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" reduction, the essential features of the pain would be left out. No description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts would convey the subjective, first-person character of the pain, simply because the first-person features are different... "
The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the ... - Page 204
by Paul M. Churchland - 1995 - 329 pages
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The Rediscovery of the Mind

John R. Searle - Psychology - 1992 - 292 pages
...pain is really "nothing but" the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features. Nagel states this point by contrasting the objectivity of the third-person features with the what-it-is-like...
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Scale in Conscious Experience: Is the Brain Too Important to be Left to the ...

Joseph King - Cognition - 1995 - 468 pages
...“...the ontology of the mental is a¿n irreducibly first-person ontology.”(p. 95); “No description of third-person, objective, physiological facts would...first-person features are different from the third-person features.”(p. 116) The third sub-theme is that the first two sub-themes are not contradictory: “The...
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The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates

Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, Guven Guzeldere - Psychology - 1997 - 884 pages
...pain is really "nothing but" the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features. Nagel states this point by contrasting the objectivity of the third-person features with the what-it-islike...
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On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997

Paul M. Churchland, Patricia Smith Churchland - Philosophy - 1998 - 370 pages
...pain is really 'nothing but' the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features." (p. 117) Of this reconstructed version of the Subjectivity Argument, Searle comments, "It is ludicrously...
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On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997

Paul M. Churchland, Patricia Smith Churchland - Philosophy - 1998 - 372 pages
...pain is really 'nothing but' the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features." (p. 117) Of this reconstructed version of the Subjectivity Argument, Searle comments, "It is ludicrously...
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Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem

Jonathan Shear - Philosophy - 1999 - 436 pages
...objective, physiological facts would convey the subjective first-person character of [for example a pain] simply because the first-person features are different from the third-person features' (p. 117). This anti-reductionist argument, he asserts, 'is ludicrously simple and quite decisive' (p....
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Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality: Discussions with John R. Searle

Günther Grewendorf, G. Meggle - Language Arts & Disciplines - 2002 - 342 pages
...patterns of neural firings. ... Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of pain would be left out. No description of the third-person,...convey the subjective, first-person character of the pam, simply because the first-person features are different from thirdperson features.” It is clear...
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Ignorance and Imagination : The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of ...

Research School of Social Sciences The Australian National University Daniel Stoljar Senior Fellow - Philosophy - 2006 - 262 pages
...independent grounds. Searle, for example, seems to me to deny manifest supervenience when he writes: "No description of the third-person, objective, physiological...would convey the subjective, first-person character of pain, simply because the first-person features are different from the third-person features" (1992,...
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