steward, the revenue of the province.84 But while the myth of the protectorate had begun to flower before the end of the century in which Charlemagne died, another hundred years passed before the legend of his crusade to Palestine made its appearance.85 Without attempting to follow the subsequent evolution of either,86 we may note that though the latter gradually ceased to be identified with history after the fifteenth century, the former has in our generation been equipped with a more effective historical guise than it ever possessed in the past.

EINAR JORANSON.

84 Monachus Sangallensis, De Carolo Magno, bk. II., cc. 8, 9 (Jaffé, Bibl. Rer. Germ., IV. 674-679). Cf. the English transl. by A. J. Grant (Early Lives of Charlemagne, London, 1907), pp. 116-125.

85 On this well-known subject, see Bréhier, pp. 37-38, and the references there cited. Bréhier's views on the protectorate have led him to overestimate the historical elements in the legend of the crusade.

86 The twelfth-century Annales Nordhumbrani (800, M. G. H., SS., XIII. 156) clearly indicate that the myth of the protectorate prospered during the period, and probably under the influence, of the Crusades. Cf. supra, n. 25.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND CONFEDERATE
COTTON

ONE of the puzzling things in the economic and military history. of the Civil War is the seemingly inconsistent attitude of the Union government regarding trade with the Confederacy. On the one hand it enforced a rigorous blockade of the Southern sea-coast to bar Southern cotton from the world markets, while on the other it connived at a more or less corrupt domestic trade in the same cotton smuggled across its own military lines. There were excuses for this policy. Cotton was needed to keep Northern factories in operation and also cotton had to be doled out for French and English mills to prevent active interference by those governments in aid of the Confederacy and free cotton. But it is the But it is the purpose of this paper to show that this policy, while undertaken for reasons of weight, nevertheless was a grave error of judgment on the part of the Federal government. Through this trade the morale of the Union troops was undermined, the Confederate army was supplied, and, because of the consequent prolongation of the war, needless suffering was inflicted on the people both South and North.

While the demand for cotton in the North to supply the war-time needs of the country was great and received serious consideration from Lincoln, the foreign situation claimed his closest attention. Affairs in that field were in a very critical condition. In England, by January of 1863, one-third of the cotton mills had shut down completely for lack of supplies and nearly half a million factory hands were out of work. In France, because cotton manufacturing was not so important as in England, the distress, while acute, was not so general. Yet the diplomatic situation there, as regarded the needed supplies for the factories, was much more strained than with Great Britain. In fact things came to such a pass that, in 1862, Thurlow Weed, one of Seward's unofficial representatives, thought that more than one government was getting ready to turn against the United States because of the need for cotton. The French minister for foreign affairs in two interviews with Weed told him emphatically that France must have cotton and that she looked to the North to get it for her in one way or another.*

1 C. F. Adams, Charles Francis Adams (Boston, 1900), p. 267.

2 Ibid., op. cit., p. 271.

3 F. W. Seward, Seward at Washington (N. Y., 1890), III. 87.

4 Ibid., pp. 85 and 86.

In addition to these reasons for allowing trade in cotton, another, based on humanity, developed during the war. As the Southern territory was occupied by Union troops large numbers of people were left destitute except for some cotton which they had stored away. Since they could not be left to starve they were allowed to exchange their cotton for the necessities of life." The Federal government therefore concluded that the trade in cotton should be encouraged as much as was safe. Secretary Chase, in a letter to his friend and subordinate, W. P. Mellen, stated the government's policy in regard to the trade. He said that he could "see no way in which safe intercourse can be established between citizens of the loyal states and those under insurgent control. The question is not one of revenue nor one of rights in a state of peace but a question of supplies to enemies. . . . The best thing to be done, as it seems to me, is to . . . let commerce follow the flag". This statement of the administration's views is borne out by the President's proclamation of August 16, 1861. By this the Southern states, with certain exceptions, were declared to be in a state of insurrection and all trade with them to be unlawful unless licensed by the President through the Secretary of the Treasury. So the government's policy may be summed up as follows: trade with inhabitants of districts occupied by Union troops was to be allowed under supervision so far as was compatible with military safety.

The laws passed by Congress on the subject, the executive proclamations, and the departmental orders which were issued in pursuance thereof were all intended to carry out this line of conduct. They were drastic and rigorous. Under them the needy planter inside the Union lines could obtain supplies in exchange for his cotton and the cotton went to satisfy the demands of the North and of Europe. All possible precautions were taken against fraud or injury. to the service. The corruption that accompanied the commerce in cotton and the failure of the rules to function as was expected can not be ascribed to the laxity of the government nor to lack of care in drafting the regulations. The trouble arose from the difficulty of assembling the right kind of personnel. The successful handling of a process of this sort, where wrongdoing was not only easy but J. W. Schuckers, Life of Salmon P. Chase (N. Y., 1874), P. 324.

