unjust idea to imagine that the abilities and labour devoted to the

service of the public should not be paid as well, and to the full as liberally by the public, as those which are applied in private life to the interest of individuals, and which are rewarded by individual compensation. Next to the offices which I have noticed, and which must be viewed in a necessary light, I come to those which relate to state duties. Many of them are attended with considerable expense for the maintenance of the relative duty they should hold to the high ranks in life of those, near whom they are placed. If we look into the various offices connected with the army, the navy, and the revenue, we shall find that the wages they receive are not higher than those they might earn by an equal exertion in private life, from individuals; and, therefore, Sir, the real state of the question appears to be, whether they are paid in a larger way by the public, than they would be by particular persons, for the performance of equal services. I only state this, that gentlemen may turn it in their minds, and not be induced to take up the matter in a general view. There are unquestionably offices of another description of less business and with fewer duties attached to them; but I think it necessary to observe, that they arise out of our ancient manners, and are, in fact, the remnants of former times, attached to the splendour of Majesty, and attendant on the dignity of monarchy. I am not inclined to say what should be the exact sum for duties of this kind. I only maintain, that such offices have ever existed; and such has been the custom of all countries which have been governed by monarchs. This custom has been interwoven in our constitution, and forms an appendage to our mixed government; not for the display of idle parade; not for the loose gratification of idle vanity, but sanctioned by the authority of our ancestors, and continued for the dignified consistency of appearance in the king of a great and free people. Having noticed this branch of public duties, I shall only observe, that though not included in the first class, they should notwithstanding be considered as connected with your constitution of mixed monarchy. Another description of offices is of a more invidious nature than any I

have yet mentioned. I allude to sinecure places, which, notwithstanding the ridicule and severity with which they may be commented on by some gentlemen, are capable of being looked at with the eye of reason. I shall, Sir, shortly state the principles on which they stand. They stand on the invariable custom of this country; they are recognised by the solemn decisions of parliament. It will not, I trust, be denied, that the fair principle of honourable remuneration has ever been held a sacred consideration. It will not, I hope, be contested, that a provision and retreat for a life devoted to the public service, has ever been deemed a just and irresistible motive for conferring permanent rewards.

The question then presents itself, whether, at the instant when one common sweep is designed, to remove all offices in which actual duty is not performed, remuneration for actions done in the service of the state is a wise, a just, and an useful principle? Another enquiry will naturally arise, and that is, whether the mode in which they are distributed is more liable to abuse than any other? In the consideration of this question, I will not confidently maintain that the first principle of remuneration may not sometimes be misapplied, as it frequently depends on chance, discretion, and various causes, which it is unnecessary for me to enumerate. It may also be objected, that it cannot be ascertained by a precise rule how to reward precise merit. But then, Sir, I say, can any other method more efficacious, more independent of abuses, and less liable to errors, be adopted? Can any other mode be pointed out in which chance and discretion are to be completely laid aside? Suppose, Sir, for a moment, `that even an application to parliament should be made the constitutional way of bestowing this kind of rewards; can it be imagined that such a proceeding would produce less complaint and murmurs than the present way in which they are conferred? I beg, therefore, gentlemen will not conclude, because there may be some offices connected with government which it may be wise to reform, that all are indiscriminately to be wiped away. I should imagine, that a correct

and particular statement ought to be made of useless offices, and excessive salaries; that specific objections should be precisely stated, and thus, by pursuing an authentic detail, the House might be enabled to entertain a probability of the saving which could be made for the country. But, Sir, if without resorting to any of these indispensable measures, if without establishing a proper clue, which in the course of enquiry would lead to a just conclusion, you were to precipitate this business, I must contend, that instead of striving to meet the popular opinion, instead of serving the essential interests of the nation, you would, on the contrary, act in opposition to both, and even excite general discontent. In such a case, the House would not do justice to themselves, nor to their constituents. This is not, however, the first time that you have been called on to interfere in similar considerations. The honourable gentleman brought forward, in the last parliament, a resolution of the same nature which he has this night proposed; and the event of it is fresh in every person's recollection. In a former parliament, a plan, which contained a particular detail, which furnished a full statement of the grounds of the application, and which went to a general economical reform, was brought forward by a right honourable gentleman, who is no longer a member of this House; yet parliament, at that period, and in an hour of confessed necessity, with every possible authority before them, with every document which a well-digested and a judiciously executed plan could furnish, with the report of the commissioners invested with powers to examine into the various branches comprehended in the proposed reform - I say, Sir, parliament, with all these authorities before them, which the most exalted talents, or the most minute investigation, could supply, proceeded in a very cautious and limited manner. They abolished some offices, and reduced the value of others; but they did not allow themselves to extend their reform beyond a prudential and constitutional line of conduct; and what cannot