Faith is here a neceffary principle, I shall content myself with barely mentioning this topic, nor enlarge on it at present.

If the preceding obfervations should be juft, and are duly confidered and applied, I trust that the Neceffity of Faith to the attainment of truth will fully appear, and the wide extent of our reliance on the word of others, in the quest of that information which, fingly, we are not able to obtain,

After this Neceffity, we fhall be properly led next to weigh the Reasonableness of this belief, on the ground of its intrinfic worth as a medium of knowledge. This is obviously founded on the deference due to the Veracity and the Ability of men,

On the latter of these topics, it is at first fight obvious that general incredulity may be justly charged with arrogance and obstinacy. For every confiderate and fincere man must allow that there are some who exceed others and most probably surpass him, in natural powers of mind, or in the general means of information, or in both. In particular branches of literature it is evident that many must excell him; for no man is able to rife to eminence in every part of literary

literary purfuit. Nay farther, it is equally certain that almost all men, perhaps I should say all, must be capable of instructing him in fome one point or other. In order to fhew this fully, it may be fufficient to remind him, that, in all probability, every man is born with a capacity and inclination of giving a preference to some instances of application above others, however low and trifling they may fometimes chance to be, and of a confequent proficiency in fuch pursuits. And in whatever manner accident may affect this natural fitnefs, may forward or impede it, in fome of these particulars it generally has an opportunity to be exerted, and to lead a man on to a confiderable degree of skill. Again, in like manner, the destination of men by incidental circumstances to their peculiar employments in life tends to produce a fimilar confequence, though it cannot advance them to the fame degree of eminence, as when natural ability and inclination confpire with affiduous diligence. Herein therefore thefe know more, and may boaft of imparting knowledge to men poffeffed of far fuperior intellects, and more favourable opportunities of general information. In thus briefly ftating thefe facts, by which it appears, that the greatest philosophers must be liable to receive inftruction from the meaneft among mankind, it is needlefs to dwell on the many intermediate fituations of men in refpect to their literary

literary rank, which confequently would furnish fo many more instances of mutual communication and credit.

Nor, if we pass on to the other qualification of Integrity, shall we find our argument for the value of Faith as a principle of knowledge checked or weakened in its progress. It is very ufual indeed to murmur and declaim against the deceitfulness of the world: but the reason of the cafe, and the opinion of the fenfible part of mankind, authorise a more favourable determination.

In enquiring into this fubject, by an investigation of the motives that are likely to sway men in giving evidence of facts and opinions, we should be careful not to omit any among the principal ones on either fide. And first, in the number of those that incline men to Veracity, the natural love of truth is by no means to be paffed over. As natural, it is also univerfal, and may be supposed to direct every man's teftimony,

unless it can be fhewn that fome other motive interferes fufficiently powerful to set it aside. It will easily be replied that this is much too often the cafe. But, though this be undeniable by reafon of the corruption of our nature, yet it still remains, and often directs by its influence. It is likewife to be confidered at other times as an affiftant

affiftant to the rest on the fame fide. Such are the fhame of afferting what is at the fame time fecretly contradicted by the evidence of our owni mind; the natural tendency to felf-love and to benevolence, which are both generally best promoted by adherence to truth; the fear of detection, and the dread of the punishment that, in fome shape or other, awaits the voluntary and premeditated violation of it. And, if to these powerful motives of conduct we, lastly, add the fanction which true religion lends to every part of virtue, we shall be led to acknowledge that there is ample ground for confidence in the Veracity of human teftimony. Whoever shall decide otherwise, will maintain an opinion unworthy of God in his creation and moral government of the world. The Almighty must either be fuppofed to have conceived a mean plan in intending to create fuch vile and wicked beings, or to have come short of his purpose, or to have fuffered them to fall into fuch objects as are deftitute of all claim to refpectability. But this, not only a pious man, but also any candid and sensible observer of mankind will never admit to be the cafe. We must indeed allow that there is room for caution, while every kind of depraved paffion and external temptation is prefent to folicit them occafionally to falfhood and diffimulation. But I contend, that to fuppofe the qualification of Veracity too sub

lime

lime for man in his prefent ftate, and that it is ridiculous to attribute it to him; or, because fome things are to be disbelieved, to conclude that all are to be doubted, and not very many to be received with perfect confidence, is far from accuracy and genuine circumfpection. These require that a line fhould be drawn and true criticism will enable men, by contemplating the nature of the evidence, and investigating its circumstances, to set at a great distance from the limits of hesitation an infinite number of affertions proposed to their belief. On the contrary, it is too manifeft, from our experience and obfervation, that weakness and ignorance of mind are very great causes of incredulity. The one is that which fo often leads to difbelief, the other at least to distruft and fufpicion. For the latter is deficient in thofe qualifications of experience and theory, which give so material a support to the credit of a new relation: the former, as it is still more pitiable, is the cause of as grievous and more culpable mistakes than credulity itself: nor can fuch fcrupulousness ever deferve the name of prudence; or will the end of fuch habits ever be wisdom and knowledge.

If, referring to what has been argued on the Veracity and Ability of men as witneffes, we proceed to confider the Certainty annexed to this fpecies