6 May 29, 1861. Ibid., p. 319.

7 The exceptions were Virginia west of the Alleghenies and such other parts of the Southern states as might maintain their loyalty to the Union or be occupied and controlled by the United States forces. Commercial Intercourse with States. . . in Insurrection (Washington, 1863), pp. 39 and 40. Hereafter referred to as Commercial Intercourse Pamphlet.

8

exceptionally profitable, called for a force of experienced men whose honesty was unshakable. Such a body of men can not be created by act of Congress and it was here that the administration's policy broke down.

As a rule the generals of the army, especially those of high rank, did what they could to carry out the policy of the government. Among the officers who labored zealously to enforce the rules and to prevent abuses four men are particularly noteworthy: Generals Grant, Sherman, Washburn, and Canby. General B. F. Butler, on the other hand, is the most notable example of an officer of high rank who was accused of corruption and of profitting by the trade. His attitude toward the matter is well shown by a letter to Reverdy Johnson written by Butler when in command at New Orleans. In this he said that he would "assure safe conduct, open market, and prompt shipment of all cotton and sugar sent to New Orleans, and the owner, were he Slidell himself, should have the pay for his cotton if sent here under this assurance". Nothing of this sort came from Grant or Sherman. The whole tone of their correspondence and orders was one of hostility to the trade and to traders. Orders from Washington directing that the commerce should not only be allowed but even facilitated 10 were obeyed reluctantly though faithfully." A note of rigid restriction runs through all of Grant's orders concerning the traffic, and when, in February, 1865, he was given entire charge of the matter he wrote General Canby telling him that he could use his own discretion but that in his, Grant's, opinion entire non-intercourse was the speediest way to bring about a permanent peace. 12

General Sherman's letters and orders sound much like Grant's in their uncompromising opposition to the commerce in cotton. He forbade all dealing in it on his first Vicksburg expedition 13 and both at Atlanta and at Savannah the trade was limited to that which was necessary to supply needy planters with food and clothing." General Washburn, who succeeded Grant and Sherman in command at Memphis, one of the most important centres of the trade, also did

8 Cotton was worth from ten to twenty cents a pound at the front and from sixty cents to one dollar a pound in the North. Schuckers, op. cit., p. 322.

9 July 21, 1862. War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1880-1901), ser. III., vol. II., p. 239. This work will be cited hereafter as Official Records.

10 Halleck to Sprague, Aug. 25, 1862. Ibid., p. 460.

11 Ibid., ser. I., vol. XVII., pt. II., p. 163.

12 Feb. 13, 1865. Ibid., vol. XLVIII., pt. I., p. 829.

13 Ibid., vol. XVII., pt. I., p. 620.

14 Ibid., vol. XXXVIII., pt. V., p. 648; vol. XLVII., pt. II., pp. 52 ff.

what he could to restrict the cotton traffic, especially along the river.15 The successor to Butler at New Orleans, General Banks, found the situation there to be extremely difficult. The supervision of the cotton-trade was very lax and the department was rife with corruption. Furthermore, while Banks's integrity is unquestioned he was not a soldier by profession and was too much inclined to subordinate military needs to political considerations. Under his régime New Orleans was the market. All goods sent there could be freely sold for United States currency and plantation supplies could be taken out.16 When General Canby replaced Banks the tone of the correspondence affecting the trade changed at once. His attitude was one of hostility toward the traffic and he limited it as closely as the authorities at Washington would permit.17 Not until the end of May, 1865, when he removed all military restrictions on trade in the pacified districts, did his attitude change.18 But by this time the general policy toward the trade was to do away with restrictions and to get cotton out of the country and money and supplies into it as fast as possible.1o

There was little trouble over the trade during the first year of the war, for it did not become important until the spring of 1862, when the fall of New Orleans and Memphis brought the Union armies into contact with the Southern cotton belt. These two cities at once became the principal shipping points of a commerce in cotton that spread with the progress of the Union arms throughout the southern part of the Mississippi Valley. The authorized trade 20 that followed was on a small scale; the latitude consisted for the most part in allowing farmers to bring their cotton into town and to sell it for supplies. It was encouraged by General Sherman at Memphis because it relieved the farmer's distress and showed him his dependence on the Union government.21 The Federal commander at Vicksburg, General McArthur, was more lax and allowed the cotton growers to sell their produce on the plantation to any author15 Ibid., vol. XXXIX., pt. II., pp. 22, 27, 170 ff.

16 Ibid., XV. 615, 649, 690, 691.

17 Ibid., vol. XLI., pt. II., pp. 534, 535, pt. IV., pp. 789 ff.; vol. XLVIII., pt. I., pp. 849, 1062, 1063.

18 May 29, 1865. Ibid., vol. XLVIII., pt. II., 19 E.g., ibid., vol. XLVII., pt. III., p. 602.

p. 650.

20 This trade was carried on under the law of July 13, 1861, which allowed the President to license individuals to carry on trade under regulations laid down by the Secretary of the Treasury. Statutes at Large . . . of the United States (Boston, 1863), XII. 257.

21 Nov. 8, 1862. Official Records, ser. I., vol. XVII., pt. II., p. 861.