political and social tendencies which were in part cause, in part effect of the crisis. The narrative opens with a brief introduction describing the practices of regulation which were applied to the problem of food supply during the old régime, and which gradually broke down under the attacks of the Economists. It closes with the overthrow of Robespierre, leaving for later treatment the experiences of the Thermidorian period and the results of the repeal of the maximum legislation in December, 1794. The treatment in point of view is hostile to the bourgeois régime. The history of the actual application of the maximum laws, especially after their revision in the spring of 1794, is given in a rather fragmentary manner, doubtless for the compelling reason that here the preliminary labor of collecting and publishing documents, fostered by the Commission on the Economic History of the Revolution, has not been pushed far. Professor Mathiez remarks that in regard to several problems he must attempt little more than general indications, suggesting lines of research for others. One problem upon which the reader will feel most need of light is the practical operation of the system of requisitions. The author mentions scattered examples of local resistance, but says there was less rioting than under the régime of freedom of trade in 1792, inertia and latent hostility being the main obstacles to enforcement.

Especially instructive are the parts of the work which touch the relation of the different political factions to the problem. The individual and the faction which receive most attention are Jacques Roux and the Enragés ". Jacques Roux is sketched sympathetically, although his personal faults and his exaggerations as an agitator are not disguised. The attitude of the Girondins and that of the Mountain toward price regulation differ little, Professor Mathiez finds, except that the Girondins were moved by class prejudice and selfishness. To win in their struggle against the Girondins the Mountain party was obliged to waive its theoretical objections to price-fixing and to make terms with the followers of the "Enragés". Again, after Hébert in September, 1793, had become the actual leader of the "Enragés ", the Mountain reluctantly introduced the most important maximum laws. Professor Mathiez brings out clearly the close relation between the excitement in Paris over the high cost of living and the inauguration of the Terror. September 4 and 5 were indeed a new May 31. But the Mountain never heartily accepted the principle of price regulation. At most, after the Committee of Public Safety had destroyed the "Ultra" and the "Citra " factions, the government honestly endeavored to enforce the law in its new form. The author recognizes the fact that "la grande coupable" in the whole series of miseries was the inflation of the assignats, which the general war had aggravated. No amount of regulation could cure evils as long as their fundamental cause remained. The strange fact is that the best minds in the Convention never seemed to begin to understand that economic freedom was impossible in the midst of such a world struggle. Professor Mathiez makes the point at the outset that while the intellectuals had become convinced before the

Revolution of the soundness of the principle of freedom in meeting the problem of supply the popular classes were far from accepting the idea, and that as soon as difficulties arose they instinctively recurred to methods of control which had so long been adopted by the rulers of the older France. The American student of the subject must also be struck by a further fact, namely, that although France was mainly rural, and the farmers made up the largest single group, no other class was so vilified by the politicians. The "farmer vote" did not frighten the leaders of the urban proletariat.

HENRY E. BOURNE.

Napoleon. By EMIL LUDWIG. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. (New York: Boni and Liveright. 1926. Pp. xii, 707. $3.00.) THE most brilliant exposition of the Napoleonic legend should rightfully be noteworthy and popular. Such an attempt to enliven history is praiseworthy, and two factors have contributed to its success. The first is the author's style, perhaps the foremost example of the way the historical present should and should not be used-for it is the medium of the entire work. The second is the copious use of the words of Napoleon himself (often frankly imaginary) and of his contemporaries. The result is to give an exceedingly vivid portrayal of his reactions to his surroundings and in particular of his relations to Josephine and his family. Herein lies perhaps the chief value of the book. The writer has indeed achieved to a marked degree that intangible quality "atmosphere".

That the work contains nothing new is not necessarily a condemnation. In the field of biography, the artist is free to establish his own canons, and Ludwig (Cohn) confines himself to the "inner history of Napoleon". Yet it may well be asked, for instance, why no serious consideration of his rôle as organizer and administrator is included. Is it legitimate to divorce the man so completely from his work? No adequate conception is given of the titanic struggle with England. Seventy-one pages are devoted to the St. Helena episode which Fournier treats in twenty-two. Obviously such a purely psychological study can not take the place of a more well-rounded account.

