port there, as we approached the White Oak road, the direction of our movements being such as to present that flank first to the enemy's position along that road. I quote the following from General Chamberlain's report:

I was desired by General Griffin to regain the field which these troops had yielded. My men forded a stream nearly waist deep, formed in two lines, Major Glenn having the advance, and pushed the enemy steadily before them. Major-General Ayres' division supported me on the left en echelon by brigade, the skirmishers of the First Division, in charge of General Pearson, in their front. We advanced in this way a mile or more into the edge of the field it was desired to retake. Up to this time we had been opposed by only a skirmish line, but quite a heavy fire now met us, and a line of battle could be plainly seen in the opposite edge of the woods, and in a line of breast-works in the open field, in force at least equal to our own. I was now ordered by Major-General Warren to halt and take the defensive. My first line had now gained a slight crest in the open field, where they were subjected to a severe fire from the works in front and from the woods on each flank. As it appeared that the enemy's position might be carried with no greater loss than it would cost us merely to hold our ground, and the men were eager to charge over the field, I reported this to General Griffin and received permission to renew the attack. My command was brought into line and put in motion. A severe oblique fire on my right, together with the artillery which now opened from the enemy's works, caused the One hundred and ninety-eighth to waver for a moment, I then requested General Gregory, who reported to me with his brigade, to move rapidly into the woods on our right by battalion en echelon by the left, so as to break this flank attack, and possibly to turn the enemy's left at the same moment that I should charge the works directly in front at a run. This plan was so handsomely executed by all that the result was completely successful. The woods and the works were carried, with several prisoners and one battle-flag, and the line advanced some 300 yards across the White Oak road.

My loss in this action was not more than 75, but it included some of my best officers and men.

It would be unjust not to mention the services of Major Glenn and Colonel Sniper in this affair, whose bravery and energy I relied upon for the successful execution of my plans. I would also express my obligations to General Gregory for his quick comprehension of my wishes, and for his efficient aid. I may be permitted also to mention the gallantry of Captain Fowler, assistant adjutant-general of division, who rode into the hottest fire to bring my orders, having his horse killed under him in doing so, and who by his conduct and bearing showed an example worthy of all praise.

During the night we buried our dead and cared for our wounded, and bivouacked in the line.

The temporary halt was necessitated by the threatening attitude the enemy's position exhibited, as above described by General Chamberlain, and in order to get the remainder of the corps up and well in hand for a weighty assault. This having been effected, the order to advance was given, with the result as described in the quotation from General Chamberlain's report.

At 3.40 p.m. I wrote from the White Oak [road] the following dispatch to General Webb:

We have driven the enemy, I think, into his breast-works. The prisoners report General Lee here to-day, and also that their breast-works are filled with troops. We have prisoners from a portion of Pickett's and Johnson's divisions. General Chamberlain's brigade acted with much gallantry in this advance, capturing nearly the entire Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment with its flag.

With the elation due to our success, I thought we might be able to carry the enemy's breast works at once, and thus force in their right flank and carry all their line south of Hatcher's Run. I at once commenced a personal reconnaissance for this purpose, and superintended personally the advance of our skirmishers to gain points of observation. We thus drew a very severe fire from the line, particularly of artillery. The examination showed me that the enemy's defenses were as complete and as well located as any I had ever been opposed to.

Thus far my operations had been quite independent of those of General Sheridan.

About 5 p. m. March 31 I received, while on the White Oak road, the following from General Webb, chief of staff, written 4.30 p. m.:

Secure your position and protect as well as possible your left flank. Word has been sent to Sheridan, and it is believed that Sheridan is pushing up. General Humphreys will be ordered to push up and to connect with your right. You might, if you think it worth while, push a small force down the White Oak road and try to communicate with Sheridan, but they must take care and not fire into his advance.

The rattle of musketry could now be heard southwest from us, which seemed to us to be receding, and which led us to think the enemy was driving our cavalry. I then ordered General Griffin to send General Bartlett, with his brigade, directly across the country, so as to attack the enemy on the flank, and I sent Major Cope, of my staff, with him. At 5.15 p. m. I received the following from General Webb, written 5.15 p. m., which directed what before had only been suggested:

The major-general commanding directs that you push a brigade down the White Oak road, to open it for General Sheridan, and support the same, if necessary. The firing is so near that the general presumes that the command will not have far to go. The distance you will push out must depend on the circumstances of the movement and the support you can give them.

