| John R. Searle - Psychology - 1992 - 292 pages
...pain is really "nothing but" the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features. Nagel states this point by contrasting the objectivity of the third-person features with the what-it-is-like... | |
| Joseph King - Cognition - 1995 - 468 pages
...“...the ontology of the mental is a¿n irreducibly first-person ontology.”(p. 95); “No description of third-person, objective, physiological facts would...first-person features are different from the third-person features.”(p. 116) The third sub-theme is that the first two sub-themes are not contradictory: “The... | |
| Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, Guven Guzeldere - Psychology - 1997 - 884 pages
...pain is really "nothing but" the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features. Nagel states this point by contrasting the objectivity of the third-person features with the what-it-islike... | |
| Paul M. Churchland, Patricia Smith Churchland - Philosophy - 1998 - 370 pages
...pain is really 'nothing but' the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features." (p. 117) Of this reconstructed version of the Subjectivity Argument, Searle comments, "It is ludicrously... | |
| Paul M. Churchland, Patricia Smith Churchland - Philosophy - 1998 - 372 pages
...pain is really 'nothing but' the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would...features are different from the third-person features." (p. 117) Of this reconstructed version of the Subjectivity Argument, Searle comments, "It is ludicrously... | |
| Jonathan Shear - Philosophy - 1999 - 436 pages
...objective, physiological facts would convey the subjective first-person character of [for example a pain] simply because the first-person features are different from the third-person features' (p. 117). This anti-reductionist argument, he asserts, 'is ludicrously simple and quite decisive' (p.... | |
| Günther Grewendorf, G. Meggle - Language Arts & Disciplines - 2002 - 342 pages
...patterns of neural firings. ... Well, if we tried such an ontological reduction, the essential features of pain would be left out. No description of the third-person,...convey the subjective, first-person character of the pam, simply because the first-person features are different from thirdperson features.” It is clear... | |
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