The task of the critic is rendered exceedingly difficult by the entire absence of critical apparatus. Nevertheless errors of fact and interpretation, contradictions, and disregard of chronology are apparent throughout. Many of the dates given are incorrect. A few typical slips may be cited. The translation of the first campaign manifesto is unwarrantably free. Joseph was not a deputy in 1799. Half statements often give an entirely wrong impression (this is the cardinal error throughout). One would think that Bernadotte and Napoleon had never met before the return from Egypt. The treatment accorded Moreau and his troops after the campaign of 1800 is entirely omitted, and Napoleon's gratitude is stressed! The statement that "all the reports from the provinces have been full of complaints regarding the lack of public safety" perpetuates the old legend

about the Directory. The figures of the plebiscite on the Consulate for Ten Years are given without comment. To say that Napoleon never falsified his papers and despatches is nothing short of ludicrous. (The assertion is contradicted by the author himself on page 642.) As for the account of the geography of St. Helena and of the exile, the most charitable assumption is that the writer put his faith in very defective sources. In general, the constant misplacing of statements made at Saint Helena and the (admitted) fabrication of soliloquies out of whole cloth are the most objectionable features.

When it comes to matters of opinion, there is of course room for considerable latitude; but no account is taken of controversial matters. Bernadotte is pictured in the usual fashion. No mention is made of the fact that he was a man of note before Bonaparte was heard of. To accuse him of ambition and ingratitude in a discussion of the Corsican is amusing. It may be added that Napoleon had nothing to do with the Swedish election-in fact he opposed it. The defense of the murder of the Duke of Enghien goes further than even the average apologist. The following is attributed to Napoleon-" The Continent must be unified, must consist of middle-sized and small powers overshadowed by the eagles of France, and democratically ranged side by side." What does this mean? Certainly no desire for a "United States of Europe" or "league of nations" was seriously entertained by the conqueror in the pre-St. Helena days. We may be permitted to differ in our views on his conduct upon his first entry into Berlin. To say that in the spring of 1811 "Russia seemed still friendly" is certainly a misreading of the evidence.

When it comes to the larger phases of interpretation, no agreement can ever be reached. The author's thesis is to be found in the words of his opening quotation, "Napoleon went forth to seek Virtue, but, since she was not to be found, he got Power". Though his analysis of his hero's motives (page 9, etc.) does not seem to uphold this view, it will doubtless satisfy the apologists, to whose school the writer obviously belongs. The picture of Napoleon as a benign, peace-loving philanthropist, goaded on by bloodthirsty powers and an evil destiny, can hardly meet with general acceptance. Grant these premises, however, and a rather powerful feeling of causal sequence is derived from the work as a whole -which is not sustained upon careful analysis. The characterization is striking rather than fused. One is reminded of the saying that it is possible to prove anything by selection and omission.

The book is absorbing from cover to cover, but it will change no mature opinions. It will, however, shape many that are unformed: therein lies its virtue and its danger. As a supplement to Lanfrey, for example, it is excellent; but as the sole source of information for many to whom Napoleon has been only a name it is deplorable.

ERIK ACHORN.

La Chute de l'Empire: La Légende de Napoléon, 1812-1815. Par ÉDOUARD DRIAULT. (Paris: Alcan. 1927. Pp. vi, 484. 40 fr.)

THIS is the fifth and concluding volume of M. Driault's Napoléon et l'Europe. The four preceding volumes have appeared at intervals during the last twenty years and have been entitled: La Politique Extérieure du Premier Consul (1800-1803); Austerlitz: la Fin du Saint-Empire (18041806; Tilsit: France et Russic sous le Premier Empire: la Question de Pologne (1806-1809); and Le Grand Empire (1809-1812). The general theme of the complete work is the significance of Napoleon to France and to the rest of Europe. In the opinion of the learned author Napoleon had most beneficent plans for Europe. He aimed at peace, for the Continent and liberty for the individual. By emancipating the individual he really laid the foundation for the rise of the various European nationalities. This is the "grand design". The break-up of the Holy Roman Empire and the pushing back of Russia were indispensable preliminaries to its successful execution. The kings of Europe in alliance with their misguided peoples thwarted the beneficent Napoleonic plans.