Thus at the time that to General Meade it seemed "the firing is so near" it plainly sounded to us more and more distant, indicating that our cavalry was falling back, of which I soon had confirmation.

At 5.50 p.m. I sent the following to General Webb:

I have just seen an officer and a sergeant from General Sheridan's command who were cut off in an attack by the enemy and escaped. From what they say our cavalry was attacked about noon by cavalry and infantry and rapidly driven back, two divisions-Crook's and Devin's-being engaged. The firing seems to recede from me toward Dinwiddie Court-House. I have sent General Bartlett and my escort in that direction, but I think they cannot be in time. I hear connonading that I think is from near Dinwiddie Court-House.

About 6.30 p. m. I received the following from General Webb:

A staff officer of General Merritt has made a report that the enemy has penetrated between Sheridan's main command and your position. This is a portion of Pickett's division. Let the force ordered to move out the White Oak road move down the Boydton plank road as promptly as possible.

The force I had sent under General Bartlett had now been gone an hour, and to recall it would have required two hours at least for it to reach the Boydton plank road, and make it too late for use before dark. My artillery had all been left on the Boydton plank road on account of the mud, which had compelled me to do so, and General Griffin had left Brevet Brigadier-General Pearson there with three regiments of infantry of Brevet Major-General Bartlett's brigade to support it.

I therefore sent the following dispatch to General Webb at 6.30 p. m., which explains what I did:

I have ordered General Pearson, with three regiments that are now on the plank road, right down toward Dinwiddie Court-House. I will let Bartlett work and report result, as it is too late to stop him.

It was then nearly dark. Having reconnoitered the enemy's breastworks on the White Oak road, I added the following concerning them to my dispatch of 6.30 p. m.:

We can see the enemy's breast-works for two miles east along the White Oak road. If they are well manned they cannot be carried. I am within 200 yards of where they turn off northward from the White Oak road.

52 R R-VOL XLVI, PT I

I then gave directions to secure the position we had gained, by intrenching, and proceeded with my staff back about two miles to the Boydton plank road, at which place I could communicate by telegraph with General Meade during the night. General Meade's headquarters were distant four miles and a half, near where the Vaughan road crosses Hatcher's Run; General Grant's were near Dabney's Mills, about four miles from me; General Sheridan's at Dinwiddie Court House, distant five miles and a half, and separated from me by a stream not fordable for infantry, where it crossed the Boydton plank road, and the bridge broken down.

At 8 p. m. I received the following dispatch from General Meade, written 7.30 p. m.:

Dispatch from General Sheridan says he was forced back to Dinwiddie CourtHouse by strong force of cavalry, supported by infantry. This leaves your rear and that of the Second Corps on the Boydton Blank road open, and will require great vigilance on your part. If you have sent the brigade down the plank road it should not go farther than Gravelly Run, as I don't think it will render any service but to protect your rear.

General Pearson had been compelled to stop at Gravelly Run on account of the swollen stream and broken bridge.

At 8.20 p. m. I wrote to General Webb:

I sent General Bartlett out on the road running from the White Oak road and left him there. He is nearly down to the crossing of Gravelly Run. This will prevent the enemy communicating by that road to-night. I have about two regiments and the artillery to hold the plank road toward Dinwiddie Court-House. It seems to me the enemy cannot remain between me and Dinwiddie Court-House if Sheridan keeps fighting them, and I believe they will have to fall back to the Five Forks. If I have to move to-night I shall leave a good many men who have lost their way. General Sheridan still hold Dinwiddie Court-House?

Does

At 8.40 p. m. I received by telegraph the following from General Webb, marked "confidential," written 8.30 p. m.:

The probability is that we will have to contract our lines to-night. You will be required to hold, if possible, the Boydton plank road, and to Gravelly Run; Humphreys and Ord along the run. Be prepared to do this at short notice.

