Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
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ability account of phenomenal actual world antiphysicalist argue beliefs black‐and‐white room brain Cambridge Chalmers CMoP cognitive independence cognitive significance color experiences conceivability consciousness contingency cortico‐thalamic oscillation counterfactual extension David Chalmers demonstrative diaphanousness direct reference theory distinct eliminativism entities epistemic gap epistemic situation example explain explanatory gap expressed fact Fregean functional grasping properties identity claim imagine instantiated introspective intuition involve Jackson knowledge argument Kripke Loar Mary's mental metaphysical mode metaphysically possible MMoP mode of presentation Ned Block nonphenomenal notion object pain perceptual concepts phenomenal concept strategy phenomenal property phenomenology Philosophy Philosophy of Mind physical concepts physical properties physicalist pick possible worlds posteriori predicate primary intension priori problem Property Dualism Argument qualia qualitative question rational referent relation relevant representation RMPs role secondary intension Semantic Premise sense strong representationalism suppose theory thin things thought experiment topic‐neutral Twin Earth two‐dimensional type‐demonstrative visual zombies