La Chute de l'Empire: la Légende de Napoléon narrates the final act of this stirring drama. Devoted to the events of the years 1813, 1814, and 1815, it recounts the familiar stories of the retreat of the Emperor from Moscow, the uprising of Prussia, the diplomacy of Austria, the Congress of Prague, the battle of Leipzig, Napoleon's remarkable campaign in defense of Paris, the Congress of Vienna, the "Hundred Days", and St. Helena. In the volume under review, therefore, M. Driault challenges comparison with the fifth volume of Lefèvre's Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe, Houssaye's 1813, 1814, and especially with the eighth volume of Sorel's L'Europe et la Révolution Française.

Although M. Driault has worked at his task for thirty years and knows the archives of Paris thoroughly it is very unlikely that his work will supersede the magistral volumes of M. Sorel. He has not explored other European archives. He has allowed certain prejudices and preconceptions to color his whole work. He is a partizan of Mediterranean civilization and a believer in the Rhine as a natural and indispensable boundary of France. Napoleon is great because he is the great protagonist of these two ideas. Men and policies are measured by the way they fit into the "grand design". Because he helped to thwart the plans of Napoleon Metternich is characterized as an imbecile, the real author of Sadowa, a man unable to see beyond the end of his nose, and neither a statesman nor a diplomat. England, naturally, is the villain of the piece. Some practical reason is always at the bottom of even its seemingly generous actions; and Rhenish Prussia is the diabolical invention of Lord Castlereagh. Because they did not insist on the Rhine frontier the French royalists betrayed France. The style is marked by great concentration and rapid transitions. The author frequently suggests rather than elucidates his point. The general result is a brilliant diplomatic and political history shot through with questionable historical interpretations.

The work has the usual scientific apparatus. It is preceded by a bibliography of six pages, which is not critical, and a suggestive essay of twenty-five pages on the balance of power. On nearly every page of the text reference is made to some of the more important sources used by the author and the book is likely to call the attention of historical scholars to some comparatively little-known reports of French diplomatic agents. The work has an analytical table of contents and a full index, which unfortunately is not topical.

C. P. HIGBY.

An Economic History of Modern Britain: the Early Railway Age, 1820-1850. By J. H. CLAPHAM, Litt.D., Fellow of King's College. (Cambridge: the University Press. 1926. Pp. xviii, 623. 25 s.)

In this work, which is to be completed in two further volumes, with at least an epilogue covering the period 1914-1920, Dr. Clapham covers the ground already surveyed by Dr. Lillian Knowles in her Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century, and by C. R. Fay in his Life and Labour in the Nineteenth Century. He works, however, on a scale unattempted in any hitherto published work, and brings into the story a wealth of detail which significantly alters many of the generalizations thus far accepted.

The first volume, now under review, is a veritable encyclopaedia for the period from 1820 to 1850 in regard to all such matters as population, communications-roads, canals, railroads-agriculture, commerce, industry, money, banking, and insurance, the economic activities and policies of the state, and finally, the conditions of life among the laboring population. Every available local history, special study, monograph, and doctor's thesis has been stripped of its essential information; and where the mass of materials thus available might be deemed inadequate, the reports of parliamentary committees and royal commissions, which have long lain. neglected in blue books, have been called into service. The result is a work which synthesizes all existing studies, and goes beyond them by making significant additions based upon the author's own investigations and research. The only criticisms which may be hazarded are that there seems to be too assured an acceptance of the depositions before the royal commissions as objective evidence, and that no attempt has been made to get into the actual account-books of large and small industrial and agricultural enterprises to find the day-to-day conditions in going business undertakings. Such work must be done before any definitive description of certain sections of British economic history can be written.

Dr. Clapham brings to his task a remarkable knowledge of British geography as well as of trade history; and his favorite method is to tour from trade to trade and from county to county in the development of his theme. There is thus revealed the diversity of the national economic activity and organization. The persistence and great importance of the

AM. HIST. REV., VOL. XXXII.-57.