I regretted exceedingly to see this step foreshadowed, for I feared it would have the morale of giving a failure to our whole movement, as similar orders had done on previous occasions. It would besides relieve the enemy in front of Sheridan from the threatening attitude my position gave me, and I therefore sent the following by telegraph, at 8.40 p. m., to General Webb:

The line along the plank road is very strong. One division, with my artillery, I think can hold it if we are not threatened south of Gravelly Run east of the plank road. General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, and let me move down and attack the enemy at Dinwiddie Court-House on one side and Sheridan on the other. On account of Bartlett's position they (the enemy) will have to make a considerable detour to re-enforce their troops at that point from the north. Unless General Sheridan has been too badly handled I think we have a chance for an open field fight that should be made use of.

Cavalry escort

Command.

The following sketch represents the position of the Fifth Corps at dark March 31, 1865:

The following is the report of casualties in Fifth Army Corps March 31, 1865:

My desire to retain the position we had gained after so much hard fighting, and which I considered under the circumstances so advantageous to us, was not accomplished, and orders came to fall back.

At 9.17 p. m. I received the following by telegraph dispatch, written. by General Webb at 9 p. m:

You will, by the direction of the major-general commanding, draw back at once to your position within the Boydton plank road. Send a division down to Dinwiddie

Aggregate.

Court-House to report to General Sheridan. This division will go down the Boydton plank road. Send Griffin's division. General Humphreys will hold to Mrs. But

ler's.

Whereupon I issued the following order to my command, which was sent out 9.35 p. m.:

I. General Ayres will immediately withdraw his division back to where it was massed yesterday, near the Boydton plank road.

II. General Crawford will follow General Ayres, and mass his troops behind the intrenchments near Mrs. Butler's.

III. General Griffin will immediately withdraw General Bartlett to his present position; then move back to the plank road and down to Dinwiddie Court-House, and report to General Sheridan.

IV. Captain Horrell, with the escort, will remain where General Griffin's headquarters now are till daybreak, and then come back to the plank road, bringing in all stragglers.

V. Division commanders in executing this movement, which is ordered by General Meade, will take care to see that none of their pickets or any portion of the troops are left behind.

VI. General Ayres and General Crawford will have their troops under arms at daylight, and the chief of artillery will have all the batteries in readiness to move.

At 9.50 p.m. I received by telegraph the following from General Webb, written 9.20 p. m.:

The division to be sent to Sheridan will start at once. You are to be held free to act within the Boydton plank road. General Humphreys will hold to the road and the return.

To this I immediately replied:

Your dispatch of 9.20 is just received. I had already sent out my orders, of which I send you a copy. You directed General Griffin to be sent to General Sheridan at once. It will take so much time to get his command together that I withdrew the other divisions first, they being unengaged, but this will not retard General Griffin. The bridge is broken on the plank road, and will take I hardly know how long to make practicable for infantry. I sent an officer (Captain Benyaurd, engineers) to examine it as soon as your first order was received. He now reports it not fordable for infantry. It requires a span of forty feet to complete the bridge, and the stream is too deep to ford. Nevertheless, I will use everything I can get to make it passable by the time General Griffin's division reaches it.

General Griffin's division, in addition to the delay of assembling General Bartlett's brigade, had to withdraw his picket-line in front of the enemy, and if he moved first, the others, pending it, had to relieve his picket-line.

The bridge over Gravelly Run we had found broken by the enemy on our occupation of the plank road on the 29th. As I was required to operate independently of the cavalry and protect my own flanks, it was desirable to me, being in my rear, as I forced the enemy on the White Oak road, that it should remain so. Even the dispatch this evening from General Meade, which I received at 8 p. m. (previously given), would have justified me in destroying it had it yet been standing intact.

I had no pontoons with me now. The supply with which I had started on the 29th had been used in bridging Rowauty Creek and the Quaker road crossing of Gravelly Run, and the boats and engineers were kept there for the service of the trains. I directed a house to be torn to pieces to supply materials. At 10.15 p. m. I received by telegraph the following dispatch from General Webb, written 9.40 p. m.:

Since your dispatch of 8.20 p. m. the general commanding finds that it is impossible for Bartlett to join Griffin in time to move with any promptitude down the Boydton plank road. He therefore directs that you send another good brigade to join Griffin in the place of Bartlett's in this movement.

Sheridan was attacked by five brigades from Gordon's corps-three from Pickett's, possibly by two from Gordon's, one of them being Hoke's old brigade.